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FOREWORD
This document is one of a series required by Contract NAS9-9953, Exhibit C,
Statement of Work for the Phase B Extension - Modular Space Station Program
Definition. It has been prepared by the Space Division, North American
Rockwell Corporation. and is submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, in accordance
with the requirements of the Data Requirements List (DRL) MSC-T-575, Line
Item 72.
This document is Volume IV of the Modular Space Station Information
Management System Advanced Development Technology Report, which has been
prepared in the following five volumes.
I Summary SD72- SA-0114-1
II Communications Terminal Breadboard SD72-SA-0114-2
Digital Data Bus Breadboard
IV Data Processing Assembly
V Software Assembly
SD72-SA-0114-3
SD72-SA-0114-4
SD72- SA-0114-5
- iii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
III
Space Division
North American Rockwell
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following persons have participated in the conduct of the IMS
ADT tasks, and have contributed to this report:
C. W. Roberts
C. R. Gerber
B. A. Logan, Jr.
E. Mehrbach
D. W. Brewer
V. R. Hodgson
Experiment/Electronics Manager
Information Systems Project Engineer
Information Systems
Information Systems
Information Systems
Information Systems
The following subcontractors have supported the IMS ADT tasks in
specialized areas:
International Tel. & Tel.
Nutley, New Jersey
B. Cooper, Proj. Mgr.
Intermetrics
Cambridge Mass.
J. Miller, Prog. Mgr.
System Develop. Corp.
Santa Monica, Calif.
R. Bilek, Prog. Mgr.
Gen'l Electric Corp.
Valley Forge, Pa.
R. Kirby, Prog. Mgr.
NR-Autonetics
Anaheim, Calif.
J. Jurison, Proj. Mgr.
Communications Terminal B.B.
Data Bus BB
Data Processing Assy
Data Processing Assy
Software Assy
Bulk Storage Technology
Data Bus BB
Data Processing Assy
Preceding page blank
SD 72-SA-0114-4
- v -
Space Division9 North American Rockwell
PD PAGE BYLAN NOT FML
CONTENTS
Page
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 APPROACH
1.2 DPA DEFINITION
1.3 DPA ENGINEERING MODEL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
1-1
1-4
1-15
1-19
2. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS . .. 2-1
2.1 BASELINE DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY REOUIREMENTS . 2-1
2.2 REFINEMENTS TO BASELINE REOUIREMENTS . . 2-7
3. BASELINE DPA CONFIGURATION .
3.1 DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSYSTEMS REOUIREMENTS
3.2 CONFIGURATION TRADEOFFS
3.3 BASELINE DPA CHARACTERISTICS
4. INFORMATION FLOW STUDY . .
4.1 INTRODUCTION . . . .
4.2 DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY (DPA) CONFIGURI
4.3 INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAMS .
5. THROUGHPUT SIMULATION .
5.1 INTRODUCTION .
5.2 TIME SLOT ANALYSIS
5.3 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
5.4 DPA SIMULATION MODEL
5.5 SIMULATION RESULTS
6. DPA REDUNDANCY STUDY
6.1 REDUNDANCY
6.2 DPA REDUNDANCY CONFIGURATION
7. CENTRAL PROCESSOR STUDIES .
7.1 CP OPERATIONAL ANALYSES
7.2 HOLM MEMORY ORGANIZATION AND
7.3 REFERENCES
ATI
3-1
3-1
3-1
. 3-11
4-1
4-2
-ON . 4-3
4-3
5-1
5-1
5-5
5-6
5-9
5-17
6-1
6-1
6-1
INTERNAL BUS DESIGN
8. MEMORY STUDIES
8.1 MASS MEMORY TECHNOLOGY
8.2 ARCHIVAL MEMORY . .
9. DPA CONFIGURATION SELECTION
9.1 REVISIONS TO BASELINE DPA CONFIGURATION
9.2 CENTRAL PROCESSOR TASK ALLOCATIONS
Preceding page blank 
- vii -
7-1
7-1
7-25
7-65
8-1
8-1
8-5
9-1
9-1
9-8
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Section
Space Division
0 North American Rockwell
PageSection
PROCESSORS PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
10.1 CENTRAL PROCESSOR TYPE
10.2 CP INTERNAL STRUCTURE
10.3 HOLM VERSUS CONVENTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
10.4 SUMMARY OF PROCESSORS CHARACTERISTICS.
DPA DESIGN REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
11.1 DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY GENERAL
11.2 MULTIPROCESSOR SET SPECIFICATION
11.3 MASS MEMORY SPECIFICATION
11.4 ARCHIVE MEMORY SPECIFICATION
11.5 PREPROCESSOR SPECIFICATIONS
DMS PROCESSOR EEM DEVELOPMENT PLAN
12.1 OBJECTIVE
12.2 PROGRAM PLAN . .
12.3 EEM PROCESSOR PLAN
12.4 SCHEDULING OPTIONS
10-1
10-1
10-2
10-4
10-9
SPECIFICATIONS
11-1
11-1
11-12
11-23
11-25
11-27
12-1
12-1
12-2
12-7
12-15
- viii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
10.
11.
12.
Space Division9 North American Rockwell
ILLUSTRATIONS
PageFigure
DPA General Diagram . . .
Data Processing Assembly Distribution
Data Processing Assembly Configuration Study.
Processor Utilization . . . . . .
Basic Recommended Redundancy Configuration
Simplex Multiprocessor Schematic.
Memory Hierarchy . . . .
Internal Bus Configurations . .
Detailed CP Subsystem Functional Allocations.
2-1 Requirements Analysis Study Approach.
2-2 Phase B Requirements Computation Rationale
3-1 Baseline DPA Block Diagram .
4-1 Power Module Hookup - Baseline . .
4-2 Core Module Hookup - Baseline . .
4-3 Station Module No. 1 Hookup - Baseline
4-4 Station Module No. 2 and No. 3 Hookup - Baseline
4-5 Station Module No. 4 Hookup - Baseline ..
4-6 Cargo Modules No. 1 and No. 2 Hookup - Baseline
4-7 G&C Information Flow Diagram . .
4-8 EPS Information Flow Diagram . .
4-9 ETC/LSS Information Flow Diagram . .
4-10 RCS Information Flow Diagram. . .
4-11 Crew Subsystem Information Flow Diagram
4-12 Structures Subsystem Information Flow Diagram
4-13 Communications Assembly Information Flow Diagram.
4-14 ISS Information Flow Diagram - Central Processor.
4-15 Information Flow Example (Antenna Pointing)
Central Processor Level . . .
4-16 Information Flow Example (Antenna Pointing)
Subsystem Level . . . . .
5-1 IMSIM Workload Hierarchy. 
5-2 IMSIM Implementation of CP Configuration.
5-3 Processor Utilization . . .
6-1 Basic Recommended Redundancy Configuration
6-2 Data Transmission Error Checkers
6-3 Short Message Echo Checker .
6-4 State Diagram for Fault Transitions *
. 1-2
. 1-3
. 1-5
. 1-8
1-9
. 1-11
. 1-12
. 1-13
1-16
2-2
2-8
3-12
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-7
4-8
4-9
4-11
4-13
4-15
4-17
4-19
4-21
4-23
4-25
4-29
4-31
5-10
5-16
5-24
6-3
6-7
· I . 6-7
· . . . 6-14
- ix -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1-5
1-6
1-7
1-8
1-9
9I Space Division% North American Rockwell
PageFigure
Simplex Multiprocessor Schematic
Block Code for M2
Language and Machine
Memory Hierarchy
M1 Functions . .
5-Way Interleaved M2 Complex
Internal Bus
Internal Bus Configurations
Internal Bus Delay Factors
Fault Tolerant Multiprocessor.
. . 7-8
. 7-18
. . 7-26
. . 7-31
. 7-33
. . 7-39
. . 7-42
. . 7-43
. . 7-49
. 7-56
Buildup Sequence - Initial MSS Complexes .
DPA General Diagram . .
Revised DPA Diagram .
Detailed CP Subsystem Functional Allocations
. 9-2
. 9-3
. 9-4
. 9-10
10-1 CP Internal Structure. . 10-3
11-1
11-2
11-3
11-4
Data Processing Assembly .
CP Block Diagram .
Central Processor Block Diagram
Preprocessor Block Diagram
. 11-3
. 11-10
.. 11-13
. ... 11-28
12-1 EEM Processor Program Schedule
12-2 ADT Breadboards Related to ADT Plan .
12-3 Relationship of EEM Processor Development to
ADT Extension . . . .
12-4 EEM Processor Development Schedule .
12-5 Procurement Options for a Dual Multiprocessor EEM.
. 12-3
. 12-4
. 12-5
. 12-9
. 12-17
SD 72-SA-0114-4
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
7-5
7-6
7-7
7-8
7-9
7-10
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4
Space Division
OD North American Rockwell
TABLES
Page
1-1 Computation Requirements for Station Operations
1-2 Redundancy Recommendations .
1-3 Summary of Memory Hierarchy
1-4 Internal Bus Major Conclusions .
1-5 Fault Tolerance Recommendations . .
1-6 Technical Characteristics of the Central Processor
1-7 Technical Characteristics of the Preprocessor
2-1 DPA Interface Requirements . ..
2-2 Computation Requirements for Station Operations
3-1 DPA Alternatives for Modular Space Station
3-2 MSS Signal Allocation Assumptions .
3-3 Central Processor Selection
3-4 Summary of Computer Sizing
4-1 Preliminary DPA Interconnection Notes
5-1 Arithmetic Unit Utilization Analysis.
5-2 Workload Summary
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
7-5
7-6
Requirements and Data Types .
Internal Bus Traffic Due to Instruction E:
Bus Traffic Summary for Configurations
Comparison of Number of Drivers and Recei,
Internal Bus Evaluation Summary
DPA Failure and Error Tolerance Criteria
xe c
verr
1-6
1-7
1-10
1-14
1-14
1-17
1-18
2-5
. 2-9
3-2
3-3
3-10
3-14
4-10
5-8
5-19
. 7-4
ution 7-45
· . . . 7-47
.s 7-51
. 7-51
· . . 7-53
8-1 Archival Storage Tradeoff Table
Central Processor Computational
RPU Sizing . .
RACU Utilization
Processor Allocations
AU-IO1 Subsystem Distribution
AU-IO2 Subsystem Distribution
Requirements 9-6
9-6
9-7
9-12
9-14
. .* 9-14
- xi -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Table
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4
9-5
9-6
8-7
Space Division
ON% North American Rockwell
Page
CP Hardware Comparison . . .
CP Memory Requirements
HOLM Implementation
Cost Evaluation of HOLM and Conventional Design
Applied to MSS . . . .
Cost Savings Between HOLM and Conventional Organizations
Summary of HOLM-Conventional Organization Evaluation -
Technical Characteristics of the Central Processor
Technical Characteristics of the Preprocessor
* 10-1
* 10-5
* 10-6
. 10-7
* 10-8
* 10-8
* 10-10
* 10-11
6-Man MSS Hardware Location * *
Electrical Interfaces · .
Multiprocessor Electrical Interfaces ·
Preprocessor Performance Characteristics -
Input-Output Performance Characteristics -
* * 11-4
* * 11-6
* * 11-16
* * 11-30
* * 11-31
12-1 Test Coverage of Key Features with Various Breadboard
Processors . * .
12-3
- xii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Table
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7
10-8
11-1
11-2
11-3
11-4
11-5
Space Division
North American Rockwell
ABBREVIATIONS
ADS Advanced Data System
ADT Advanced Development Technology
ADTX Advanced Development Technology Extension
AFC Automatic Frequency Control
AGC Automatic Gain Control
AN Autonetics (Division of North American
Rockwell Corporation)
BPF Bandpass Filter
bps Bits Per Second
CAIRS Computer-Assisted Interactive Resource
Scheduling
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee
CDR Critical Design Review
CEI Contract End Item
CLASP Computer Language for Aeronautics and
Space Programming
CM Command Module (Apollo)
COMPOOL Common Pool (of Data)
CP Central Processor or Circular Polarization
C.P. Computer Program
CPCEI Computer Program Contract End Item
CPCI Computer Program Configuration Item
CPDF Computer Program Development Facility
CPIC (A) Computer Program Integration Contractor
.(Agency)
CPT&E Computer Programming Test and Evaluation
CR Change Report
CRT Cathode-Ray Tube (Display)
CSS Crew Subsystem
CTB Communications Terminal Breadboard
CTF Central Test Facility
DACS Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly
dB Decibel
DBCU Data Bus Control Unit
dBm Decibel Referred to One Milli-Watt
dBW Decibel Referred to One Watt
DCR Design Change Request
DDB Digital Data Bus
Demux De-Multiplex(er)
DMS Data Management System
DPA Data Processing Assembly
DPSK Dual Phase Shift Keying
DRSS Data Relay Satellite System
- xiii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
ON1 North Amencan Rockwell
Engineering Change Proposal
Experiment Data Facility
Engineering Evaluation Model
Engineering Evaluation Model Processor
Effective Isotropic Radiated Power
Electromagnetic Compatability
Electromagnetic Interference
Earth Orbital Shuttle
Earth Orbital Space Station
Electrical Power Subsystem
Environment Control and Life Support
Subsystem
Extra-Vehicular Activity
External
Energy Per Bit to.Noise Density Ratio
Facsimile
Frequency-Division Multiplex
Frequency Modulation
Formal Qualification Test
Guidance and Control Subsystem
Government Furnished Equipment
Giga-Hertz
Gated Operational Amplifier
HAL
HOL
HOLMI
Hz
IF
IFRU
IM
IMS
IMS IM
IOC
IOCB
IOU
I/O
IPA
IQL
IR
ISS or IMS/S
ITT
K-words
K-EAPS
K-bps
Klz
Higher-Order
Higher-Order
Higher-Order
Hertz
Aerospace Programming Language
Language
Language Machine
Intermediate Frequency
In-Flight Replaceable Unit
Intermodulation Products
Information Management Svstem
Information Management Simulation
Initial Operational Capability
Input-Output Control Block
Input-Output Unit
Input-Output
Intermediate Power Amplifier
Interactive Query Language
Infra-Red
Information (Management) Subsystem
International Telephone and Telegraph
Thousands of (Computer) Words
Thousands of Equivalent-Add Operations
Per Second
Thousands of Bits Per Second
Kilohertz
- xiv -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
ECP
EDF
EEM
EEMP
EIRP
EMC
EMI
EOS
EOSS
EPS
ETC/LSS or ECLSS
EVA
EXT
Eb/No
FACS
FDM
FM
FQT
G&CS
GFE
GHz
GOA
North Amencan Rockwell
LEM Lunar Excursion Module
LM Lunar Module
LNA Low Noise Amplifier
LO Local Oscillator
LPF Low Pass Filter
M1, M2 (Computer) Memory Designation
Mbps Megabits Per Second
MCB Module Control Block
MHz Megahertz
MOF Mission Operations Facility
MOL Manned Orbiting Laboratory
MSC Manned Spacecraft lenter
MSFN Manned Space Flight Network
MSS Modular Space Station
MIUX Multiplexer
mW Milli-Watts
>W Microwave
mV Milli-Volts
NF Noise Figure
OBCO On-Board Checkout
OCC Operations Control Center (On-Board)
ODM Operational Data Management
OM Operating Memory
PA Power Amplifier
PCMI Pulse Code Modulation
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PL/1 Procedure Language
PM Phase Modulation
PN (PRN) Pseudo Random Noise
ppm Parts Per Million
POT Preliminary Oualification Tests
PSK Phase Shift Keying
RAM Research and Applications Module
RACU Remote Acquisition and Control Unit
RCS Reaction Control Subsystem
RF Radio Frequency
RHCP Right-Hand Circular Polarization
RPU Remote Processing Unit
Rx Receive
S&C Standards and Conventions
SCCB Software Configuration Control Board
SCN Specification Change Notice
SD Space Division (of North American Rockwell
Corporation)
SDC Systems Development Corporation
- xv
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
D • North Amencan Rockwell
Signal to Noise Ratio
Statement of Work
Space Programming Language
Step-Recovery Diode
Solid-State Circuit-Breaker
Structures Subsystem
Support Test Equipment
Test and Validation (Programs)
To Be Determined
Temperature-Controlled Crystal Oscillator
Tunnel Diode Amplifier
Time Division Multiplexing
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Test and Integration Plan
Telemetry
Test Operations Oriented Language
Thompson Ramo Woolridge Corporation
Telemetry, Tracking and Control
Traveling Wave Tube
Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier
Transmit
Unified S-Band (Equipment)
Ultra-Violet
Version Description Document
Very High Frequency
Vestigal Side Band
Voltage Standing Wave Ratio
- xvi -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
S/N
SOW
SPL
SRD
SSCB
SSS
STE
TAV
TBD
TCXO
TDA
TDM
TDRS
TIP
TLM, TM
TOOL
TRW
TT&C
TWT
TWTA
Tx
USB (E)
Uv
VDD
VHF
VSB
VSWR
A t • North American Rockwell
LIST OF INTERIM REPORTS
AA-101 DPA Flow Diagrams, September 1971
AA-102 DPA Throughput and Authority Analysis,
February 1972
AA-103 DPA Configuration Selection, April 1972
AS-101 Modular Space Station Computer Program
Standards and Conventions, December 1971
AS-102 Modular Space Station Computer Program
Specification Tree, February 1972
AS-103 Modular Space Station Computer Program
Development, Test and Configuration
Control Plan, May 1972
AS-104 Modular Space Station Computer-Assisted
Resource Allocations and Utilization
Reccomendations, June 1972
CTB-101 Concepts for Multiple RF Link
Mechanization, May 1971
CTB-103 Antenna-Mounted Electronics Component
Design, October 1971
CTB-105/106 CTB Integration and Test and Operations
Manual, June 1972
DB-101 Parametric Data for Bus Design, May 1971
DB-103 Component Performance Requirements,
Schematics and Layout Drawings,
December 1971
DB-104 Digital Data Bus Breadboard Final Report,
May 1972
DD-102 Modular Space Station Data Processing
Assembly Parametric Evaluation of
Subsystems Input/Output Interface,
June 1971
- xvii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
North American Rockwell
DD-103
DP-101
DP-102
DP-103
DP-103
DP-104
DP-105
DP-106
DP-107
DP-108
DP-109
DP-110
EL-277
IB-101
ICD #TRW 20549
ICD #AN 26465
MD-101
RF-101
Modular Space Station Data Acquisition
and Control Subassembly Model Configuration
(SD 71-233), July 1971
Data Processing Assembly Configuration
(Preliminary), June 1971
Data Processing Assembly Supervisor
Specification, May 1972
DPA Processor Performance Requirements
(Preliminary), August 1971
DPA Processor Final Description, May 1972
EEM DMS Processor Development Plan, June 1972
Data Acquisition and Control Redundancy
Concepts, August 1971
Application of Redundancy Concepts to
DPA, January 1971
Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly
Breadboard Design Requirements, October 1971
Data Bus Control Unit Performance Requirements,
January 1972
Data Bus Control Unit Design Reports, March 1971
DBCU Acceptance Report (to be published)
Bulk Storage Development Plan
DPA Internal Flow and Traffic Pattern,
May 28, 1971
Interface Control Document - Data Bus
Modem/RACU, Revision A, January 17, 1972
Interface Control Document - Data Bus
Controller Unit to Buffer I/O, Revision
January 21, 1972
Mass Memory Parametric Data
Modular Space Station Communications
Terminal Breadboard Preliminary System
Specification, October 1971
-xyiii -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Central Processor Operational Analysis,
September 30, 1971
Central Processor Memory Organization and
Internal Bus Design, December 30, 1971
Automatic Control and Onboard Checkout
Final Study Report
- xix -
SD 72-SA-0114-4
SA-101
Space Division
Oi% North American Rocl<well
SA-102
SD 71-227
Space DivisionOj North American Rockwell
1. INTRODUCTION AND TASK SUMMARY
The requirements for a long duration manned space station include con-
tinuous maintenance of operational capability with minimum crew participation.
This requirement can be achieved by automating operations of the subsystem
functions with use of a computer system, hereafter referred to as the Data
Processing Assembly (DPA).
Volume IV summarizes the efforts directed to defining the DPA data
input/output requirements and traffic flow patterns, allocating logical and
computational functions for the development of information flow diagrams and
defining a DPA configuration.
The computations required may be performed in a number of ways. The
concepts, performance, mechanizations, reliability and cost are sensitive to
the amount of automation required. The approach taken was to (a) define the
computation and logical functions which must be performed by the data pro-
cessing assembly (DPA) for the modular space station (MSS) orbital operations,
(b) define in preliminary form the memory size and computer speed required to
accomplish these functions, (c) allocate computations and logical operations
to elements of the DPA, (d) develop preliminary flow diagrams which portray
the information flow rates and functions performed by the DPA and its input/
output interface with the MSS subsystems and (e) define a DPA configuration.
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 present the configuration selected for the Data
Processing Assembly. As noted the station operations Central Processor (CP)
is located in the primary Control Module (SM-1). Supervisory control of the
equipment in the Power and Core Modules is provided via a radio link during
station buildup prior to SM-1 arrival. A special component (Build-up Data
Processor) is located in the Core Module for interfacing with the radio link
and DPA. This component will be removed or disengaged when SM-1 arrives and
supervisory control will then be exercised by the station operations Control
Processor. The baseline configuration is further shown to consist of remote
processing units (RPU's) performing certain subsystem functions (particularly
G&C) and failure detection. A redundant bus network connects these and the
Remote Access Control Units (RACUs) to the central processor.
A multiprocessor organization has been defined as the most suitable for
the central processor. Redundancy at the central control level is further
supplied by another central computer containing the critical operations
functions and experiment support software. This second Central Processor is
located in another pressure volume_(SM-4) and is identical to the primary
computer. The RPU's consist of uniprocessors with spqcial input/output
processing or signal processing as required to accommodate the subsystem
functional requirements.
1-1
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1.1 APPROACH
Figure 1-3 shows the tasks, their relationships, and the subcon-
tractors who participated in each task. The impact of the simultaneous MSS
Phase B study is also indicated. It will be noticed in reading this report
that many different values of memory size and operating speed are used.
Basically, this is due to two factors: the DPA studies were impacted by the
Phase B studies and the DPA studies were iterative (particularly as regards
the selection of a DPA configuration). The most significant difference
between two sets of DPA requirements is due to the ongoing requirements and
subsystems analysis in the Phase B study. Once past the insertion of this
large delta, the differences in assumed requirements is minor (not more than
10%) and does not significantly alter the DPA concept or the results of the
study.
The study began with an analysis of the DPA requirements. This task
defined the subsystems' functions which require data processing support;
defined the mechanization required to provide data processing support for
each identified function; estimated the memory, speed and input/output data
rates required for mechanization of each function; and integrated the sub-
systems' computation requirements to define a total set of MSS DPA require-
ments. As indicated by Figure 1-3, the requirements analysis was continued
throughout the Phase B effort, and finally resulted in a significant re-
duction of the DPA requirements. Table 1-1 presents the resulting
performance erequirements for station operations in parameters of processing
speed, memory capacity and data bus rate. Shown are the basic requirements,
the design margin, the growth margin, the initial design requirements and
the maximum design requirements.
The next task was the definition of the baseline DPA configuration. The
alternatives to be considered at each processing level were enumerated and
the distribution of the signals (subsystem interfaces) was tabulated based on
the physical distribution of the MSS subsystems. A tradeoff was performed
which resulted in the selection of a central multiprocessor plus subsystem
preprocessing as required. The multiprocessor-to-subsystem interfaces are to
be implemented with Remote Acquisition and Control Units (RACUs) which
communicate with the central processor via a digital, time-serial data bus.
The purpose of the information flow study was to define the MSS DPA
information flow so that the DPA-could be simulated using NASA's IMSIM (a
simulation model used to assess various computer configurations). A method
of flow diagram presentation and attendant tabulations was carefully selected
to provide a comprehensive data file of software and information character-
istics that will prove beneficial in the continuation of the Advanced
Development Tasks and related studies. This data file consists of descriptions
of each subsystem, baseline configuration data, buildup information, DPA
computational loads and allocations, computer sizing information, message
tabulation, signal interface lists, and DPA parametric data requirements.
The objective of the DPA throughput simulation was to provide infor-
mation that would facilitate a selection of the final DPA configuration for
the MSS; in particular, to provide information pertaining to DPA component
performance that would yield a DPA configuration capable of accommodating
imposed workloads within required response times.
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The operational doctrine assumed to be in effect for the data bus is
that of polling. Polling control is assumed to be a function of the I/O unit
and the polling schedule is assumed to be on a "fixed" time basis per device.
The polling schedule assumed is predicated on dividing a second into 250 slots
of 4 ms each.
Nine time slots (36 ms) were simulated; these were the initial nine
slots of each one second interval and were chosen for imposing the largest
operational load on the DPA. Processor utilization during the execution of
the simulation is shown in Figure 1-4 . The simulation led to the following
conclusions: the central processor can effectively process expected work-
loads, arithmetic unit speed of 750 KEAPs is adequate, the I/O processor is
under utilized at 750 KEAPs, a data bus commutation cycle of 250 slots per
second is seasonable, the operating memory transfer rate of 2x106 words per
second is adequate and the mass memory transfer rate of 1x106 words per second
is adequate. Note - as indicated by Figure 1-3 , this task was conducted
using the early Phase B requirements in contrast to the later Phase B require-
ments which were finally adopted.
The application of redundancy to the DPA stems from the failure criteria
established for the MSS. The redundancy study was directed toward applying
the criteria to the DPA concepts and recommending a satisfactory operational
system. The recommended redundancy configuration is shown in Figure 1-5
The redundancy recommendations are shown in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2. REDUNDANCY RECOMMENDATIONS
CENTRAL PROCESSOR TWO CP COMPLEXES
EACH COMPLEX CAN TOLERATE ONE
FAILURE AND DETECT ANOTHER FAILURE
EACH COMPLEX CAN PROVIDE BACKUP OF
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
DATA BUS TWO PLUS TWO ORGANIZATION
ERROR PROTECTION CODE FOR ERROR
DETECTION
RETRANSMISSION FOR ERROR CORRECTION
DBCU CONTROLS ALL FOUR BUSES
RACU DUAL BUS INTERFACE
SIMPLEX SUBSYSTEM INTERFACE
1-7
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
North Amei-ican Rockwell
7
-- 
-
I 
SA
00
' X %-O
I//// 
%
zT
gZ
 
/
E
/////~//79 
wI-
o.r-I44JN
.40U)
C)a)0s-
4I5,mto
.
,
-
r
-4
C
LN
.
4
J
r
_
.
w
 
_
I1-8
1-8
SD 72-SA-0114-4
CeOrLV)O
u
 
N
I
,
,a
:C Cl.,
0
c
- 
o
:0
J 
I 
-
U-UN
I I
a en
''"
"
"
"
'11/"//////////' ///II
.
~
~
~
-
 
-
-
I 
I 
E
I 
A
s
r-q
4iI
I
PII
K/////////////////////// 
F
IIIIIIIIII
~
-
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-A,
Space Division
%
 North American Rockwell
a
 
a
) P 4
b
O
 
P
I 
4 01 
zU
 
a
sEawON
IIN
VH
D
1-9
SD 
72-SA
-0114-4
r., 0.riaasbo, to0U
s-d 0aa Ida)10 a)Up9C,C"Ca coM· U;
Space Division
'• %North American Rockwell
The objective of the central processor study was to determine the MSS
central processor operational use and software organizationoon the design
of the hardware aspects of the central processor. The architecture of the
central processor was recommended to be as shown in Figure 1-6. The concept
of a Higher Order Language Machine (HOLM) was studied as a basis for studying
the central processor memory hierarchy and the internal bus design. Figure 1-7
shows the memory hierarchy which was studied for the MSS Data Processing
Assembly; Figure 1-8 presents the candidate internal bus configurations.
Tables 1-3 and 1-4 summarize the conclusions reached during the study. Further
analyses of fault tolerance for the central processor were conducted for the
HOLM. The conclusions of those analyses are presented in Table 1-5.
Table 1-3. SUMMARY OF MEMORY HIERARCHY
M1-LOCAL MEMORY
FUNCTION STACKS, DESCRIPTORS, INSTRUCTION
BUFFER, DATA VALUES
SPEED 200 - 500 ns
SIZE 400 - 32 BIT WORDS
TECHNOLOGY CMOS LSI
M2-OPERATING MEMORY
FUNCTION CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS, REDUNDANT
CRITICAL DATA, OVERLAY AREA
SPEED FIVE-WAY INTERLEAVED 1 MICROSECOND
MEMORY MODULES PER M2 COMPLEX.
DATA RATE 160 MBPS.
SIZE TWO M2 COMPLEXES.
EACH COMPLEX 80K 32 BIT WORDS
TECHNOLOGY PLATED WIRE
M3-MASS MEMORY
FUNCTION NON-CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DATA
REDUNDANT COPIES OF CRITICAL PROGRAM
SPEED FIVE MILLISECONDS LATENCY
6 - 10 MBPS TRANSFER RATE
SIZE 106 32 BIT WORDS
TECHNOLOGY DRUM - LOW RISK
PLATED WIRE - HIGH RISK
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- BUS CONTROL UNIT FOR DATA
- I/O MEMORY INTERFACE
- PROCESSOR I/O INTERFACE
w
0
U-0
Lu.
z
O
a-
z
x
BUS
Figure 1-6. Simplex Multiprocessor Schematic
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CONFIGURATION 1
SINGLE TIME MULTIPLEXED BUS
M2
1
CONFIGURATION 3
DEDICATED BUSES WITH
MULTI PORT M2
M2
I
1
AUAU I/O
AU
M2
1I
M2
11 
AU _I _
1/0o 4
CONFIGURATION 2
MULTIPLE TIME SHARED BUSES
WITH MULTIPORT ELEMENTS
M2
IA
M2
_i _I--u .I
0lTAU
AU
TI
AU
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL
CONNECTION
III/O
Figure 1-8. Internal Bus Configurations
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Table 1-4. INTERNAL BUS MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
CHARACTERIZATION Internal Bus B in M2 switching
network and should be packaged
with M2
STRUCTURE Dedicated
WIDTH 32 bits
TRANSFER RATE 5 MBPS maximum
MODE Synchronized interfaces
Table 1.5 FAULT TOLERANCE RECOMMENDATIONS
AU-MI
DUAL REDUNDANT AU'S WITH
COMPARATOR FOR ERROR
DETECTION
GENERATES M2 PARITY AND
CHECKWORD
INDICATES M2 ERRORS BY WRITE
ECHO CHECK
RECONFIGURATION VIA SOFTWARE
RESTART AT LEVEL OF SCHEDULED
TASK
M2
TWO INDEPENDENT M2 COMPLEXES
CONTAINING CRITICAL PROGRAMS,
REDUNDANT CRITICAL DATA, AND
OVERLAY AREA
BLOCK PARITY WITH IMBEDDED
ADDRESS FOR ERROR DETECTION
SOFTWARE RECONFIGURATION THRU
REALLOCATION OF M2 SPACE TO
CRITICAL TASKS
INTERNAL BUS
NOT REDUNDANT
WORD PARITY ERROR DETECTION
M3
RECOVERY NOT REQUIRED
FAILURE DETECTION SIMILAR TO M2
I/O
TRIPLE REDUNDANCY WITH VOTERS
M2 FAILURE DETECTION AS PER AU
DBCU
GENERATES F.S. COMMUNICATION
SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM THEIR OWN
WIND DOWN IN A F.S. SITUATION
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Subsequent to the selection of a baseline DPA configuration, several of
the influencing factors were changed as a result of the concurrent MSS Phase B
definition studies. Most notable of these factors were the new buildup
sequence for the MSS, the redefined DPA failure and error tolerance criteria,
and the redefined computational requirements. Based on these new factors and
the studies that were completed, the DPA configuration was redefined as shown,
in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. An analysis was also performed to determine the effects
of a more efficient distribution of the processing tasks within the central
processor between the arithmetic uinits and the input/output processors.
Figure 1-9 presents a detailed allocation of the central processor functions
which resulted from the analysis.
1.2 DPA DEFINITION
The Data Processing Assembly (DPA) provides the computing functions
needed for a high degree of reliable automation in the Modular Space Station.
The central processors and preprocessors are key elements of the DPA and must
perform reliably and effectively over the life of the station. The processor
performance requirements task covers the central processor and preprocessor
in terms of their internal organization and required functional and perform-
ance characteristics.
The central processor is a multiprocessor which possesses the features
shown in Table 1-6. As noted, a conventional organization is preferred. A
memory hierarchy consisting of buffer memories in the processing elements,
modular operating and mass memories is provided. The requirements can be met
with two arithmetic and input output processing sets. Each set contains dual
units with capability of comparing memory addressing, controls, and processed
results.
The central processor utilizes two operating memories for the main
storage functions. These memories are supplied by paging techniques with
information from a mass memory. Additional offline storage is provided by an
archive memory. The key features of these are tabulated in Table 1-6.
An arithmetic unit provides one million equivalent adds per second
capability. An extensive repertoire, including floating point, is incor-
porated into the design. Modes of operation include the normal computational
and the executive. Privileged instructions only executable in the latter are
used. Linkage to the executive mode is by interrupts and special instructions.
All input/output functions are controlled by the AU's by means of I/O
control words and commands from the AU's.: Once initiated, I/O actions proceed
independently of the AU's until completed.
Two transformer rectifier sets are used to conver tthe primary ac
voltages to secondary dc voltages. A redundant power distribution capability
is provided internal to the CP. Each set contains power circuitry in active
redundancy to be able to use either of the secondary sources.
It was noted earlier that the state-of-the-art in smaller aerospace
computers is well advanced for the type needed for the preprocessors. The
typical characteristics achievable from these is shown in Table 1-7.
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Table 1-6. Technical Characteristics of the Central Processor
Type:
Multiprocessor, conventional organization, parallel, binary, 16/32
bit data and instruction words.
Operating Memory, M-2:
Two required, plated wire, NDRO, each consists of five memory modules
of 13K x 33 bits maximum, one parity bit per memory work, one parity
word exclusive ORed with block address for every five memory words,
echo checking of write operations, one microsecond cycle time with
interleaving of the five memory modules, maximum capacity of 18K x
33 bits per each module.
Auxilliary Memories:
Mass Memory - M3, Virtual memory using paging methods, error detection
using one parity bit per word and one parity word with address exclusive
ORed per every four data words; echo checking of write operations,
2 mil plated wire, NDRO, maximum capability of 1280K x 33 bits, modular
design based upon 64K modules.
Archive Memory - Magnetic tape storage with >5x106 bits per cartridge.
Input-Output:
Two required, each contains dual I/O units with comparator AU initiated
with self-contained control, solid state buffer memory or nominal 2K x
33 words and 200 nanosecond cycle time, interface with Data Bus Control
Unit, Telemetry Bus, and Mass Memory.
Arithmetic Set:
Two required, each contains dual arithmetic units with comparator,
solid state buffer memory of nominal 2K x 33 words and 200 nanosecond
cycle time 1 million equivalent adds per second per set, fixed and
floating point with 100-200 instructions.
Physical Estimates:
Mass Memory Archive Memory Multiprocessor
Set
Size, cubic inches 3900 1200 1000
Weight, pounds 180 40 290
Power, watts 15 45 400
1-17
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division9% North American Rockwell
Table 1-7. Technical Characteristics of the Preprocessor
The physical values shown in Tables 1-6 and 1-7 are achievable with
today's packaging capability. The processors are based upon the use of cased
devices on multilayer boards. The mass memory utilizes 2 mil plated wire and
power strobing and high density devices with beam leads, hybrid thin film,
and ceramic substrates.
1-18
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Type:
Uniprocessor, parallel-binary, 16 bits data, 16/32 bit instruction words
Memory:
Capacity - 20K word, 17 bit Plated Wire Storage.
One bit of parity per 16 bits.
Cycle time - 1 microsecond
Input/Output:
One buffered 16 bit parallel input and output channel.
Eight external interrupts.
Instruction Repertoire:
Single and double word addressing.
Single word non-addressing.
Indexing
Indirect addressing.
Add Times (Fixed Point):
Add - 4 microseconds
Multiply - 20 microseconds
Divide - 40 microseconds
Special Features:
Internal and external interrupts
General register file usable as index, base or data register
Physical (20K x 17 Bits):
Size - 400 cubic inches
Weight - 15 pounds
Power - 50 watts
9|r Space Division
byrll North American Rockwell
1.3 DPA ENGINEERING MODEL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The objective of Engineering Model Development Plan task was to provide
the specification of the Engineering Evaluation Model (EEM) processor and its
development plan for the central control of the Data Management System (DMS).
The DMS consists of hardware and software which is being assembled and tested
for operation in the time period of 1973-1984 by NASA, MSC-Houston, to study
data management problems associated with the Space Station and Shuttle programs.
The DMS is being configured such that its operation approximates the operation
of the Modular Space Station Data Processing Assembly. The DMS currently is
defined as consisting of:
a. DMS Processor
b. Data Bus Control Unit (DBCU)
c. Digital Data Bus (DDB)
d. Remote Acquisition and Control Units (RACUs)
e. Preprocessors
The development plan identifies the tasks for the analyses, fabrication,
and evaluation of a breadboard processor configuration. Technology is not
specified. The end product of the development effort will be a processor that
has been integrated and tested to function with the existing elements of the
DMS.
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2.0 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
2.1 BASELINE DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY REQUIREMENTS
2.1.1 Technical Objective
The objective of this IMS Advanced Development task was to develop a pre-
liminary set of parametric data which defines the modular space station (MSS)
subsystems support and interfaces which must be provided by the data processing
assembly.
2.1.2 Background
The requirements for long duration manned spacecraft include continuous
maintenance of operational capability with minimum crew participation. This
requirement can be achieved by automating operations of subsystem functions
and managing their performance to achieve an integrated base for scientific
operations. For the space station and subsequent spacecraft, the automation
will require implementing a computer system. The computation required may
be performed either by a processor dedicated to a function (similar group of
functions), or a large capacity general-purpose computer. The concept, per-
formance, mechanization, reliability, and cost of this capability is sensitive
to the specific requirement as defined by the automation required and the inter-
action between a computer assembly and the operational subsystems.
2.1.3 Scope
The scope of this study was to define in preliminary form the DPA data
input/output flow rates and traffic flow patterns, allocation of logical and
computational functions which would provide the basis for the development of
information flow diagrams, and initial definition of a DPA configuration for
data thruput authority simulation.
2.1.4 Study Approach
Three other studies have been performed which have provided input data to
this study: NR IR&D study, "Automatic Control and On-Board Checkout (SD 71-227),
Autonetics Guidance and Control Subsystem Study (NASA Contract NAS9-10416), and
IBM On-Board Checkout Study (NASA Contract NAS9-11189). The approach of this
study was to (1) define the subsystems' functions which require data processing
support, (2) define the mechanization required to provide data processing support
for each function identified in (1) above, (3) estimate the memory, speed and
input/output data rates required for mechanization of each function, and (4)
integrate the subsystem computation requirements to define a total set of MSS
DPA requirements.
Figure 2-1 is a logic diagram showing the NR study approach. The dotted
blocks show related studies and other reports which contain data pertinent to
the study.
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2.1.5 Guidelines
The following guidelines were used as the initial frame of reference for
this study.
1. The Modular Space Station System Requirements Book (SD 71-205)
was used as the basis for the space station requirements and
build-up configuration.
2. The initial DPA configuration was as specified in DRL-60,
Shuttle-Launched Modular Space Station (SD 70-546).
3. The station operations central processor shall provide backup
capability for the experiments central processors and vice-
versa.
4. Sizing of the station operations central processor shall be
determined solely by the station operations computational
support requirements (directed by NASA).
5. The central processor has multiprocessing and multiprogramming
capabilities.
6. Subsystems computations and logical operations will be per-
formed at the lowest level processor (i.e., preprocessor--
lowest level, central processor--highest level) to the maximum
extent possible.
2.1.6 Summary of Results
This section summarizes the parametric results of the Subsystem Input/
Output Interface Study; no attempt will be made to establish the study ration-
ale here, but rather to report the highlights of the study.
As stated previously, the primary objective of this study was to determine
the computation support that the data processing assembly (DPA) must provide to
the other MSS subsystems in order that the subsystem functions can be performed.
For that reason, the parametric interface data that were developed consisted
of the computational requirements that the DPA must provide to each subsystem
and the amount of data flow that must occur across the interface between the
DPA and each subsystem. While the nature and number of interface signals were
defined in order to size the interface data rate, no attempt was made to estab-
lish the physical aspects of the interface such as number of wires, signal
levels, formats, etc.
The purpose for making this study was to generate the data necessary to
size the data processing assembly and permit the definition of a DPA config-
uration. The DPA in this study includes the central processors, preprocessors,
RACU's and digital data bus.
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There were four primary interface parameters that were developed: (1)
the software or program size required in the DPA to support a subsystem;
(2) the speed at which each program must be executed; (3) the rate at which
sampled data must be input from a subsystem to the DPA; and (4) the rate at
which computed data must be output from the DPA to a subsystem. The program
size parameter translates directly into DPA memory size requirements and the
unit of measure is 32 bit words. The speed parameter is a measure of the
number of instructions that must be executed per unit time and the dimension
is equivalent adds/second. Both the input and the output rates are measures
of the data flow across the interface dimensioned in digital bits/second.
Note that the terms "input" and "output" as used in this study are referenced
to the DPA, i.e., data are "input" to the DPA from a subsystem and "output"
from the DPA to a subsystem.
For ease in estimating the subsystem support requirements that the DPA
must provide, the tasks were broken down into computation functions that the
DPA must perform. In many cases, these computation functions were the same
as the subsystem functions that were defined in the Phase A study. For
example, in the G&C subsystem functions such as attitude determination, nav-
igation determination and control moment gyro (CMG) control were used. In
other cases, it was necessary to define new computation functions such as
deploy solar array booms, solar array pointing control, and fuel cell control
for the electrical power subsystem. The DPA to subsystem interface require-
ments were developed for each of these computation functions in terms of the
parameters discussed above and then treated in a linear fashion to reach the
total interface requirements.
A summary of the DPA interface requirements is presented in Table 2-1.
The first column lists the subsystems that require computational support and
the other functions that are required by the DPA in order to provide that
support. The first section of the table lists the programs or memory sizes
and shows where they predominantly reside, that is, in operating (rapid
access time) memory or mass (medium access time) memory. Archival memory
(magnetic tape) is required as backup for all of the programs that will
normally reside in operating and mass memories in order to provide a "refill"
capability in case of a malfunction and/or when replacement is made. In
addition, a large amount of archival storage is required for the data base
and for storage of experiment data. The total memory requirement is estimated
at 495 thousand words (32 bits) of operating memory, 1.3 million words of
mass memory and 13 million words of archival memory.
The second section of Table 2-1 tabulates the speed at which each program
must be executed. The EPS is the major contributor to the overall speed
requirement with 7 million equivalent adds/second. The total speed require-
ment is 8 million equivalent adds/second; however, this figure is not too
meaningful because it implies that all programs will be executed concurrently.
The only real merit of this total speed requirement is to form an upper
boundary or worst case speed condition.
The final section of Table 2-1 deals with the DPA input and output inter-
faces. The number and types of signals are listed along with the rate at which
data will flow across the interfaces. The total input data rate is 4 million
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bits/second and the total output data rate is 3.7 million bits/second, with
the EPS and experiments being the major contributors.
As with the speed requirement, these total data rates represent what
would be required if all tasks were performed concurrently and should only
serve as upper bounds on the interface data rates. No allowance was made for
identification or formatting of data for internal DPA data flow. The thing
that is of primary interest is the rate for which the DPA digital data bus
must be designed in order to carry the input/output data without reaching
saturation. To answer this question, both the interleaving of programs and
configuration of the DPA itself had to be considered. Although this was
beyond the scope of this study, it was felt that a preliminary analysis
should be conducted to establish a baseline bus data rate. The analysis was
conducted and the resultant preliminary data bus operating rate requirement
is 6 megabits/second.
2.1.7 Conclusions
This study has shown that the DPA, which includes the central processors,
preprocessors, RACU's and digital data bus, must possess the following char-
acteristics in order to support six-man station operations and experiment
operations.
Operating memory 495K words
Mass memory 1.3M words
Archive memory 13 words
Speed 8M equivalent adds/second (worst case)
Data bus I/O rate 6 megabits/second
These characteristics must be considered within the constraints and
limitations that (1) redundancy to meet the failure criteria has not been
included, and (2) experiment requirements are still very preliminary. The
full impact of these two factors on the DPA characteristics is not intuitively
obvious at this time.
The two major contributors to the DPA computation and data rate require-
ments are the electrical power subsystem (EPS) and experiments. The EPS
requirement is caused by the highly automated design approach and the need
to react to an electrical power overload or fault condition within 4 milli-
seconds. Experiment support requirements are largely caused by the high
rates associated with image sensors.
To say that the DPA requirements are large is not really enough. These
requirements need only be compared to the Apollo computer (39K memory and
43K adds/second speed) to gain a perspective of the MSS DPA complex. A more
realistic comparison is the IBM 360-85 located at Space Division's Downey
facility which is used on a time-share basis to perform data processing for
all of NR's Southern California Divisions. The 360-85 has an operating speed
of 650K equivalent adds/second, an operating memory of one million bytes and
a mass memory of four million bytes. In comparison the DPA requires the size
and a mass memory slightly larger.
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It is germain here to mention the baseline DPA configuration that is
presented in Section 3.0 of this volume. The parametric data generated in
this study was largely used to define that baseline configuration. That con-
figuration currently consists of 26 computers to handle the computation load:
24 preprocessors that have been allocated high-speed dedicated computations;
one multiprocessor for generalized station operations computations and overall
supervision of the other processors; and another multiprocessor for experiment
operations. So, while the DPA computation requirements summarized above are
large, they can still be satisfied with computers that exist today and new
technology developments are not required. However, many advanced architectural
concepts are required, and these have been studied as indicated in the follow-
ing sections of this volume.
2.2 REFINEMENTS TO BASELINE REQUIREMENTS
A baseline DPA configuration was selected as a reference point for suc-
cessive tasks (see Section 3.0). That configuration consisted of a central
processor (CP) and 24 remote processors (RPU). The RPU's were allotted the
high-speed computations; the low speed and supervisory computations were
assigned to the CP (this also reduces the data bus traffic).
2.2.1 Modifications to Basic Requirements
Figure 1-3 shows the ADT tasks and, partially at least, the impact of the
simultaneous MSS Phase B Study. The Phase B requirements, as they were under-
stood at the beginning of the study, were the major input to the ADT study.
Based on these requirements, a baseline DPA configuration was selected. This
baseline configuration was used in both the ADT tasks and the Phase B studies.
Naturally, the basic requirements reflect the preliminary nature of our under-
standing of the MSS subsystems. The continuing analyses of the MSS subsystems
during the Phase B studies had the effect of reducing the computational
requirements for subsystem support.
Figure 2-2 picks out the sequential nature of the ongoing requirements
analysis. Almost all of the difference between the two requirements summar-
ies results from a reduction in the computational support required by the
electrical power subsystem (lowering of the 4 msec response requirement for
90 percent of the functions) and from the placing of the telemetry/command
data on a separate dedicated bus. Lastly, no experiments requirements are
reflected in the Phase B requirements summary.
2.2.2 Design and Growth Margin Philosophy
The DPA computation requirements have been expressed in terms of five
parameters: (1) processing speed, (2) operating memory size, (3) mass
memory size, (4) digital data bus rate, and (5) archive memory size, as
shown in Table 2-2. The basic requirements for these computation parameters
were determined by trial programming the various functions allocated to each
MSS subsystem.
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Design margin is that factor that was added to the basic computation
requirements because of uncertainty in estimating the basic requirements.
Uncertainty arises from many sources such as lack of definition of the func-
tions that a subsystem must perform, estimates for the control algorithms,
and assumptions pertaining to processor characteristics. A design margin of
100 percent of the basic requirements was used in the Phase B study.
Growth margin is that factor that was added to the basic computation
requirements for (1) planned growth from the six-man station to the 12-man
station, and (2) uncertainty of future mission requirements. A DPA
"modularity" design philosophy is intended to permit computation capability
add-on (expandability), and for that reason the growth margin was minimized
for the initial six-man implementation. The digital data bus rate is the
only DPA parameter that cannot be designed with a growth capability and for
that reason a growth margin of 7.2 megabits/second has been included at the
outset. This is an estimate of maximum data rate capability (10 megabits
per second) that will ever be required. The other computation parameters
do not have a growth factor included in them because of the expandability
feature of the DPA design.
2.2.3 Final DPA Requirements
As shown in Table 2-2, the design requirements are a summation of the
basic requirements, design margin, and growth margin. The design requirements
represent the size and performance characteristics that were used in implement-
ing the DPA design.
In arriving at the DPA computation requirements and resultant implementa-
tion, the following general philosophy or set of ground rules was used:
1. The design margin shall be 100 percent of the basic requirements.
2. A growth capability shall be provided; however, a growth margin
shall not be included in the initial (six-man) requirements,
except in those cases where growth by expandability cannot be
accommodated.
3. A digital data bus rate of 10 megabits/second is the maximum
data transfer requirement for both station operation and
experiment operation.
4. The experiment operation central processor and memories will be
duplicates of the station operation hardware.
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3.0 BASELINE DPA CONFIGURATION
There are numerous alternatives which might be considered in the
preliminary DPA characteristics study task. In enumerating these alternatives,
a systemmatic approach has been taken to assure that all alternatives receive
consideration. In view of the modular nature of the MSS, there are three
distinguishable data processing applications: overall station data processing,
module (local) data processing, and subsystem/function dedicated data processing.
The following assumptions have been made to begin the enumeration of
alternatives:
1. Some kind of overall station data processing is required;
this may be either a uniprocessor (UP), a multiprocessor (MP),
or a multicomputer (MC).
2. At the subsystem/function dedicated data processing level,
consideration will only be given to the presence (P) or
absence (0) of data processing; the particular type and
quantity of processing required by a function or a subsystem
will be individually determined.
3. At the module data processing level, there may be either an
MC, an MP, a UP, or no processor at all (O).
Based on these assumptions, there are 24 alternatives, as shown in
Table 3-1.
3.1 DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
Since the space station is modular, the distribution of processing
requirements by module is needed in selecting a DPA configuration. An
assumption was made, based on the subsystems physical distribution, of the
distribution of signals associated with the required computing functions.
Table 3-2 lists these functions by subsystem and indicates the assumed distri-
bution within the station modules.
3.2 CONFIGURATION TRADEOFFS
On the basis of the assumptions established for this preliminary DPA
configuration study for the modular space station, a number of basic features
can be established.
Pre-processors are required since frequent or cyclic computing tasks
exists. The pre-processors are to be determined by subsystem functional needs
and can be either multiprocessor, multicomputing or uniprocessors.
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Table 3-1. DPA Alternatives for Modular Space Station
3-2
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Overall Subsystem/
Station Module Function
DPA Data Data Data
Alternative Processing Processing Processing
1 UP 0 0
2 UP 0 P
3 UP UP 0
4 UP UP P
5 UP MP 0
6 UP MP P
7 UP MC 0
8 UP MC P
9 MP 0 0
10 MP 0 P
11 MP UP 0
12 MP UP P
13 MP MP 0
14 MP MP P
15 MP MC 0
16 MP MC P
17. MC 0 0
18 MC 0 P
19 MC UP 0
20 MC UP P
21 MC MP 0
22 MC MP P
23 MC MC 0
24 MC MC P
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With regards to the candidates listed in the previous Section 3.0, the
selection of a multiprocessor at the central level can be made for the
following reasons:
The Station A results obtained in a GE study for the selection of a
multiprocessor for a central computer was reviewed and felt to be valid.
While the computational load on the central computer is redufed for the
Modular Space Station over the Station A, the computer requirements as noted
from the central computing functions of OBCO and mission/planning still are
large. Hence the conclusion is that a multiprocessor is better for reasons
of size and weight, power, expandability, system flexibility, requires
excessive components for equivalent performance or backup and introduces
complexity in control. The uniprocessor would require duplication of a large
amount of memory for the redundancy consideration and be less flexible or
expandable with regards to future requirements. Table 3-3 presents an evalu-
ation of the central computer parameters. While no weighting is given to
these, it is evident that multiprocessing would be the best selection.
(Note: The class of computer organization which contains multiple, modular
elements while still having a single central processing unit in operation but
providing reconfigurability is classified here under multiprocessing.)
At the module processor level, the multicomputer can be eliminated since,
if the computing load is large, this organization has no advantage over the
multiprocessor by the above reasons. Further, since the selection of the
multiprocessor at the central level has been made, for commonality reasons,
which relate to cost effectiveness, the multiprocessor would be a better
selection. If the computing load is small, the uniprocessor is better for
commonality with the preprocessors. This selection would require duplication
of the uniprocessor in the first modules in order to meet the reliability
dictate of Fail Operation, Fail Safe during buildup. Final selection of the
uniprocessor or multiprocessor for the module level is dependent upon the
local computational load being large or small.
The candidates for further analyses then become:
DPA Alternative Central Module Subsystem
A MP 0 P
B MP MP P
C MP UP P
At this stage, the decision whether to have module computing or not was
answered by the consideration of the functions performed by those processors.
These are module supervisory control and checkout during ground test and
station buildup. The ground test can be done with a ground based computer
connecting into the data bus. This connection is probably required anyway in
order to check the data bus. Control during buildup can be done without
module computers by locating the central processor in the first-launched
module and using it to control the buildup operations. An alternate to this
is to provide a command/telemetry communications-link to the ground and use
ground equipment to establish supervisory control and checkout until the
central computer arrives in SM1.
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Table 3-3. Central Processor Selection
Criteria Uniprocessor Multicomputer Multiprocessor
Hardware
Complexity 1 2 3
Software
Complexity 2 2 1
Size, Weight 2 1 3
Power 1 1 3
Expansion
Capability 1 1 3
System
Flexibility 1 1 3
Graceful
Degradation 1 1 3
Development
Status 1 2 2
Logistics 3 1 3
On-Board
Checkout 2 2 2
Test and
Validation 2 3 2
System
Reliability 2 1 3
Cost 1 2 3
Rating: 0 = No Impact
1 = Poor
2 = Medium
3 = Good
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Since there were reasonable ways to provide the computing functions at
the module level, the decision for the preliminary DPA was that alternative A
be selected. Further, of the two variations, i.e., placing the central
computer in the first-launched module or providing a communication's link
control during buildup, the latter was selected based upon system considerations
which include the reduction of weight and other physical attributes in the
first modules and the desire to keep the central computer in SM1. This desire
stems from the interface considerations with the central computer peripherals
(mass memory, displays and control console, printers, etc.) and the consideration
of bringing the SM1 module back for modification or repair. In this event, an
integral command and control module has advantages.
3.3 BASELINE DPA CHARACTERISTICS
The baseline configuration is the multiprocessor central processor located
in the Primary Control Module (SM1) with pre-processors distributed as required
plus buildup supervisory control provided by a Buildup Command Control Data
Processor (BUCCDP) located in the first-launched module to provide commands
for both the power and core modules during buildup only. This component will
be removed or disengaged when SM-1 arrives and supervisory control transferred
to the stations operation central processor.
Several methods exist for linking the BUCCDP with the DPA. The baseline
concept is to provide a separate redundant bus to each of the pre-processors
and RACU's in the power and core modules. An alternate way would be to connect
the BUCCDP to the Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly. The first method
requires additional busing and affects the RACU and pre-processor interface
design. The latter approach requires a combination of Data Bus Control Unit,
communication command demodulator/telemetry link, and some means of controlling
the combination. Since the object is to minimize hardware in the first modules,
it was concluded that a redundant hardware bus network is a more effective way.
Further study in this area is needed.
Figure 3-1 gives a block diagram of the baseline ADT DPA showing the
number and distribution of pre-processors and RACU's. Further shown is the
interconnection of the peripherals within the SM1 and SM4 modules.
Safety of operation is provided through use of redundancy of equipment
and location. The two control centers are located in two separate pressure
volumes. Interconnection is provided with a multiple bus network. Maintenance
is facilitated with an OBCO system which includes the monitoring of signals
and the ability to isolate faults with either automatic or man-generated
checkout programs. Other features of this preliminary DPA are commonality
arising from similar components and few types; flexibility due to the bus
structure; incremental buildup capability and interchangeability of components;
and operational availability due to several levels of redundancy and degraded
modes of operations.
Components of the DPA are realizable with the present aerospace state-of-
the art. Future improvements in physical characteristics and cost are possible
with the expected technology changes in memories (solid-state and plated wire)
and logical devices.
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The baseline configuration also offers the sytem advantage of permitting
subassemblies and subsystems to be operated and checked out prior to total
system integration. The approach of using pre-processors should be cost-
effective in eliminating special purpose circuitry at lower system levels
required otherwise.
The central computing complex supervises the pre-processors and controls
the communication with the space station and ground subsystems. It supplies
the spacecraft and mission management operation and overall fault isolation
plus crew interface. The central processor has access to the measurements
and control points within the affected subsystems through the RACU's.
Redundancy of monitoring of critical signals is done by using the central
processor and the pre-processors. Non-critical signals are monitored by the
pre-processors only. The central processor controls the overall fault iso-
lation.
The configuration presented here is for a 6-man level. The growth to
the 12-man station is accommodated by increasing the memory sizing and adding
RACU's to accommodate the increased power load.
The experiment or backup central processor is made identical to the
operational or primary central processor. Its normal operation would be
to hold critical'programs in its operating memory. Periodically data would be
supplied to these:programs to provide a reference point in the event of
reconfiguration for a primary processor failure. The remainder of the computer
is devoted to servicing the experiments. Upon reconfiguration, the required
operational programs (loaded from mass memory) are performed in addition to
the normal experiment support.
Table 3-4 defines the features required for the processors. Pre-processor
memory requirements range from 1.8K to 13.2K words. As can be seen from the
data in Table 3-4, the pre-processors speed requirements exceed that achievable
in state-of-the-art uniprocessors for several of the pre-processors. The
functions required involve the repetitive comparison between limits of
numerous signals. Autonetics has developed and produced an advanced special-
purpose MOS device for this comparison function. The device can result in a
reduction of the speed requirements by an amount proportional to quantity
used. (A preliminary estimate is that one such device can reduce the speed
by a factor of 50.) Further study of the requirements and implementation is
suggested.
With special processing, the speed required can be within the range of
existing aerospace computers. The sizing for the central processors is
included in Table 3-4.
NOTE: This baseline configuration served two uses: as a
configuration for further study in the ADT effort;
and as a configuration for further study in the MSS
Phase B study. As a result of this second use, a
design decision was made as part of the Phase B
study to lower the processing requirements (see
paragraph 2.2.1) and to standardize the design of the
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Table 3-4. Summary of Computer Sizing
Ground Rules: Standard List - OBCO provided during buildup. Battery
charging allocated to preprocessing. Memory estimation
given in 32 bit words.
Module Computer perating Ms eed rchiv
Memory Memory Ops/Sec Memory
Preprocessor 1 4. OK 1104K
Preprocessor Z 4.OK 1104K
Preprocessor 3 1. 8K 295K
Preprocessor 4 1. 8K 295K
Powe 1 Preprocessor 5 13. 2K 65K
Preprocessor 6 7.5K 741K
Preprocessor 7 7. 5K 741K
Preprocessor 8 9. 1K 125K
Preprocessor 9 9. 1K 125K
Preprocessor 10 2.5K 807K
Preprocessor 11 2. 5K 807K
(1) Preprocessor 12 13. ZK 65K
Core Preprocessor 13 6. 7K 665K
Preprocessor 14 6.7K 665K
Preprocessor 15 2. 6K 40K
Preprocessor 16 2.5K 1K
SMI Preprocessor 17 5. OK 475K
Preprocessor 18 5. OK 475K
Preprocessor 19 1.9K 173K
Preprocessor 20 1.9K 173K
SM13 Preprocessor 21 1.9K 173KPreprocessor 22 1.9K 173K
SM4 Preprocessor 23 5. OK 475K
Preprocessor 24 5. OK 475K
SM1/SM4 Central-Subtotal 74. OK 259. 6K 581K
-Transient Memory 16. OK
-Support Package 98. OK 36K
-Data Base 248, 4K 2360K
OB CO 64K
-Master Backup 804K
90. OK 606. OK 581K 3264K
(1) Requires Ground Backup Command and Control
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units making up the MSS subsystems. Hence, as will be
shown in Section 9, the later configuration will use
one type preprocessor (sized to the maximum pre-
processor requirement) and one type RACU (which is,
however, modularly incrementable as required).
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4.. INFORMATION FLOW STUDY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Tee purpose of the information flow study was to define the MSS DPA
information flow so that the DPA may be simulated using NASA's IMSIM for DPA
thruput analysis. The simulation of the DPA in turn will be used as a tool
to assist in defining the final DPA configuration selection. The basis for
the study has been the results of related Space Station studies, and the over-
all description of the Space Station and its mission.
A method of flow diagram presentation and attendant tabulations was
carefully selected to provide a comprehensive data file of software and infor-
mation characterisitcs that will prove beneficial in the continuation of the
Advanced Development Tasks and related studies. This data file consists of
descriptions of each subsystem, baseline configuration data, buildup infor-
mation, DPA computational loads and allocations, computer sizing information,
commodity tabulations, signal interface lists, and DPA parametric data
requirements.
The decision as to what information would be included in the data. file
was predicated on the type of information required for a DPA thruput and
authority analysis and the means used to perform this analysis. Two questions
that had to be answered before the analysis could be conducted were:
(1) What is the DPA to do? and
(2) How is the DPA to accomplish its tasks?
The following rationale was used to gather information to resolve the
first question. In order for the MSS to fulfll its orbital mission, certain
basic functions have to be performed (e.g, life support; power supply and
distribution; experiment preparation, performing, and processing, etc.). The
above functions generate some sort of "commodity" (units of information; e.g,
data commands, status or analomies) to be used by the other functions. To
facilitate the transfer of these commodities requires a service function of
some sort. The DPA provides this service function. The DPA is not a
"generator", but rather performs the dissemination, manipulation and storage
tasks in regard to the commodities output by the generators on some sort of
demand basis (preplanned or dynamic).
The manner in which these generator functions are implemented acts as a
requirement on the implementation of the DPA. It is the nature and character-
istics of the commodities produced by the generator and the processing to be
performed by the DPA in regard to these conditions that determine the capa-
bilities to be included in the DPA.
In effect this rationale dictates the collection of information with
regard tothe commodities that will enter and leave the DPA, the manipulations
that the DPA shall perform on the commodities and the equipment that the DPA
will use or interface with to manipulate and transmit these commodities.
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The resolution of the second question requires that the collected infor-
mation be structured on a system basis. The information so structured will
indicate the points of entry and exit of commodities, the path over which the
commodities are to travel, the location of the manipulation routines through
which the commodities are to pass and the transfer function to be performed
by the manipulation routine in response to a commodity, the vehicle to be
used (i.e., message formats) by the commodities and the gating (message
transfer doctrine) imposed on message transfers. In addition, the performance
characteristics and configuration of the hardware entities comprising the DPA
as well as the doctrine governing the operations of these entities were
considered.
4.1.1 Guidelines and Constraints
The guidelines and constraints under which this report was prepared are
listed below.
A. The information flow diagrams depict data flow and configuration
allocation for the MSS preliminary baseline configuration
(reference Section 3).
B. The central processor provides central control, checkout and backup
for the pre-processors.
C. The pre-processors provide dedicated computation for a specific
function or subsystem.
D. Module processors have not been considered in preparation of the
information flow diagrams. Required centralized processing has
been shown under the Station Operations Central Processor flow
diagram.
E. The purpose of a Remote Acquisition and Control Unit (RACU) is to
provide a signal interface between the central processor and a
subsystem. RACU features are as defined in DRL-13 (SD 70-159-3).
F. Data transfer between a RACU or pre-processor and the central
processor will be accomplished via a serial data bus in order to
reduce long wire runs and large signal interface connections
between modules.
G. Subsystem computation tasks which are performed frequently were
prime candidates for allocation to pre-processors.
H. Pre-processor redundancy has been dictated by the redundancy of
the subsystem or functional loop that they control.
I. Two central processors (CP) will be provided, one located in each
pressure volume. During normal operations one CP will be assigned
tasks associated with station operations and the other will be
assigned experiment management and data processing tasks. When one
CP has failed, the other CP shall provide a backup capability to
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handle critical functions, as a minimum. Backup for non-critical
functions will be provided within the constraints of normal memory
and speed limitations.
J. The experiment computation contribution to the central processor
flow has not been included.
4.2 DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY (DPA) CONFIGURATION
Figure 3-1 gives a block diagram of the baseline DPA showing the number
and distribution of preprocessors and RACU's. For this same baseline con-
figuration, an equipment hook-up concept has been developed. Figures 4-1
through 4-6 show this concept for the eight modules of this configuration.
These figures show the data bus, the RACU'sland the Data Bus Control Units
(DBCU's) which make up the DACS. (The data bus also interfaces with the
Remote Processing Units (RPU's) just as if they were RACU's). Table 4-1
provides commentary on some aspects of these interconnection diagrams. Also
included in these hook-up diagrams are some (interfacing) elements of the
MSS Information Subsystem which are not considered to be elements of the DPA.
For example, the Remote Terminal Units (RTU) are remote display/control
devices driven by the DPA via the data bus; the Modulation Processor is a
signal combiner and subcarrier modulator which is part of the Communications
Assembly.
4.3 INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAMS
This section of the report contains the information flow diagrams which
show functionally the routes which must be taken by subsystem commodities to
accomplish the DPA tasks. These flow diagrams were developed by using the
speed, memory and input/output subroutines defined for each subsystem function,
tabulating the data on commodity and software sheets with other pertinent
information such as iteration rates and concatenations (linkage to other
programs) and then drawing a flow diagram which shows the commodity flow and
subroutines required to accomplish a specific DPA task.
Information flow lines through the DPA are annotated with the commodity
reference numbers which travel over each line. Central processor functions
which relate directly with each subsystem is illustrated in the subsystem
diagrams shown in Figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13. All other
processor functions are shown on the central processor diagram (Figure 4-14).
Central processor and pre-processor software are identified on the diagrams
with numbers in the "S" series. Subsystem equipment and Remote Acquisition
Control Units (RACU's) are identified on the diagrams with numbers in the "E"
series (for equipment). Information (i.e., "commodities" such as data, commands,
status, etc.) which flows between processor functions, RACU's, equipment, and
The function and the designation (E-number) of the RACU's shown on the
Information Flow Diagrams are not in direct correspondence with the function
and designation of the RACU's shown in diagrams 4-1 to 4-6. The former were
created first to show a generalized configuration. The latter represent the
baseline DPA configuration.
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Table 4-1. Preliminary DPA Interconnection Notes
Basis - The initial MSS Phase B vehicle failure criteria:
a. Buildup Reliability Dictate
· Fail Operational
· Fail
b. Manned Dictate
· Fail Operational
· Fail Degrade - 30 days survival, mission continuation
· Fail Emergency - 96 hours survival,mission continuation
· Fail
c. Catastrophic Dictate
· Two pressure volume
Features
a. Four power channels kept independent by providing RACU's and
pre-processing on that basis.
b. Within a module only dual redundancy is required since backup
subsystem functions are provided in another pressure volume (A
violation occurs for the solar array inverters 3 and 4. It's pre-
processors are located in the power module along with those for SA
inverters 1 and 2. Unless inter-module wiring is provided, loss
of circuit breaker control affects all channels).
c. RACU's are used for fault isolation. (The alternate approach of
using pre-processors loaded with fault isolation routines and
data from the central processor was not used in the sizing efforts.
This latter approach affects operational and mass memory needs
and needs to be evaluated further.)
d. The data bus redundancy is defined to require such redundancy that
any line pair (command-response) be able.to connect to any two bus
lines. Triple line pairs thus provided can also give another level
for fail safe.
e. Exact adherence to expressed RACU features was not observed for
discrete-in-and-out. A review of these to determine if a digital
word interface is better or whether 32 rather than 24 is more
desirable is required. The maximum number of analog-in was held
at 200, however.
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peripheral devices are identified on the diagrams with numbers in the "C"
series (for commodity). Software and commodity characteristics were tabulated
onto data sheets and are available for review upon request.
An example of how information and commodities flow between computer
program elements and hardware subassemblies is shown in Figures 4-15 and 4-16.
These diagrams are repeats of Figures 4-14 and 4-13, respectively, where the
flow is indicated by heavy black lines. The objective in this example is to
point the directional antenna, using the DPA and software. Commands are
-generated at the keyboard of the control console by the astronaut operator.
The keyboard command causes a transfer of commodity C-67A "Console
Parameters" from the control console to the display interface routines S-66A,
66B, and S-67. S-67, in turn generates commodity C-50A "Interactive Input
Parameters."
The Interactive Input Control routine S-50 is activated and passes the
request to the appropriate subsystem function S-705. S-705 generates a
command request commodity C-63A which activates S-63 and S-63A Command Assembly
and message generation subroutines.
The command subroutines assemble the command "point antenna" and transfer
the command to S-65, the Command Execution subroutine which causes commodity
C-65A (Assembled Command List) to be transferred to the Remote Acquisition
Control Unit (RACU) E-711, which issues a signal to torque the antenna to the
requested position.
RACU E-711 also samples various antenna measurements such as the servo
null voltage and sends the information back to the central processor (S-705)
via commodity C-730 (Figure 4-16). S-53 is activated and sends commodity
C-53B to the Display Interface routine S-67A. S-67A generates commodity C-67B
which produces a display signal on'the CRT. The communication subsystem
status update and a data base update is also performed but is not discussed in
this example.
4-25
SD 72-SA-0114-4
T< 
A
 
>
°
 CS or
 -
-
 
-I (aoters,< 
-
5 
66s-<;s 
-
,E 
.1 
,
 
J
=
 , 
rr 
>X 
O
 
'jK
3 
-1-
(i 
.a
4
- 
o
o
.
.
 
_
_
_
_
t 
:: 
j)z 
'i 
(; 
21 
'
'
 
)~4 
d7*), 
I 
~
 
.
~
L 
f 
L 
I 
i
flA 
ii 
I i
a
~
~
~
, 
0
S II 
X
 
I 
1 
,
,<
+EiA
w
 
0)
0
j j 
:' 
,I 
.
I 
1
\)X
~ffs9A
vlvv 
4 
|C
8 
I 
/ 
I 
'I 
' 
, 
'
jAcOyp-11AI i/A. 
'OAr, 
I 
141- 
0, 
0 
~
 ~
 
~
~
~
"
ad
8
1
=
P
W
r
ols-J 
~
 
~
 
Ix~~s 
s 
ss 
I
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _j~~~~r,·r-
/
ci)
c 
c
.o
 
c 
<
(1 c
.
.L
.0 
_
 
0_
a 
0
cn 
z 
0L-
-
-4
R
-1
U-
bb'
I-0o 0-j0Li.
ti--14
o
 o
.
8o
o
 IUE
nI IIIIII
_
 
-
-
_
 
'
-
-
-
 
a 
.4 
_
 
_
 
-
-
-
…
_
-
 
_
 
_
 
\/
44 I0co0 C4aiwP
 
X
 
a)
.4.4H I0U)
0mI-z'.41I
0C,4H0 4Hd F-IOdH.-4r4 p:jbO,4fPr4
vqbktzWNk ~1.,U'IA
r- 
-
-
 
-
-
^
-
I r 
:1
k- 
I
V__________~
I 
3.-, O
I 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
I
I
I
-
-
 
-
-
-
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
1
Space Division
By4 North American Rockwell
5. THROUGHPUT SIMULATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This section documents SDC's effort toward completing a throughput and
authority analysis of the Modular Space Station's Information Subsystem Data
Processing Assembly (DPA). The results obtained from the analyses are pri-
marily predicated on the ADT configuration as defined in Section 3.
The objective was to provide information that would facilitate a selec-
tion of the final DPA configuration for the Modular Space Station; in
particular, to provide information pertaining to DPA component performance
that would yield a DPA configuration capable of accommodating imposed work-
loads within required response times.
Initially, the scope of the activities to be performed during this task
was to determine the hierarchy of authority for the handling (processing) of
data within the DPA. This hierarchy was to include the RACU's, the pre-
processors and the central processors. Included within this task was to be
the determination of the capabilities at each level of authority (such as
conversion, switching command/response, processing, etc.) and the data
transfer throughput to perform the function at the specified level for both
response and command data.
This scope was redirected during the course of the task to the following
set of study objectives, listed in the order of their priority of accomplish-
ment.
1. Determine if the Advanced Development Task (ADT) DPA configuration
will work. That is, has authority been properly assigned so that
the performance of the baseline DPA will meet a pre-specified set
of criteria.
2. If the ADT DPA does not work, modify on a parametric basis the
operations of its elements until a workable DPA configuration is
obtained.
3. When ADT DPA does work, determine the effects of transients
(delays caused by failures and reconfigurations) upon the
performance of the DPA.
4. Determine the effects of different types of configuration provisions
on the performance of the DPA.
5. Investigate alternate DPA configurations. That is, investigate
the effects of DPA performance generated by varying the ratio between
centralized vs. decentralized processing allocations.
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6. Investigate the effects of alternate workload/element characteris-
tics upon the ADT DPA performance. For example, what are the
consequences on DPA performance if fuel cells are used in lieu of
batteries?
It was understood that the meeting of these objectives might be con-
strained by both the time and funds available. Under these constraints it
was agreed that accomplishing a significant part of objectives 1 and 2 or
1 and 3 (i.e., provide some meaningful results that future MSS Advanced Study
tasks can build upon) would constitute a successful accomplishment of this
task.
The approach taken to assess the adequacy of the DPA has included a
combination of analytical investigations which were verified by computer
simulations,. The following basic steps comprised SDC's approach to this
task:
a. Device Load Analysis
Each Remote Processing Unit (RPU) and Remote Acquisition Control
Unit (RACU) was inspected to determine the amounts of data
transferred and processed by associated functions (G&C, ECLSS, etc.).
For each device, tabulations were made of the:
1. Response load on the data bus (R-BUS)
2. Command load on the data bus (C-BUS)
3. Transfer load (operating memory or mass memory-to-processor
transfer).
4. Processing load (arithmetic processor load imposed by the
memory-to-processor transfer).
These tabulations were performed for all sampling intervals
envisioned for these functions (50 ms, 100 ms, etc.).
b. Device Time-Line Summary
As an extension of step (a), summaries of the total transfer and
processing loads for all devices were tabulated at all sampling
frequencies. For example, if a RACU transmits data at 100 ms
intervals for three subfunctions, the sum of these three loads
would constitute the 100 ms load imposed by this device.
c. Commutation Cycle Determination
The next step involved the determination of a commutation cycle
rationale for sampling all of these devices at the required sampling
rates. A fixed-cycle polling scheme was eventually selected as the
most satisfactory means for retrieving required data via the data
bus.
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d. Commutation Cycle Slot Allocation
Once a rationale had been developed, the results of steps (a) and
(b) above were used to determine a means of allocating devices
to particular slots of the polling cycle. Particular attention
was given to the impact on the Arithmetic Unit (AU) of the Station
Operations Central Processor (CP), since the efficient use of this
processor is a reliable indicator of overall CP performance.
As a related portion of this slot allocation effort, estimates
were made of the adequacy of proposed arithmetic processor speeds
to handle expected workloads.
e. Computer Simulation of ADT Configuration
To confirm the results of the numerical investigations of the
preceding steps and to investigate the effects of the interactions
of CP processing units and related elements, a computer model was
constructed and simulation runs were performed. Several sets of
statistics were accumulated, and the adequacy of the proposed ADT
configuration was verified.
5.1.1 DPA Configuration and Performance Assumptions
At the outset of the throughput simulation the preliminary baseline DPA
configuration (sometimes called the ADT configuration) had been defined (as
described in Section 3). However, the results of the MSS Phase B studies in
refining the DPA requirements were not then available (see paragraph 2.2).
Hence, certain assumptions were made in regard to the DPA performance charac-
teristics. In particular, it was assumed that the station operations central
multiprocessor contains two I/O processors, two arithmetic units (AU), and
two modular operating memories. In view of the fact that the requirements
tabulated in paragraph 2.1.7 include experiments as well as station opera-
tions, the assumptions detailed below were deemed sufficient for consideration
of station operations only:
Central Processor Assumptions
1. In regard to accomplishment of objective 1, (i.e., to verify that
the DPA configuration can work), assume a single computer configura-
tion within one CP multiprocessor. That is, only one of each type
of element (I/O, AU, OM, MM, AM, RACU, DBCU) will be sufficient to
verify concepts via simulation modeling methods.*
2. The arithmetic unit operates at 0.75 MAPS, while the I/O unit
operates at 300K words (32 bits per word) per second.
That is, each AU-I/O unit combination will generally be performing (or be
capable of performing) the same operations. Therefore, the conceptual
adequacy of the DPA configuration can be adequately proven by simulating
one pair of these processors.
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3. The executive governing the operations of the CP is assumed to be
simpleminded; e.g., no paging.
4. The DBCU is assumed to be transparent to all incoming and outgoing
signals.
5. The station operations central processor operating memory consists
of at least four modules. Each module contains 32K-32 bit words
of memory. Both the AU and I/O are connected to each module. A
given memory module can only service one (AU or I/O) processor at
a time.
Operating Memory Operational Characteristics:
o Random Access
o 750 nanosecond cycle time
1. Mass memory characteristics per SD70-159-3*, where appropriate.
(Note that tape recorder is not a normal on-line access device).
2. Archival memory characteristics per SD70-159-3*, where appropriate.
RACU
1. Input/output rate - 300K words/second (must match bus transmission
rate).
2. Standardized throughout the station.
3. Samples subsystem measurements and has measurements available for
dump to the CP upon command from the CP.
4. Provides fault isolation capability for subsystem loops through the
central processor, which are controlled and monitored by RPU's.
5. Monitors and controls subsystem loops through the CP which are
assigned to the CP.
6. Has a 4K byte (8 bit) memory of which 600 bytes are overhead.
RPU
1. Monitors and controls subsystem loops in which it operates.
2. Provides status of each subsystem loop to the CP on a cyclic basis.
3. Detects subsystem loop failure, switches in redundant subsystem
loop, and notifies CP which subsystem loop has failed.
*"Solar Powered Space Station Preliminary Design"
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4. Has: a.
b.
c.
6K word memory of which 900 words are overhead
Operates at 500K equivalent adds/second
I/O rate: 300K words/second (must match bus transmission
rate).
5.2 TIME SLOT ANALYSIS
The operational doctrine assumed to be in effect for the data bus is
that of polling. Polling control is assumed to be a function of the I/O
unit and the polling schedule is assumed to be on a "fixed" time basis per
device. The polling schedule assumed in the authority and throughput analysis
is predicated on dividing a second into 250 slots of 4 ms each.
The 250 slot assumption was obtained by considering that the DPA has,
in accordance with step (B) of paragraph 5.1, the following device sampling
rate requirements:
Shortest Sampling
Interval Per Device
Required Samplings Per
Second at Highest Rate
5
9
44
2
13
Total 73
50 ms
100 ms
1 sec
10 sec
60 sec
100*
90
44
0.20
0.22
Total 235
* 1 sec
e.g., 0.05 sec/sample x 5 devices = 100 samplings per second.
Approximately 235 slots are thus required if each of the 73 devices
is to have its own time slot to report to the CP at its highest required
frequency. Allowing an additional 15 slots to handle contingencies such
as OBCO-Fault Isolation or Real-Time Bio-Medical inputs brings the total
slots required per second to 250. For these 250 4-millisecond slots, the
polling schedule is essentially periodic with a period of 25 slots. The
slot allocation for one 25 slot period is as follows:
Slot Number 1 2 ' A 9 7 8 _9 ) 11 L?!2 4
50 ms devices (plus A B A B C D
2 > 1 second)
100 ms devices (plus F H JK LM N 1 2
4 @ 1 second)
+] [+ 4ms
where A, B, C, D and E represent the
sample rates of 50 ms.
slots for polling 5 devices that have
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F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M and N represent the slots for polling 9
devices that have maximum sample rates of 100 ms.
1, 2, 3 and 4 represent the slots for polling 40 devices, four
per period, that have a sampling rate of 1 second.
/ represents the slots for polling those devices with a sampling
period of one second or more.
5.3 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Based on the tabulations described in the preceding sections, a numeri-
cal analysis and tabulation of expected arithmetic unit utilization was
performed. Particular attention has been given to the use of this processor,
since its operations are the heart of the CP. Thus, if it can be shown that
an arithmetic unit can satisfactorily accommodate the software workload
imposed by DPA devices (at given bus transfer rates), high confidence may
be realized in the functioning of the entire DPA as an efficient system.
The arithmetic unit analysis proceeded as follows:
For each slot, a specific RPU, RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) or RACU will
be sampled. The expected load placed on the arithmetic unit by each device
in its time slot has been estimated by totaling the expected operations from
the following formulas. Note that each of these six equations may not apply
to every device. For example, RACU 16 (employed for data on RCS thrust
valves and 02 H2N2 tanks) does not use equations B, C or F (output call mess-
age, transfer of data to OM, and output processing, respectively), but it
does utilize processes A, D and E. Thus, the load tabulated for each device
consists of the totals of the applicable portions of the following equations:
A: Input processing and
interpretation
B: Output call message
C: Transfer-data to OM
for storage
D: Transfer program in
from OM
6
input transfer load + 426 operations for
pre-processing, interpretation, post-
processing, and executive control (10, 391,
10 and 15 operations, respectively)
= 37 operations for executive control, I/O
processing, transfer, and access (15, 20,
1 and 1 operation, respectively)
= OM data transfer load and 36 operations
for executive control, I/O processing
and access
= OM program transfer load and 36 operations
for executive control, I/O processing
and access
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E: Perform applications
processing = number of operations required + 15 words
for executive control
F: Output processing = number of output words + 20 words for
I/O processing
As indicated earlier, a single device may require transmission (sampling)
at several different rates. Thus, these computations were carried out for
each sample rate of each device. The worst-case load would then be the maxi-
mum possible load imposed on the arithmetic unit when all samples occur
simultaneously. For example, RACU 37 transfers data at 1 sec, 10 sec, and
100 sec intervals: at every 100 seconds, this total maximum simultaneous
load can be expected.
This worst-case approach was used in constructing the cycle loading
postulated in Table 5-1, "Arithmetic Unit Utilization Analysis." Each
slot entry in this table indicates the hand-calculated operations required to
support the DPA devices, grouped into the commutation cycle sequence shown
in paragraph 5.2.
Table 5-1 contains the following data:
1. The column labeled "Slot" (No. and Ident.) identifies the
twenty-five slots of a slot group.
2. The column labeled "Slop Group 1" shows the device assigned to
each slot in the group and the number of operations required to
process the workload of that device.
3. Columns labeled "Slot Group 2, 3 and 4" are similar to that of
Slot Group 1. For a given slot identification, the operations
differential between Slot Group 1 and Slot Group 2 reflect the
difference in processing the worst-case load and the periodic
load.
4. The column labeled "Slot Groups 5-10" shows the operations required
for processing the workload from the devices that would be in the
numbered or checked slots if all ten slot-groups were tabulated
(does not represent slot assignments).
5. The entry labeled "Periodic" in the "Slot Groups 5-10" column
shows the operations required to process the periodic workloads
for those devices assigned to lettered slots in Slot Group 2, summed
over the last six slot groups.
6. The row labeled "Overhead" accounts for the operations required
to perform the CP background loadings and to output the words
(commands, displays and printer) assumed during each slot.
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Note that a preponderance of processor requirements have been placed
into Slot Group 1; i.e., no attempt has been made to evenly distribute
processor requirements over a full 1 second period. Thus, in the first
100 ms, it is noted that over twice as many operations (157,603) are
required than those possible at a processor rate of 75,000 operations per
100 ms. However, as this table indicates, all processing can be completed
within a one second period at a duty cycle of approximately 80 percent:
601,353 required operations per second 80 percent
750,000 available operations per second
Therefore, if loads are distributed more equitably, or if processing
backlogs can be tolerated, a 750,000 ops per second arithmetic processor
appears adequate to handle anticipated station operations loads. Moreover,
if additional processing is made available from the duplexed arithmetic unit,
the speed requirements can be reduced.
Note also that within the first slot group of Table 5-1, RACU 35 (Slot
"A") has a 3012 EAPS entry in slot 1, while only 769 EAPS appear in slot 14
and subsequent slots. This is an extension of the worst-case grouping to
consolidate as much processing as possible into the front end of an individual
slot group; i.e., it was assumed that the 50 ms and 1 minute sample loads all
occurred in the first slot of the first slot group. This assumption imposes
an added constraint on the simulation modeling discussed later; that is, if
the configuration can be shown to be satisfactory under these saturation
conditions, greater confidence can be had in the workability of the postulated
DPA.
5.4 DPA SIMULATION MODEL
This section describes the generation of a version of the simulation
model used to assess the adequacy of the DPA configuration. This model,
termed "IMSIM", has been tailored to produce meaningful results for this
analysis, and used to verify the results of the numerical analyses. Summary
results from the execution of simulation runs are presented in paragraph 5.5.
5.4.1 Simulation Model Characteristics
The capabilities incorporated into IMSIM have been oriented towards
providing flexibility in representing computer system configurations and
their workloads. Characteristics of equipment which are specified in the
model by input parameters have been selected as those which could signifi-
cantly impact the behavior of computers and communication links. Significance
as used here, refers not only to the relevancy of characteristics, but also
to the impact magnitude, considering the granularity of simulated time and
space. Thus, characteristics such as weight and shape are considered irrele-
vant, as are functions completely external to the computer system. (Such
functions may, however, be represented as response characteristics for the
appropriate devices). Likewise, localized control signals such as interrupts
have transmission times and data loads which are insignificant, even though
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the implied functions may not be. For example, a signal to connect a device
for transmission may be delayed until the device recognizes that signal, but
the resulting connection can then be established virtually instantaneously.
The equipment simulation categories used in this model cover five basic
types of equipment: memory units*, storage units*, computer processors, data
transmission links, and a group called "devices" that includes all hardware
not in the preceding four categories. Three additional categories are
included by expanding the concept of equipment: data sets, system configura-
tion specifications, and executive algorithms. The data sets provide an
additional degree of freedom in loading storages and directing data trans-
mission, while system configuration specifications identify methods of
equipment interconnection. Executive algorithms, on the other hand, specify
methods of directing software control over job and task execution (i.e., over
DPA "users").
The "users" are represented in a hierarchical structure which permits
workloads for the IMSIM to be organized and associated with conceptual
capabilities of the DPA. The structure is shown in Figure 5-1. The "job"
represents a complete function such as "plan flight path change", which may
be broken down into tasks such as "prepare attitude change", "prepare spin-
despin change", etc. The "tasks" are described in terms of the required
routines, data blocks, and the messages to be transmitted over data links.
Job
Task
Routines Data Blocks Messages
Figure 5-1. IMSIM Workload Hierarchy
The interdependence of tasks within a job may also be specified. This
approach offers several advantages: subdivision of the job into tasks permits
parallel processing for the job in a multiprocessor or multicomputer system;
different processor requirements may be specified for various portions of
the job; and different jobs may involve the same type of task. This latter
feature permits prototype tasks to be defined only once, thereby avoiding
redundant inputs.
"Memory units" are used to simulate AU and I/O local memories, while
"storage units" are used to simulate mass and operating memories.
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The "message" has been chosen as the principal driver for the model. A
message specifies a loading for data links and other equipment in communica-
tion, plus the amount of processing required for each transmission. This
method of operation acknowledges the fact that a program may operate for
varying lengths of time, dependent on the types and quantities of data to
which the program is applied. Thus, routines and data blocks are essentially
relegated to the status of space-takers (although their presence in local
memory may be essential to performance of a task).
The IMSIM data base is structured to facilitate retrieval of information
which is required for (or potentially useful to) the algorithms which repre-
sent executive control of the system. A centralized table concept is generally
emploued through which data can be prepared by transactions* in given parts
of the model for use or regulation of transactions in other parts of the model.
An example of such a table is the task table which contains the complete status
of every extant task. Data which are solely for use in connection with a
single transaction are retained by that transaction as transaction "para-
meters"; this association is preferable to global (in contrast to "local")
representation, and is used whenever possible, because it simplifies the
formulas for servicing transactions as these transactions are moved about in
the logical block network.
The global/local classification of data is also well suited to prepara-
tion of outputs, since the purpose of simulation is to observe general
characteristics of the model behavior and effects on statistically signifi-
cant populations, rather than the experience of individuals (transactions).
As used in IMSIM, transactions represent the simulation program work-
load. Thus, transactions are injected into the model to represent job requests,
whether generated by a random function or read from an input script. These
job transactions then cause other transactions to be produced to represent
the steps (tasks) of the job, which in turn cause other transactions to be
produced to represent the routines, data blocks, and messages which comprise
the job. The most important transactions are those which represent tasks
and messages. The task is the primary unit of work for a processor, while
the message is the unit of work for a data link. These transactions require
other simulated system resources in order to occupy processors or data links.
Thus, a processor is only employed on a task (i.e., is acquired by a trans-
action) when certain routines and data blocks have been placed in memory,
while a data link is acquired for message transmission only when the source
and sink for the message are also accessible.
IMSIM incorporates a deterministic association between message trans-
missions and task processing; i.e., on the assumption that the purpose of a
task is to transofrm input data to output data, each message transmission
implies an amount of task processing. Similarly, an amount of processing
implies completion of either the analysis of an input message or the
In IMSIM, transactions are used to represent the job flow as the
model proceeds from task to task, and the transmission of information
over data lines.
5-11
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division0 4 • North American Rockwell
preparation of an output message. Thus, whenever messages are delayed,
processing may be delayed, and when processing is delayed, message trans-
mission may be delayed. (It should be noted here that the model design
prevents a stalemate in which both messages and tasks are waiting for each
other).
Transactions also represent the job-steps and task types described by
the model user. These two inputs are not really distinct classes, but rather
a separation of task characteristics into two convenient groups. Job-step
inputs specify the interrelationships of tasks within each job, while task
inputs specify the tasks in more detail, including the elements and messages
involved in performing the tasks. Transactions representing job step and
task types are stored as "prototypes" which may be copied as often as
required to develop a job in response to a job request.
Still other transactions are created during the development of a task
environment to represent the routines, data blocks, and messages required
for a task. These transactions then move through the logical paths of the
model, determining additional task characteristics (e.g., memories to be
employed, processing time), and at times take on the character of an execu-
tive task to represent system overhead functions in connection with task
initiation.
The concept of IMSIM is a computer system, centered around the memory
units which will provide the workspace for data to be processed and instruc-
tion for controlling equipment. The equipment consists, on one hand, of up
to 20 computer processors which execute the vast majority of stored instruc-
tions and operate on the data contained in the memories, and, on the other
hand, the data transmission links and peripheral units which send, receive,
and store data. To provide for maximum flexibility in configuring the
system components and to allow for representation of special structures such
as multiprocessor and federated computer systems, the model permits each
memory to be connected to any or all processors and to as many as 28 data
links, and for each peripheral unit to be connected to as many as 28 data
links.
The entire simulated system can be subdivided into as many as six
subsystems, or "virtual machines". A virtual machine is characterized by
a set of memory units and processors, configured so that every memory unit
is addressable by any processor of the virtual machine and is connected to
the same set of data links as every other memory. The executive tasks are
automatically replicated for each of the virtual machines. This means that
whenever a task or interrupt requires executive service, an appropriate
processor from the pertinent virtual machine is selected and applied to an
executive task. This concept enables the model user to simulate a variety
of computer configurations within the context of one overall generaic system.
Configurations such as federated, shared-file, direct-couple, central-peripheral,
etc., can be developed, each with multiprocessor capability. The only functional
restriction placed on these configurations is that all autonomous computers
employ the same type of executive, i.e., they are all governed by the same
executive algorithms.
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All data transmission in the DPA is simulated in IMSIM using the
concept of "messages". A message is defined to represent a series of
transmissions between two components of the system over communication lines
or channels which are represented by "data links". The data links are not
explicitly specified in connection with messages; instead, they are determined
dynamically by a user-specified executive algorithm. In essence, this execu-
tive algorithm is a search for paths between the source and sink associated
with a message.
In the simplest case, the source and sink represent the system
components which transmit and receive a message. For example, a command (or
series of commands) could be typed in on a keyboard for direct entry to a data
buffer within a computer memory. This process would be represented by a
message with the keyboard specified as the source "device" and the buffer as
a sink "data block". Using message input parameters, the model user can
specify the number of transmissions (commands in the example) which are repre-
sented by the message, the source and sink, the length of transmissions, the
interarrival time between transmissions, and the amount of computation involved
in processing each transmission. The length, interarrival time, and computa-
tion time can be specified as functions of a random variable, if desired.
Two other characteristics indicate the relationship between a message
and tasks which may refer to it: 1) The start time for the series of
transmissions may be specified relative to the start of a job or to a task.
2) The nature of a task is defined as the dependence of message transmission
on task execution; transmission may be completely independent, or it may be
dependent on a particular task execution. In the first case, denoted as
"source-driven", transmission is controlled strictly by an interarrival time
function, and may result in a data loss if resources are not available. This
type of message may be shared by several tasks, as in the case of telemetry
data which may be recorded, sampled, and reduced simultaneously. In the
second case, denoted as "sink-driven", interarrival times may be extended
beyond the amount specified by the interarrival time function due to delays
in acquiring input/output units, data links, or delays in task processing
(representing either the preparation of an output message or analysis of an
input message).
All message transmission is assumed to be under control of an executive
I/O service function. The particular executive is determined by the virtual
machine to which the task is assigned. Every transmission is initiated by
acquiring a suitable processor for the I/O request-service executive task.
The workoad, equipment and executive algorithm specification types
utilized by the model user to construct models are summarized as follows:
Work Simulation:
Type 1 - Jobs
Type 2 - Tasks
Type 3 - Routines
Type 4 - Data Blocks
Type 5 - Messages
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System Specifications:
Type 6 - Devices
Type 7 - Memory Units ("local" memories)
Type 8 - Storage Units ("auxiliary" memories; i.e., operating
and mass memories)
Type 9 - Processors
Type 10 - Data Links
Type 11 - Data Sets
Type 12 - Configuration Hookup
Type 13 - Executive Algorithms
5.4.2 DPA Representation
5.4.2.1 Applications Workload
As stated earlier, a complete simulation of the entire DPA configuration,
including the simulation of all workload inputs (i.e., all processing loads
imposed by all slots of the postulated commutation cycle) is not a practical
approach. Such a procedure would usurp an inordinate amount of computer time,
and would therefore not be an efficient use of available resources. For this
reason, a representative sample of the projected CP workload was selected for
simulation, under the assumption that if this sample compared favorably to
expectations (that is, the numerical analyses), reasonable extrapolations of
the simulation results could be made.
The sample case so selected consists of the first four slots of Slot
Group 1, as shown in Table 5-1 (slot indents A, F, B, and G). Thus, the
generators of the workload will be RACU 35, RACU 64, PACU 63, and RPU 15.
Additional work per slot for the arithmetic unit is generated by the need
for interpretation of workload messages and having the arithmetic processor
perform the CP background tasks on a slot by slot basis. In the I/O processor,
additional work per slot is engendered by two periodic tasks, communications
background and data bus scheduling.
It should be noted that the computing load triggered by these four
sample time slots is the same for the revised Phase B DPA configuration as
it is for this postulated ADT DPA configuration (described in Section 2).
Thus, the simulation approaches and the numerical analyses for these slots
are representative of both configurations. It should also be noted that
RACU 35 includes several subfunctions that require a 50 ms response time.
This is the highest response time requirement for the MSS. Thus, simulation
of the highest MSS sampling rates were performed in this effort.
The job flow through the system is thus represented by a series of
tasks. For the arithmetic unit, scheduling of task performance is done by
buffering and/or by predecessor-successor relationships indicated on the
job inputs. In the I/O processor, scheduling of task performance is done
by buffering or by time control using the simulated clock. Associated with
each of these tasks are messages. The model is set up to equate one word
as being one character in regards to transmissions and one equivalent add as
being one time unit.
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At this start of each simulation run, it was assumed that no backlog of
activities exist. This assumption causes the arithmetic unit to sit idle
until the first inputs are received from the I/O processor. When the I/O
processor so triggers information to be transferred for the arithmetic unit,
the AU then proceeds to process the data, and eventually the AU will generate
additional transactions that signal task completion. This does not imply,
however, that the AU and I/O units are simply waiting for each other's
triggers to perform tasks on a sequential basis. Each processor attempts to
perform as many tasks on a "simultaneous" basis as possible; i.e., if
resources are temporarily in use, or if message triggers are in process,
each unit will attempt to execute other tasks to optimize the efficient use
of these processors.
5.4.2.2 System Specifications
The model of the DPA is set up to represent a processing configuration
where the arithmetic and I/O processing units are treated as two virtual
machines. The interchange of information between the processing units is
effected by means of buffers (IMSIM Data Sets) contained in the Operating
Memory modules. To achieve this buffer interlinkage, the Operating Memories
modules are treated as IMSIM storage devices with the characteristics of
hi-speed memories; i.e., low access times, high transmission rates and random
access. The Mass Memory modules are also treated as IMSIM storage devices,
which have been given the characteristics associated with auxiliary memories.
Only the local memories associated directly with the arithmetic and I/O
processing units are explicitly handled as IMSIM memory units.
The channels connecting the I/O and arithmetic units to each of the
three operating memories are assumed to be selector type channels, with a
single channel for each of the Operating Memory modules serving both process-
ing units. In this way only one of the processing units can utilize a channel
at one time. The channels connecting the I/O processing units with the three
Mass Memory modules are considered to be multiplexed, with burst mode cap-
ability. The performance characteristics of the I/O and arithmetic processing
units, storages, data sets, data link channels and devices are contained on
IMSIM forms. The interconnections among the above items are contained on an
IMSIM input form and are illustrated in Figure 5-2.
Note that this configuration simulates essentially one-half of the CP;
i.e., one AU, one I/O processor, and one set of associated equipments. Since
both sides of a CP will essentially perform the same functions, it is not
necessary to simulate the entire CP to verify the adequacy of the DPA.
5.4.2.3 Executive Representation
Two distinct executives are assumed, one for the arithmetic unit and
one for the I/O unit. The complete I/O executive is assumed to be in residence
in the local memory of the I/O processing unit. For the arithmetic unit, it
is assumed that a nucleus executive is always in residence in the arithmetic
unit's local memory and that additional executive capability would be obtained
from Operating Memory storage when required. In terms of task scheduling, it
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is assumed that the arithmetic unit executive performs its assignments on a
serial basis; that is, it performs all input, or output processing for one
processing load before it takes on the next load.
For both executives, it has been assumed that performance of both "pre
and post" interrupt processing requires ten instructions each. In addition,
fifteen instructions have been assumed as being required for both the arith-
metic and I/O unit executives for switching between processing tasks. These
assumptions were employed in the generation of associated tasks and messages
for these processes.
A summary of the executive options is as follows:
(1) Algorithm 1 - Transmission Path Selection
Choose the first suitable link, whether in use or not, and
wait till it is available (when necessary).
(2) Algorithm 2 - Virtual Memory Allocation
No virtual memory space consolidation will be performed.
(3) Algorithm 3 - Task Scheduling
Task scheduling will be performed in accordance with assigned
priorities.
(4) Page Swapping
No page swapping will be performed (all required routines and
memory data blocks are established in virtual memory prior to
commencement of the slot workload transactions).
(5) Not applicable (devices, storage units, and virtual machines
are selected for tasks by discrete specifications within other
input forms).
In addition, the I/O processor is capable of responding to I/O and
service request interrupts, while the AU responds to I/O, service request,
and bounds fault interrupts. These executive functions are employed by
IMSIM in the execution of simulation runs, and are reflected in utilization
statistics.
5.5 SIMULATION RESULTS
As discussed earlier, and as summarized in Table 5-2, it is apparent
that more than 4 time slots (16 ms) would be required for the arithmetic
processor to perform all of its required functions for those 4 slots.
Operating at 750K operations per second, this processor could only execute
12,000 operations in 16 ms, whereas Table 5-1 indicates that 12,206 operations
would be required to process all inputs generated by RACU's 35, 64, 63, and
RPU 15 during this time period. Thus, the simulation has been designed to
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investigate the amount of time required to process this temporary satura-
tion condition, so as to lead to conclusions concerning the adequacy of the
DPA. (As Table 5-2 and the accompanying text illustrates, the total estimated
backlog can easily be handled by this processor in a one-second cycle, with
about 20% reserve capacity). Therefore, this simulation has been designed
to investigate the amount of time required to process this temporary satura-
tion condition, so as to lead to conclusions concerning the adequacy of the
DPA. (As Table 5-2 and the accompanying text illustrates, the total estimated
backlog can easily be handled by this processor in a one-second cycle, with
about 20% reserve capacity). Therefore, this simulation is designed to inves-
tigate the nature of the I/O processor/arithmetic unit interaction and the
capability of the arithmetic unit to accommodate temporary overloads. It
should be repeated, however, that the overload projected here could be alleviated
by reallocating device/slot assignments, rather than placing heavy requirements
on the first slot group. However, since this worst-case approach provided an
excellent test case for the simulated DPA configuration, the "saturation
approach" was retained for simulation purpose.
As shown in Table 5-2, 9 time slots, or 36 ms, were used to complete a
simulation run*. (As will be seen shortly, this time was mainly due to
continued periodic operations of the I/O processor, rather than operations
in the arithmetic unit. The AU actually completed its duties in 5 time slots).
Pertinent statistics regarding the execution of the model during this period
are as follows:
(1) Task Execution
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TASKS IN PROGRESS SIMULTANEOUSLY 15
AVERAGE NUMBER OF TASKS IN PROGRESS SIMULTANEOUSLY 0.22
Of the total number of tasks simulated (29), over half (15) were in
process at one time. Thus, between the AU and I/O, at least one point was
reached where over 50% of the tasks were awaiting resources, awaiting the
completion of other tasks, or were in execution. However, on the average,
only 0.22 were in simultaneous progress during the 9 slot period. This is
not surprising, since for 4 time slots, no tasks were performed on the AU
and only one of the I/O; therefore the resultant long term average can
validly be expected to be much less than 1.0 for this 36 ms run.
In actuality, numerous simulation runs were performed, with modified work-
loads. The results presented here summarize the output of the most illustra-
tive of these runs. (Preliminary runs were first made to check out the hard-
ware configuration by executing "serial" processor runs; that is, the I/O
processor would trigger a task for the AU, then remain inactive until the AU
completed the task and signalled the I/O processor for more work. These
initial runs servied to verify the adequacy of certain hardware aspects, but
they did not test the interactive effects of both processors operating on
simultaneous tasks. Thus, more sophisticated workloads were progressively
employed to investigate parallel processing, as well as to construct and
verify special output reports to tabulate DPA results).
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Table 5-2. Workload Summary
DPA WORKLOAD SIMULATED 4 time slots (16 ms)
ANTICIPATED (ARITHMETIC PROCESSOR @ 750 > 4 time slots (12,206
KOPS) LENGTH OF TIME TO PROCESS THESE 4 operations)
SLOTS.
LENGTH OF SIMULATED RUN 9 time slots (36 ms)
EXECUTIVE TASKS SIMULATED (Internal to IMSIM) 5
TASKS FOR SIMULATING VIRTUAL MEMORY LOAD 2
SIMULATED APPLICATIONS TASKS 22
TOTAL TASKS 29
ARITHMETIC PROCESSOR PROTOTYPE ROUTINES 2
I/O PROCESSOR PROTOTYPE ROUTINES 6
TOTAL PROTOTYPE ROUTINES 8
ARITHMETIC LOCAL MEMORY DATA BLOCKS & 2 blocks (3000 total words)
BUFFERS (SHARABLE)
I/O LOCAL MEMORY DATA BLOCKS & BUFFERS 6 blocks (3500 total words)
(2 SHARABLE, 4 DEDICATED)
TOTAL LOCAL MEMORY DATA BLOCKS & 8 blocks (6500 total words)
BUFFERS
MESSAGE PROTOTYPES 48
TOTAL MESSAGE TRANSMISSIONS . 55
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(2) Operating Memory Utilization
These statistics detail some of the characteristics associated with the
three modules of operating memory. Again, "averages" are computed over the
full 36 ms run time. Thus, the low averages for OM modules 1 and 2 indicate
that these buffers were occupied for a very small percentage of the run.
However, the OM 3 buffer was full for vitually all of the 36 ms. Further
inspection of message transmission statistics showed that this indeed was
the case: the buffer was filled early in the simulation cycle, and remained
so until associated periodic message transmissions were terminated at the
end of the run.
(3) Mass Memory Utilization
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OPERATING MEMORY MODULE 1 (I/O-A COMM BUFFER STORAGE AREA)
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 17
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.10 ms
MAXIMUM DATA CONTENT 40 words
AVERAGE DATA CONTENT 0.05 words
OPERATING MEMORY MODULE 2 (A-I/O COMM BUFFER STORAGE AREA)
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 17
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.03 ms
MAXIMUM DATA CONTENT 15 words
AVERAGE DATA CONTENT 0.19 words
OPERATING MEMORY MODULE 3 (BUFFER FOR RECEIVING TRANSFERS
FROM M.M.)
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 2
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.28 ms
MAXIMUM DATA CONTENT 1000 words
AVERAGE DATA CONTENT 992.45 words
MASS MEMORY MODULE 1 (ROUTINE STORAGE AREA)
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 2
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 1.82 ml
MASS MEMORY MODULE 2 (COMMUNICATIONS AREA)
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 3
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 1.90 m
Space Division
y • North American Rockwell
The two pertinent modules of mass memory exhibited the statistics shown above.
As with OM modules, the average transmission times exhibit the lengths of
time to transfer required amounts of data to appropriate elements of the CP
at specified transfer rates.
(4) Data Link Utilization
As above, average transmission times reflect the times required to transfer
appropriate amounts of data at specified transmission rates. Note that
the relatively slow multiplexed channel connecting mass memory modules to
the I/O processor require comparatively long average transmission times.
This in part reflects the larger amounts of data that are required in MM+I/O
transfers.
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DATA LINK 1 - OM-1 TO AU, I/O
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 22
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.37 ms
DATA LINK 2 - OM-2 TO AU, I/O
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 17
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.03 ms
DATA LINK 3 - OM-3 TO AU, I/O
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 2
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.28 ms
DATA LINK 4 - R-BUS
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 8
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.13 ms
DATA LINK 5 - C-BUS
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 2
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 0.02 ms
DATA LINKS 101-103 - MM-1,2,3 TO I/O
NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS 4
AVERAGE TRANSMISSION TIME 5.64 ms
Space Division9% North American Rockwell
(5) Processor Utilization
The above summary itemizes the overall utilization of the two processors
for the 36 ms period, each operating at 750K ops per second. Note that the
AU total utilization is within the expected range of 16-20 ms. Note also,
that although the I/O processor is employed almost as often as the AU, its
total utilization is considerably lower than the AU. This is partially
because the I/O does not perform the relatively long applications processing
tasks of the AU, but generally serves to transfer and format data within the
CP. The low utilization of the I/O processor also suggests that a speed of
750 K ops per second is quite high for this unit, and that a lower speed or
a reallocation of tasks among these two processors is desirable.
As an independent check on arithmetic processor statistics, special
IMSIM output reports were designed to generate slot-by-slot utilization
statistics for the run. A summary of these outputs is tabulated below and
is illustrated in Figure 5-3.
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ABITHMETIC PROCESSOR
TIMES USED 1.1.7
TOTAL UTILIZATION 16.23 ms
I/O PROCESSOR
TIMES USED 99
TOTAL UTILIZATION 1.47 ms
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I ,·. 
Space DivisionOD North American Rockwell
ARITHMETIC PROCESSOR SLOT STATISTICS
MAXIMUM ACTUAL PER CENT **
SLOT COMPUTED LOAD OPERATIONS UTILIZATION
1 3012 1965 65.5%
2 7435 2415 80.5%
3 769 3000 100.0%
4 990 2811 93.7%
5 - 1917 63.8%
7-9
I/O PROCESSOR SLOT STATISTICS
MAXIMUM ACTUAL PER CENT **
SLOT COMPUTED LOAD OPERATIONS UTILIZATION
1 240 8.0%
2 356 11.9%
3 NOT 140 4.7%
4 CALCULATED 144 4.8%
5 30 1.0%
6 30 1.0%
7 20 0.67%
8 80 2.7%
9 25 0.83%
*See Table 5-1
**Percent Utilization = Actual Ops
3000 Possible Ops
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6.0 DPA REDu'NDAJCY SI'-DY
6 .1 IiTPODUCTIO N
Thne application of redundancy to the DPA stems from the failure criteria
established for the UIS (Miodular Space Station). The basic guidelines and
constraints used in establishing these criteria were crew safety and mission
continuance. The criteria are applicable to all MSS functions and as such
dictate the following levels of functional classification:
1. non-critical functions
2. non-time critical functions
3. time critical functions
For each level of classification the following fault tolerance capabi-
lities are required:
1. non-critical functions must fail safe following the first failure
2. critical functions must
a) be operational following the first failure (fail operational);
b) provide reduced performance subsequent to a second failure
(fail degraded);
c) provide crew survival for 96 hours subsequent to a third
failure (fail emergency).
The difference between time critical and non-time critical functions is
the response time. Time critical functions require active (on-line) redun-
dancy while non-time critical functions may be satisfied with standby re-
dundancy (i.e., a functional replacement within some time period). This task
was directed toward applying these criteria to the DPA concepts and recommend-
ing a satisfactory operational system.
A DPA redundancy configuration and an operational concept is recommended.
The recommendation utilizes a multiprocessor, multi-computer organization with
an interconnecting 4 channel data bus system. Rationale and tradeoffs are
presented in support of this recommendation.
6.2 DPA REDUNDANCY CONFIGURATION
The recommendations given in this section are based solely on meeting the
fault tolerance criteria specified for each level of functional criticality.
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As stated previously, all MSS functions are assigned one of three levels of
criticality, each having the following criteria:
Level Criteria
(1) Non Critical : Fail Safe
(2) Non Time Critical : Fail Op, Fail Degrade,
Fail Emergency
(3) Time Critical : Fail Op, Fail Degrade,
Fail Emergency
By its nature the DPA executes many functions of all three levels of
criticality and is therefore constrained to all of the above criteria. The
DPA is tailored to take advantage of those criteria of lesser criticality.
To achieve this, the computational (processing) requirements are split between
two processors, each of which is organized to operate as either a multi-
processor or a multi-computer. As such both processors will be located in
separate isolatable volumes and, in general, both processors will have the
capability of backing the other one up. In the case of time critical functions
on-line backup (active redundancy) is provided, while off-line backup
(standby redundancy) is provided for the non-time critical functions. In the
case of non-critical functions the processors will fail safe noting that the
actual action and reaction of the DPA relative to any one particular subsystem
is out of scope for this report. That is, relative to any one particular
subsystem insufficient information is known at this time as to whether the
DPA should,
1. discontinue performing the function and notify operator;
2. execute a power-off command or standby sequence and
notify operator;
3. execute a set of "pre-canned" tests for fault isolation;
4. switch in or request a possible backup unit;
5. take some other action.
In any case all of these functions and more can be performed, the
details of which are recommended for some future study. The purpose here
being to recommend a DPA redundancy configuration for meeting the failure
criteria and to describe the operational sequence in the event failures
are detected within the DPA. In addition, general recommendations for
interfacing subsystems relative to their classifications are provided.
The redundancy configuration recommended herein is presented in Figure
6-1. This concept differs somewhat with the preliminary DPA configuration
and the digital data bus configuration (see Volume III). The proposed
recommendation requires all 4 channels of the data bus to be accessible
from each of the various stations modules.
6-2
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
OD North American Rockwell
>
 
a>;,
rat 
-
a
 
,
 a
I 
I 
a
-iin
~
~
~
~
>
I 
I
I 
.
I
I0
Z
0
I 
i 
I 
<
 
0
II- 
I.
I 
I
I 
4
-(
6-3 
.
.
-H
>C 
u
 
ge3N
1
]
N
N
D
 
CIO
SD 
72-SA
-0114-4
Space DivisionD North American Rocl<well
The configuration, as shown, consists of two centrally located processors,
one in each isolatable volume. The two processors are interconnected with each
other and interfaced with the various subsystems through a 4 channel data bus
system. When operating in the primary mode (no faults detected) each processor
is in control of two of the four channels, each channel being independent of the
others. As shown, each processor is provided a data bus control unit for this
purpose. The amount of added dedundancy applied to each processor is consistent
with only the amount needed to provide the means for performing a comparative
analysis for on-line critical functions and for reconfiguration. This can be
accomplished with the two operating memories, two arithmetic units, plus the
four I/O's as shown with both processors. The constraint is that all on-line
instructions for critical functions are permanently stored in the operating
memory. If this is not feasible, then an additional Mass memory will be
required for each processor.
There is one further redundancy illustrated in Figure 6-1, the remote
terminals. Since both central control and display ections are simplex in
nature, the addition of at least two remote terminals provides the necessary
backup plus the added capability of distributing DPA monitoring and control
to other areas within the spacecraft.
Before going into the operational concept (i.e., response to faults),
the problem of error detection is discussed and recommendations for
detecting errors is presented.
6.2.1 Error Detection
On the surface, the application of redundancy the DPA appears to be
for reconfiguration purposes only; however, this same redundancy applies to
meeting the design goals for error detection necessary for fault tolerance
systems.
In many large complex systems the amount (cost) of error detection is
directly proportional to the amount of return as related to efficiency and
down-time. Efficiency being related to the measure of time between the
occurrence of an error and its detection while down-time is the measure of
turn-around time for maintenance and repair. If a typical system, for
example the DPA, is constrained to be fault tolerant (as in this case) and
furthermore, must meet a maintenance requirement consistent with In-Flight
Replaceable Units (IFRU's), then a completely different design goal must
be used for the implementation of error detection. That is, a design goal
approaching 100 percent error detection is desired plus having the added
capability of isolating to no more than 3 IFRU's with a maintenance and
logistics concept (man-in-loop) consistent with selecting which one of the
three failed. This requirement will result from the relationship between
MTBF and i4TTR versus the number of IFRU's to be handled.
The attempt, here, is to establish a baseline concept for an error
detection system, keeping in mind the desired design goal. However, it is
very unlikely that this will be achieved while being cost effective.
Furthermore, to perform a complete error detection analysis for the DPA and
evaluate which of the many techniques is most optimum is out of scope for
this report. Even so, an error detection system is the first building block
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necessary in establishing a baseline operational concept. Thus, in the
following paragraphs, the errors to guard against are identified, a means for
detecting the errors is given, and the required response is provided.
6.2.1.1 Identification of Errors
The major errors to guard against, concerning the DPA, are identified
as follows:
1. Operator/Program errors
2. Data transmission errors
3. Storage media errors
4. Equipment errors
a. Solid errors
b. Intermittent errors
c. Error detection errors
d. Power and cooling faults
For this system all programs loaded in the DPA and executed will be
assumed error free. That is, all programs affecting MSS operations will have
been checked and re-checked on the ground under "almost" identical conditions
prior to being loaded in the actual DPA. Furthermore, any new programs
added in-flight will be under direct scrutiny of the onboard personnel and
supervisory program during the acceptance phase of such programs.
The remaining errors are self-explanatory noting that data transmission
errors encompass all errors between the DPA and the subsystems, but not the
subsystems themselves.
The errors identified thus far are all attributable to the DPA itself,
That is, in the event any one of these errors are detected, any corrective
action to be taken is made to the DPA. In essence, there exists another
class of errors for which the DPA must react. Such errors would be attributed
to the subsystems in the performance of functions and, any corrective reaction
taken by the DPA would have to be in conformance with that subsystem's level
of criticality, thereby its failure criteria and corrective action. Since
this type of information has not yet been specified in sufficient detail such
reactions will be left for future studies. If the DPA is interdependent with
a subsystem in the performance of a critical function and an error in this
loop occurs as a result of the DPA, detection and response would fall into
the first set of errors identified.
6.2.1.2 Means for Detection
For the system in question the designer has at his disposal four basic
means to the solution of detecting a given error:
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1. Hardware
2. Software
3. Man-in-the-loop
4. Any combination of 1, 2, or 3
The problem is not so much in selecting an approach but once having
selected an approach there exists a multitude of techniques for the detection
of any one particular class of error. Thus, the designer must wade through
the various techniques and select only those most applicable. Having selected
the more applicable techniques for the various classes of error, an analysis
must then be conducted in order to determine which combination of techniques
is best suited to meeting the desired design goals while being cost effective.
Obviously this amount of detail is out of scope for this study. Therefore,
the method used here is to apply techniques in all of the approaches which
have been successfully used in the past and to capitalize on the recommenda-
tions made in the study on "Data Acquisition and Control Redundancy Concept"
(see Volume III). Furthermore, this method will attempt to provide sufficient
overlap between the various approaches and techniques such that errors missed
by one technique are detected by another.
6.2.1.2.1 Operator Errors. Operator errors are recommended to be detected
and controlled by means of hardware, software, and hardware/software combina-
tions.
Memory protection is to be implemented by hardware. That is, the operator(s)
will be provided the capability of keying data into fixed memory locations only
(hardwired address from location A to location B). All data entered will then
be under software control and thereby checked by the routines and/or programs
modules for which the data are intended. The supervisory program is required
to be self protective against any changes that may affect crew safety and/or
mission continuance. Transmission errors will be discussed in a subsequent
paragraph.
The response of the DPA to operator errors will be to notify the operator
and identify the error.
6.2.1.2.2 Data Transmission Errors - Data transmission errors are defined as
those errors occuring in the transfer of data in the four channel data bus
system. In the recommended configuration, two channels are dedicated to each
processor when operating in the normal mode (no faults). For this case the
following means for error detection is recommended.
1. Error checkers preceeding drivers and following receivers as
illustrated in Figure 6-2. These may be implemented as either
Longitudinal and Vertical Redundancy checkers (sometimes called
serial/parallel parity checkers) or as one of the class of
Polynomial checkers. For the present the LRC and VRC will be
used.
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"Typical Between DPA & Subsystems"
f; DRIVER - RECEIVER DECODER/ERROR
CHECKER
Figure 6-2. Data Transmission Error Checkers
Note: -> Implies Echo Checking
- - H Implies Bootstrap
Figure 6-3. Short Message Echo Checker
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2. Periodic "Short Message" echo check. This will be used
as a subsystem to-core data bus self test illustrated in
Figure 6-3. As such, this provides the added capability
of independently error checking and isolating terminals
without added hardware costs. It is assumed that CP-1
and CP-2 perform this check periodically while subsystems
perform an echo check prior to executing the transmission
of any message.
3. Simultaneous data transfers are recommended between the
central processors and those subsystems performing critical
functions. This is consistent with operating the central
processors in the multi-computer mode. In this case the central
processor provides the capability of comparative analysis in order
to approach a 100 percent error detection design goal. However,
there are two problems using this approach. The first is that
of isolating to an IFRU in the event of a fault. This is a
necessary requirement in order to minimize the mean-time-to
repair. The second problem is that no two subsystems inter-
face with the DPA in exactly the same manner. For example,
the RCS and IMU's are designed to detect faults and reconfigure
within themselves. Thus, based on the assumption that critical
subsystems perform a comparative analysis on the data received
(which can only be determined when the details of the subsystem
mechanization are known), the following capability is recommended.
Capitalizing on the Echo check described above the "Short
Message" is recommended to be boot-strapped through the RACU
and/or RPU I/O with the subsystem prior to checking the data
bus interface as illustrated in Figure 6-3. In this manner a
complete thru-put checkout can be made with little or no
imposition on the central processor and with a minimum of
hardware. Note this last recommendation (i.e., boot-strapping)
is applicable to all interfaces.
6.2.1.2.3 Storage Media Errors. It will be assumed that the storage media
(archive memory will be interfaced with the central processor in the same
manner as a subsystem (i.e., via the 4 channel data bus) and thereby treated
in the same manner. The only added recommendation is that programs and/or
data read from this source are under the direct control of a supervisory
program and thereby checked for integrity. This can be done using several
acceptable techniques (e.g., either the LRC and VRC or a polynomial check).
6.2.1.2.4 Equipment Errors. The means recommended for the detection of
equipment errors includes software, hardware, and the combinations of both.
This is not to exclude the man-in-the-loop who provides the overall backup
and who, having encountered two failures, must select which of the two last
computers to use in the event of a third failure (assuming the first two
failures has not been repaired).
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The first recommendation is that error checkers be limited to the level
of an IFRU. This is consistent with the maintenance and repair concept, and
to go below this level would only result in unnecessary costs. Furthermore,
it is recommended that the error detection system be designed to provide
sufficient overlap such that only single fault detectors need be used (e.g.,
a simple parity checker or equivalent). These recommendations are based on
having the added capability of performing comparative analysis in the
processor and, if required, in the subsystem.
There are two types of errors that the checker can detect (assume the
checker is not failed): a solid error or an intermittent error. To detect
the difference, a combination hardware-software technique is used. The
method recommended is normally referred to as roll-back. If an error is
detected an interrupt is created and a retry is made. If the retry is un-
successful the error is considered solid, otherwise, intermittent. If
the processor is operating in the multi-computer mode, this information
must be transferred from one computer to the other and acted on accordingly,
i.e., time phased prior to comparing outputs. If an error is detected in
the I/O, the good data are transferred normally followed by a flag to both
receivers. This can be accomplished relatively easily having multiple
access to all RACU's and/or RPU's.
To check the error checkers, a "canned' routine may be used periodically
for injecting an error into the system for this purpose.
Finally, the processors are recommended to be operated in the multi-
computer mode and comparative analysis be performed on the data. This is
needed whenver the added assurance of meeting the 100 percent error detec-
tion design goal is required.
It will be assumed that power and cooling are redundant and provisions
for failure detection are implemented within these systems.
6.2.2 Operational Concept
The operational concept referred to herein is concerned only with the
operation of the DPA 's response to detecting an error (fault) and corres-
pondingly satisfying the fault tolerance criteria. The operational concept
is consistent with the redundancy configuration given in Figure 6-1. For
simplicity it will be assumed that initially one processor (CP-1) performs
the MSS operations while the other processor (CP-2) performs experimental
functions. In this way the operational concept can be described for CP-1
noting that the converse is applicable to CP-2.
6.2.2.1 Normal Operation
Normal Operation is defined as operating in a "no fault condition".
Operating in this condition the DPA and subsystems will be performing non-
critical and critical functions. In the performance of non-critical functions
the DPA will be operating in the multiprocessor mode. In this mode, CP-1A
and B (A & B refer to independent arithmetic units contained within each
processor, see Figure 6-1) will be sharing a common memory bank in the
performance of the required non-critical arithmetic and logical operations.
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The transfer of data between CP-1 and its associated subsytems will be
conducted over the two data bus channels dedicated to CP-1. In this manner
non-critical functions can be executed efficiently in a minimum amount of
time. In this mode, all of the error detection capability described, with
the exception of comparative analysis by the processor, is applicable. In
essence, the DPA is mechanized to satisfy only the criteria of failing safe
when operating in this mode (i.e., not overly designed).
In the performance of critical functions, CP-1A will be operating
independent of CP-1B. This is referred to as multi-computer mode. In this
mode both arithmetic and control units will be performing identical functions
simultaneously, each operating from independent memory banks with the
resulting data compared for errors. If no errors are detected, both sets of
data are transferred simultaneously on separate channels. This allows both
receivers at the subsystem level, access to independent data; one receiver
receives one set, the other receives the other set. This is in conformance
with the recommendation that if comparative analysis is required at the
subsystem level that it be performed as close to the point of criticality
as possible. That is, performed within the subsystem where the criticality
exists. Conversely, data transferred from critical subsystems will, in
general, be transmitted as two independent sets over the two dedicated
channels. The added features of this mode over the multiprocessor mode is
the comparative analysis on the independent data which is necessary in trying
to achieve the 100% error detection design goal.
For purpose of this concept it is assumed and recommended that the
supervisory program be located in both CP-1A and B and that both operate
independently from a common real time interrupt (external clock). As such
that will allow synchronization of modes where the modes are time scheduled.
That is, a delta (T1) time for non-critical functions (multi-processor mode)
and a delta (T2 ) time for critical functions (multi-computer mode).
6.2.2.2 Single Fault Reconfiguration
The faults referred to here and in the following paragraphs are those
faults which are cause for possible reconfigurtion. Such faults include those
classified as data transmission errors, equipment errors, and errors derived
from comparative analysis.
In general, faults occur in four major areas: subsystem, RACU and/or
RPU, data bus, or a central processor. Taking one area at a time, when
operating in a multi-processor mode, and imposing an error the following
responses are recommended:
Subsystem: Notify operator and respond in accordance with
subsystem requirements.
RACU/RPU: Notify operator; respond to subsystem; isolate
fault using results of "short message" echo check
in combination with transmission check; notify
operator and retry on request to determine if
failure was intermittent.
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Data Bus:
Central
Processor:
Notify operator; execute retry to determine if failure
was intermittent; if not, isolate failure using "short
message" echo checks, transmission error checkers;
interrupt CP-2 and secure one of its two data channels;
notify operator and continue normal operations.
Notify operator; execute retry to determine if failure
was intermittent or solid and notify operator accordingly;
if solid and not in mass memory (1) interrupt CP-2 for
a critical function take-over (2) terminate CP-lA or B
whichever has fault and continue operating on non-
critical functions; if solid and in mass memory interrupt
CP-2 to take over non critical functions (if CP-1 archive
memory could be used this would be preferred).
When operating in the multi-computer mode and a fault is detected the
following responses hold:
Subsystem:
RACU/RPU:
Data Bus:
Central
Processor:
Notify operator and reconfigure in accordance with
subsystem requirements or notify operator that the
subsystem has reconfigured within itself.
Notify operator; determine if failure is intermittent
or solid; if solid reconfigure as per subsystem require-
ments or in some cases (monitoring) notify supervisory
program and reconfigure software to handle only one
source of independent data; isolate failure and notify
operator.
(same as multiprocessor mode)
Notify operator; interrupt other arithmetic and control
unit and execute retry; if intermittent, continue;
otherwise interrupt CP-2 to take over critical functions
and to aid in isolating the failure was not detected by
one of the checking techniques, in which case isolation
is effected immediately; otherwise, CP-2 will check for
differences in the data and, if different, authority is
relinquished back to CP-1 and the subsystem reconfigured;
if they are the same, the data are operated on and
compared with CP-lA and B's results for isolation; the
failed one is terminated and the other is assigned
the non critical functions, noting that CP-2 will be
performing the critical functions.
6.2.2.3 Second Fault Reconfiguration
To continue second and third fault reconfigurations for the subsystems
and their interface with the data bus, is meaningless without more specific
information. That is, the reconfiguration concept applied to the central
processors and data bus is just as applicable to the subsystems without
further information.
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It is assumed, therefore, with the exception of a mass memory failure
that CP-2 is performing critical functions and either CP-lA or B is performing
non-critical functions at this point. This is acceptable since a failure in
mass memory need only fail safe. When operating in this configuration it is
recommended that periodically all three arithmetic and control units perform
an identical "Canned" operation for comparison of performance. This adds to
the confidence level that the CP-lA or B system is operating and, thus allow
CP-lA or B to be used for isolating between CP-2A or B in the event of
failure.
It is further assumed for the present that the first failure response is
applicable for second failures in the subsystems and interface equipments,
therefore only failures in the data bus and processor are discussed.
Data Bus with First Failure in Data Bus: Notify operator and a) if
second failure is in CP-1 data bus, interrupt CP-2 for takeover of
non-critical functions; continue reading critical data in CP-1 on
CP-2 channels for isolation purposes in the event of a CP-2 failure.
b) if second failure is in CP-2 data bus channel, interrupt CP-2
for take over of non-critical functions and the remaining dedicated
CP-1 data bus channel; continue reading critical data in CP-1 for
isolation.
Data Bus with First Failure in CP-1: Notify operator and a) if second
failure is in CP-1 data bus, switch to second channel and continue.
b) If second failure is in CP-2 data bus, interrupt CP-1 and take
over data bus not in
Second Failure in CP-1: Notify operator; interrupt CP-2 to take over
non-critical faunctions; initialize program for possible third failure
(man-in-loop isolation).
Failure in CP-2 with First Failure in CP-1: Notify operator; interrupt
CP-1 to isolate failure, if not detected by error checker; continue
operating with C -1 executing non-critical functions and CP-2A or B
critical functions; continue comparative analyses on "canned" program
between processors; periodically perform comparative analysis on all
data accessible from two independent sources; increase man-to-machine
communications; execute all reconfigurations under operator control.
CP-1 Failure with First Failure in Data Bus: Notify operator;
interrupt "good" CP-1A or B unit for take over of non-critical functions.
CP-2 Failure with First Failure in Data Bus: Notify operator;
interrupt CP-1 for take over of critical functions and one of the two
CP-2 data channels and to isolate between CP-2A or B if undetected by
checkers; critical functions will continue being monitored by CP-2A or B
for isolation purposes.
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All of the second fault reconfigurations described are based on detecting
a solid fault. This assumes that prior to reconfigurating a retry will be
executed to differentiate between intermittent and solid faults. One pre-
caution must be noted here. If a subsystem is required to perform compara-
tive analysis and two successive data bus failures occur such that one of
the two interface equipments are disallowed access to independent data, then
that subsystem must be alerted to conduct its function based on a single set
of data (see Figure 6-1).
6.2.2.3 Third Fault Reconfigurations
To provide the details for all possible third fault reconfigurations is
somewhat out of scope for this report. To be more explicit, there are 18
basic reconfigurations if the order of data bus failures is neglected. On
the other and, if they are accounted for there are a possible 108 reconfigura-
tions which should be described. The 18 possible basic reconfigurations are
illustrated in Figure 6-4 noting that if data.bus failures were ordered this
would expand to 108 possibilities. Therefore, only the impact of the man-in-
the-loop will be discussed relative to third fault reconfigurations.
Ideally, it would be desirable to automatically reconfigure through
any three consecutive failures. With the present concept, however, this
cannot be achieved for all cases and therefore configuration must be
supported by the operator. The role of the operator can best be illustrated
by assigning the following priorities as a function of the sequence of
failures:
Priority One: 3 consecutive arithmetic unit failures
*Priority Two: 3 consecutive data bus failures
*Priority Three: Any combination of 3 failures involving either channels
1 and 3 or 2 and 4 of the data bus
Priority Four: Any other combination of three failures
*Note that the "Two Fault Reconfiguration" case is designed to handle the
event of two consecutive failures in channels 1 and 3 or 2 and 4 (i.e., 4
cases).
For priorities one, two, and three as listed, the operator is required
to isolate the fault and initiate the reconfiguration for at least one of
two possibilities in each case. His decision will be supported by the proposed
error detection system, software design aids, and any added capabilities
provided by the various subsystems. In the present concept this would involve
43 cases: 3 at priority one, 16 at two, and 24 at level three. For the
remaining cases, which involves approximately 65, the DPA can automatically
reconfigure and thereby reduce the burden on the operator. The responses
required by the processor(s) would be typical of those described for the
"one" and "two" fault reconfiguration cases. These responses can be elaborated
on at the time when the subsystem reconfigurations are known in more detail
and at that time the total system response can be described relative to
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detecting all errors. It should be noted that for many of those cases
falling in priority 4, that a fourth failure could be tolerated with the
man-in-the-loop concept.
6.2.3 Summary
The various errors to guard against the DPA were discussed. A baseline
error detection system was developed based on the following criteria:
1. To detect errors consistent with fail safe criterion
established for non-critical functions.
2. To provide a means for approaching a 100% error detection
capability in the performance of critical functions.
3. To be compatible with the In-Flight Replaceable Unit
concept for repair and maintenance..
The recommended DPA redundancy configuration was elaborated on. The
two central processors (CP-1 and CP-2) were recommended to operated in both
the multiprocessor and multicomputer modes. This being necessary in order
to satisfy the following requirements while being efficient and cost
effective.
1. Provide sufficient memory capacity and speed capability to
perform the required MSS and on-board experimental
operations simultaneously
2. Provide a design consistent with the failure criteria
established for the MSS.
A preliminary operational concept was presented with the recommendation
that the concept be expanded in fugure studies to include the details of the
response to errors for the subsystems.
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7.0 CENTRAL PROCESSOR STUDIES
7.1 CENTRAL PROCESSOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSES
This section presents the results of the DPA Central Processor Operations
Analyses task. The objective of this study was to determine the impact of the
MSS central processor operational use and software organization on the design
of the hardware aspects of the central processor.
7.1.1 Software and Data Types
This study began with a review of the specific DPA computational require-
ments and general software production problems as they impact the architecture
and hardware design of the central processor, with great emphasis on overall
system cost effectiveness. Although very few computational characteristics,
other than the processing of specific data structures, were found to bear
directly on the choice of computer hardware, many general aspects of program
execution and software production were found to be sensitive to hardware
organization and design.
In attempting to extract basic processing characteristics that do have
impact on machine design, it became apparent that what really mattered was
the structure of the data elements involved in the computations, and the kind
of arithmetic or logical manipulation to which they were subjected. The
processing system can be designed to handle specific data types.
The scope of allowable data types is an important aspect in the software
design. They represent the forms of information which are processed by the
computer programs. The required data types depend to a large extent upon the
intended use of the multi-processor system, and may impact the design of the
software and hardware system.
The following data types have application to the space station:
1. Boolean. A Boolean data type is a variable which can assume only
one of two values, true or false, on or off. An example of a
Boolean data variable is an overflow bit in an arithmetic unit,
or an execute bit in an I/O control word.
2. Bit strings. Bit strings are a collection of one or more binary
bits. String data possess a length property. A bit string of
length one may be considered a Boolean variable. However, a gen-
eralized bit string may be of any length. The entire string is
an addressable entity. Bit strings are utilized to record status
information, generate control information, and pass discrete
information between software modules.
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3. Scalars. Scalar variables are numbers represented in fixed
or floating point formats. The exact format is not of import-
ance at this time. Scalars, besides being used in arithmetic
operations, are utilized to convey quantitative information
such as 02 pressure, fuel cell voltage, etc.
4. Vector. A vector is an array of scalars obeying the laws of
vector algebra. It is represented by n-components within an
n-dimensional coordinate system.
5. Matrix. A matrix is a rectangular array of M rows and N
columns of MN scalar elements. A matrix may also be thought
of as N vectors of dimensionality M. A matrix obeys the rules
of matrix arithmetic. Matrices are utilized for various G&C
functions, including coordinate transformation, and error
coefficient matrices.
6. Character strings. A character is a non-numeric (in the sense
of value) data type consisting of letters, numerals, or other
symbols. Like a bit string, a character string consists of a
variable number of characters addressable and manipulable as a
single entity. A character string of length N consists of N
individual character elements. The string "DISPLAY DATA" is a
12-character string. Blank is a legal character. Character
strings are the main data type used for crew/computer interaction.
7. Pointers. This data type contains information about the loca-
tion of another data type. Pointers are utilized as control
mechanisms to develop generalization and flexibility in the
software system. They allow the dynamic operation of the soft-
ware system and provide a means for linking program modules,
data modules and control modules. An example of the use of
pointers is in a file directory where the file name is used as
a key for retrieving the pointers which indicate the storage
location of the file.
8. Name. This data type is the differentiating reference to similar
data types. For instance, a matrix, scalar, bit strings are all
referenced to by name. The name "STATE VECTOR 5" refers to a
specific unique vector. No other vector in the system has the
same name. However, it is possible to have a name equivalence,
where the same data element possesses more than one name.
9. Array. An array is a collection of identical data types known
by one name. All the elements within an array must possess some
consistent attributes. For example, in an array of vectors all
vectors must possess the same dimensionality. Every character
string in an array of variable length character strings must
possess the same maximum length.
7-2
SD 72-SA-0114-4C
Space DivisionV114 North American Rockwell
10. Structures. A structure is an hierarchical organization of
data which may contain other structures, arrays or individual
data types. A structure need not consist of identical data
elements. It may contain many levels. The outermost struc-
ture is called a major structure and is considered to be at
level one. Minor structures are considered to be at lower
levels, 2, 3, 4, etc. Each item in a structure possesses a
name. If the name of a major structure is referenced, the
entire structure including all subroutines and elements are
addressed. If the name of minor structures is referenced,
all the elements of the minor structure are addressed.
Structures appear in program organizations as well as file
management situations. A major program containing sub-
program modules which in turn reference other subroutines
can be considered to be a structure. Another example of a
major structure is a file. A file structure may contain many
minor structures or subfiles which in turn may contain pages
which can be considered to be arrays of addressable parts.
Table 7-1 indicates which data types are used for each operational
software requirement. Besides the specific operational requirements 1
through 8, taken from Section 2.0, the overall software system includes
other, nonoperational functions 9 through 12. The intent of the following
paragraphs is to define these requirements in some detail.
1. Sequence and Control
The large number of operational programs which must be
executed sequentially and on demand involves internal task
scheduling, task queuing and priority control. Maximum
utilization of the processor demands a multiprogramming
environment which allows more than one program to be run in
the same processor at the same time; e.g., if one job is
waiting for an I/O request to be serviced a second job can
be executed. Input/output and interrupt control are a part
of this function.
2. Resource Allocation
The large amount of memory required for program and data and
the high processing rates demanded by the space station have
led to the consideration of a multiprocessor with an hierarch-
ical memory organization containing four levels of memory: M1
- local storage dedicated to a particular P; M2 - operating
memory accessible by all P and I/O modules; M3 - the mass
memory accessible via the I/O unit, and M4 - the archival mem-
ory also available via the I/O unit and servicing both multi-
processors.
7-3
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division9% North American Rockwell
Table 7-1. Requirements and Data Types
Type* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
~Func ti o n __Characteristics
1. G&C
Exp. mod. update X X X X (1) Highly mathematically oriented -
extensive use of vector and matrix
algebra
Shuttle alignment X X X (2) Wide dynamic range of numeric data
Terminal rendezvous X X X X X X (3) Boolean variables and flags for
logical decisions
Docking X X X X X X (4) Real time control
2. EPS
Solar array pointing X X X X X (1) Control requires Boolean variables for
control logical decisions as well as bit strings
and scalars to send control information
Fuel cell control X X X X X (2) Scalars are used to monitor quantita-
tive information.
Lighting control X X X X (3) Arrays are employed to store large
amounts of control information
(4) Vectors and matrices are required for
statistical analysis
3. ETC/LSS
Pump and repress X X X X (1) Control requires command words gen-
erated from bit strings and characters
CO2 management X X X X (2) Monitoring requires scalars for quanti-
tative information
Atmosphere control X X X X (3) Boolean variables are required for
logical decisions
Active thermal X X X X (4) Food management involves arrays and
structures as well as names and values
H2 0 management X X X (scalars)
Food management X X X X X X X
Special LSS X X X X
4. RCS
H2 /0 2 X X X X (1) Simple arithmetic
N2 X X X X (2) Decisions
Thrust valve function X X X X (3) Monitoring and control
5. Crew
R.T. medical data X X X X X X (1) Monitoring, control and storage of data
in arrays
N.R.T. medical data X X X X X X (2) Utilization of structures for file
management
Medical analysis X X X X X (3) Mathematical computations for
analysis
6. Structures
Docking X X X X Monitoring and control functions
7. ISS
Communications X X X Bit manipulation, character strings and
logical operations
*See legend at end of table.
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Table 7-1. Requirements and Data Types (Cont)
Data Type
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Function _ Characteristics
7. ISS (Cont)
Displays X X X X Character and message generation
Use of arrays
Mission management X X X X X X X Simple arithmetic operations file structures
8. OBCO X X X X X X X X (1) Simple mathematical computations
(2) Hardware interfacing via I/O
(3) Bit manipulation for complex decision
problems
(4) Data comparison
9. Sequences and Contro.l X X X X X X X X (1) Logical decisions
(2) Control of program structures
(3) Queue control, use of pointers
10. Resources Allocation
Memory control X X X X X X (1) Paging, address control, directory
searching
Processor control X X X X X X (2) Priority control, real time program
control
(3) Very little arithmetic
11. Memory Protection X X X X X (1) Address comparison
(2) Pointer control
12. Failure Anticipation X X X X X X (1) Data backup storage
and Recovery (2) Comparison verification
(3) Pointer control
(4) Complex prestored decisions for
recovery
LEGEND (DATA TYPES):
1 Booleans
2 Bit Strings
3 Scalars
4 Vectors
5 Matrices
6 Character Strings
7 Pointers
8 Names
9 Arrays
10 Structures
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The control of the transfer of information between these memory
levels is a significant requirement. M1-M2 transfer will be
under hardware or firmware control with a fixed paging type
algorithm. M2-M3 and M3-M4 information transfer control can be
accomplished in many ways through implementation of paging seg-
mentation, or overlay techniques. Economy of memory, higher
performance and flexibility introduced by incorporating a dynamic
allocation and deletion scheme.
A second area of resources allocation is establishing the relation-
ships between tasks and processors. It is possible to preassign
tasks to processors. This assumes that complete information con-
cerning task performance is known a-priori. The introduction of
new tasks might require a new assignment strategy. A more general
approach is to assign tasks to processors at execution time
depending upon priority of the task and the busy status of the
various processing elements, and is the approach usually considered
in maximizing the capabilities of a multiprocessor organization.
3. Memory Protection
The large number of independent tasks requires that the tasks be
allowed to access only those areas of memory to which they are
assigned. This memory protection requirement helps reduce the
propagation of errors. It may be implemented by a combination of
software and hardware techniques.
Another area of memory protection which must be considered is the
utilization of cormnmon data between many tasks. Tight control of
this COMPOOL is required to provide temporary data lockout during
write operations. Some data may only be read, other data may be
modified by only a particular task, while a third category of
data may be modified by all users. The illegal modification of
data in the COMPOOL by unauthorized tasks must be detected and the
task aborted.
4. Failure Anticipation and Recovery
The operational requirements allocate a significant amount of
memory for OBCO functions associated with all the space station
I/O equipment. These OBCO programs mainly deal with fault iso-
lation and initial checkout.
Requirements exist for anticipating failures within the multi-
processor itself and recovering from failures after they occur.
Sufficient backup storage must be made available so information
is available to properly initialize redundant equipment and to
take over in case of failure.
Associated with each entry in Table 7-1 are comments concerning the nature
of each computation. Functions such as G&C or analysis programs are very math-
ematically oriented and use scalars, vectors, and matrices. Functions which
7-6
SD 72-SA-0114-4
'|r Space Division
ONy North American Rockwell
perform mostly monitoring and control functions require scalars for quantita-
tive information, and generate control words by manipulating and concatenating
bits and characters. Very complex decision processes require structures.
Storage of large quantities of data can exploit the properties of arrays.
Data types such as names and pointers are most useful for program and memory
control functions.
7.1.2 Approaches to Fault Tolerance in the Multiprocessor
The choice of an effective faul tolerant design requires an investigation
of error detection mechanisms, fault isolation logic, and recovery philosophy.
These items will be discussed in general and their application to the oper-
ating units of the multiprocessor (P, M2, I/O, bus) will then be presented.
Figure 7-1 presents a simplex version of the proposed configuration.
The purpose of this diagram is to illustrate the basic elements of the multi-
processor. A dedicated bus multiport memory configuration is illustrated for
the internal bus. Also shown are separate paths between the P and I/O units.
The utilization of dedicated buses is not that critical in the configuration,
and the principles to be discussed could be implemented with a time-shared bus
or even a cross bar switching mechanism.
The interface between the P and I/O units is conceived to consist of two
signals, one directed from P to I/O and the other from I/O to P. The signal
initiated by P and sent to I/O, tells the I/O unit to indirectly fetch through
a fixed M2 location control information concerning an I/O command. Data
transfer to or from the data bus always goes directly to M2. The signal ini-
tiated by the I/O and sent to P is an I/O interrupt and instructs the P unit
to look indirectly through another fixed M2 location to ascertain what the
I/O unit wants. The type of information that the I/O communicates to the
P unit includes command execution completion and I/O unit, data bus or per-
ipheral unit failure indications.
7.1.2.1 Error Detection and/or Correction
Two types of error must be considered. These are errors due to transients
and errors due to permanent hardware failures. Transient errors are generally
not caused by a hardware failure but rather by a source of external noise. It
is therefore impossible to isolate the source of the error by testing since
the hardware operates satisfactorily. The state of the hardware is altered
by the transient and the valid state is restored. It is therefore not neces-
sary for a spare unit to be switched in order to perform recovery. Any
successful error detecting technique must detect both transient and hardware
failures. A number of methodologies may be applied to provide the error
detection capability.
7.1.2.1.1 Periodic Diagnosis. This..method relies on software to periodically
initiate test sequences and compare the results with predetermined values.
For a number of reasons, periodic diagnosis is unsatisfactory for error
detection within the multiprocessor. First, there is no guarantee that the
error is detected before damage has been caused in terms of bad write operations
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into M2 or incorrect I/O commands. Second, there are failure modes which can
prevent a processor from sequencing, requiring, therefore, some form of hard-
ware time-out to be provided. Third, the categorization of all the possible
failure modes and the execution of the tests to interrogate the possible fail-
ures can be a significant software effort (experience has shown this can
amount to more than 50 percent of the total). Fourth, there is a large prob-
ability that transient errors will not be detected in time for satisfactory
recovery.
7.1.2.1.2 Error Detecting Codes. The commonly applied parity coding is an
effective method of detecting single errors, but is ineffective in protecting
against transients which affect more than a single bit. This is the statis-
tical independent requirement.
Coding techniques have been studied for many years. Codes may be class-
ified as either transmission codes or arithmetic codes. Both may be used for
error detection on the internal bus and in memory. Transmission codes do not
retain their error detection characteristics under arithmetic operations. As
a matter of fact, neither transmission nor arithmetic codes retain their char-
acteristics under nonlinear binary operations.
There are a number of points to consider before relying solely upon cod-
ing for error and failure detection.
1. Not all component failures result in erroneous data
2. The cost of the additional hardware may be more effectively
applied to other techniques of detection and correction.
3. Extensive error coding imposes higher bit rates, and degrades
performance.
7.1.2.1.3 Component Level Redundancy. This methodology applies redundancy
at the circuit or gate level. It is possible to design fail safe logical
systems, in the sense that the system continues satisfactory operation even
if a component fails or a single bit transient error occurs. By incorpor-
ating redundancy as an inherent part of the initial design procedure, rather
than after the design is accomplished, logic can be synthesized which is
tolerant of single component failure.
Quadded logic allows a number of logic gate failures within a digital
computer without disturbing its capacity to perform the function for which
it was designed. This technique can, in theory, increase reliability by
orders of magnitude.
Another form of logic level redundancy is known as interwoven redundant
logic. With this technique, each gate receives a number of versions of each
input and forms its output from the redundant input information. Certain
redundant gates, while performing logic, can correct errors from the previous
stage in one layer of a multilayer structure. Other redundant gates correct
errors in two alternating layers. Majority voting and quadding techniques
are special cases of interwoven redundant logic.
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All of the above techniques suffer from three major drawbacks:
1. On the basis of gate count alone, the application of component
level redundancy is expensive (at least four times the simplex
version)
2. The large increase in the number of interconnections between
the redundant gates can produce unreliability
3. It is a very difficult problem to maintain statistical
independence between failures when one considers problems
associated with mechanical packaging and power supplies
7.1.2.1.4 Functional Level Redundancy. Functional level error detection is
at the level of the arithmetic unit, operating registers, shifter, etc. If
the functional units are synchronized properly, then the output nodes of the
redundant units can be compared and errors detected. Even at this level,
there can exist single failures that prevent error detection; for example, a
power supply transient.
Functional units need not necessarily be 100-percent duplicated to pro-
vide error detection. Parity bits may be added to each logical word of the
nonredundant system. However, parity will not detect all single component
failures.
Majority voting is a technique where each functional unit or system is
triplicated and the output is chosen to agree with the majority of the indi-
vidual outputs from the triplicated elements. An example of an application
of majority vote techniques is the Saturn V computer. Adaptive vote taking
is a modification and extension of the majority vote technique. This method
employs more than three versions of a functional unit output. When one unit
fails, it is automatically switched out of the majority vote network, allow-
ing a greater increase in reliability over conventional majority vote tech-
niques.
7.1.2.1.5 Modular Redundancy. A question arises as to whether functional
level redundancy with comparators at each functional intersection or modular
redundancy (a complete duplicate P, M2 or I/O unit) provides better error
detection properties. From a system performance point of view it is necessary
to detect the inability of a subsystem to communicate correctly with its
environment. A duplicate module operating independently of the first with a
comparator to detect any difference in outputs is just as effective in detect-
ing errors as functional redundancy within the module, provided that error
sources are statistically independent in the two modules. In fact, modular
redundancy may very well be more cost effective, since the total component
count will not, depending of course on the complexity of the comparator,
approach that of the functional redundancy examples in the previous section.
7.1.2.2 Fault Isolation
Once a failure is detected it must be isolated to the level of a replace-
able unit so that recovery can begin. In the case of majority voting, fault
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isolation can be performed by the hardware. It is not a mandatory step since
error correction is automatically assured. In the case of two identical
redundant units, a comparator cannot tell which unit is bad. It can only
indicate a discrepancy and it is necessary to invoke further diagnostics,
usually via software, to check the results to determine which unit is bad.
Software, of course, requires time for execution and can never be fully
effective. In a multiprocessor it is possible for the P elements to perform
self-test in addition to cross-checking between two P elements. For M2 units
or I/O units the P element initiates all fault isolation test sequences. A
philosophical question arises as to whether it is possible to verify that the
particular fault isolation software can isolate all possible fault situations.
Experience with automated test equipment indicates that this is a formidable
task.
7.1.2.3 Failure Anticipation and Recovery
When a failure is detected and isolated, enough valid information must
survive the failure to enable a spare resource to be initialized to the cor-
rect state so that recovery and continued operation can be effected. The
logic mechanism required in anticipation of recovery can be very complex, and
must be thoroughly designed if it is to prove cost effective.
MIT has proposed the concept of a single instruction restart (SIR). The
concept was developed to make recovery from hardware failures and transients
transparent to the programmer. A fundamental tenet in the SIR concept is
that all errors are detected within the instruction in which they first occur,
so there is no propagation of errors to subsequent instructions. Each
instruction is divided into two parts; a compute phase and a store phase.
During the compute phase, results are stored in a temporary buffer and during
the store phase they are transferred to their final storage location. Each
phase is made restartable. When an error is detected the instruction phase
in which the error occurred can be automatically re-executed.
The main motivation for SIR was the Apollo experience in which restart
points were maintained dynamically during execution of the programs. With a
random error rate of 1 in 1012 for the Apollo guidance computer (AGC), an
error might occur within several hundred hours. This error rate imposed a
requirement for a means of recovery after a transient error is detected. For
each program module a restart pointer was maintained so that a preplanned
sequence could be executed in case of an error. The development and testing
of this mechanism was extremely costly. It is estimated to have consumed
over 50 percent of the total software effort. It should be realized that the
AGC was a simplex computer with no hardware redundancy. When an error was
detected, action had to be taken immediately. That is, the recovery program
could be initiated at any point in the middle of any program sequence.
On the other hand, if hardware redundancy, for example, majority voting,
is employed a program module can be allowed to continue to the end before
fault isolation and recovery are initiated. This will relieve the programmer
of many of the problems associated with restart, since he may conceive of the
situation as one in which errors can only occur at the end of program modules
and not in the middle of critical sequences.
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7.1.2.4 Tolerance in P
Error detection within the P element of the multiprocessor is most
important. A permanent or transient failure can give rise to a number of
different error patterns. Some of the problems in the detection of these
error patterns are discussed below.
7.1.2.4.1 Problem Areas.
1. Fan Out
In the process of logical design, a single gate is often used
to drive many different gates. This is called "fan out". The
failure of the driving gate not only causes its output to be
incorrect, it can also propagate to the output of all the gates
to which it is attached. An example where this problem
directly affects the data content within a P element is in
data busing.
Internal to P are a number of buses or common points where
many different data registers may be gated. The failure of a
logic element or connection in the data bit logic usually man-
ifests itself as a single bit error. This type error can be
easily detected by conventional parity techniques. However,
the failure of a control line used to gate information onto
the bus can manifest itself in a multiple error situation. In
the worst case, all the bits on the bus could be in error.
If two registers are gated onto the bus at the same time, a
logical OR between the two registers occurs. No mechanism
exists which can, in general, detect this situation short of
a complete duplicate bus with redundant control lines.
In terms of coding theory, if there are N information bits, a
minimum of N check bits must be used to detect a burst of N
errors. This busing example shows a situation in which a
single component failure caused a potential N bit burst error.
2. Arithmetic Unit
In discussing the failure tolerance aspects of the AU, one
must distinguish between the coded form of the data inputs and
the actual information which the coded form represents. The
coded information may possess redundant information which can
be exploited to provide error detection.
An AU may be defined as having two inputs, an operation and an
output. A and B are the information inputs9 C is the informa-
tion output and OP is the operation defined between A and B:
A OP B = C,
7-12
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space DivisionOT4 • North American Rockwell
OP is typically ADD, SUB, Logical AND, Logical OR,
Exclusive OR, MULT, DIV, etc.
Now, if F(A), F(B), and F(C) are the coded words, there
must exist an operator * such that,
F(A) * F(B) = F(C)
Also, to be useful, in error detection, the function F
must contain enough redundant states to detect all single
errors. One may consider two types of F functions. Sep-
arate codes enable F(A) to be the juxtaposition of A and
some redundant check bits G(A) with a check bit operation *:
F(A) = A, G(A)
A OP B = C G(A) * G(B) = G(C)
Nonseparate codes do not lend themselves to this parti-
tioning.
Literature exists which deals with the problem of arithmetic
codes. That is, OP = ADD or SUB. Both separate and non-
separate codes exist. However, if OP = Logical AND or
Logical OR, there is conjecture that no efficient separate
code exists. To be efficient, the number of bits necessary
to represent F(A), while still retaining a single error
detection capability, must be less than twice the number of
bits necessary to represent A.
It is not our purpose to prove the mechanisms of arithmetic
codes. Suffice it to say that they exist. All the arith-
metic codes provide error detection by performing a residue
check on the result of the arithmetic operation.
The utilization of a nonseparate code creates problems for
the programmer in performing nonarithmetic functions. An
example of a nonseparate arithmetic does is one in which
every number is multiplied by 3. After an addition, the
result, taken modulo 3, must be zero or an error has occurred.
One of the most efficient separate codes is where G(A) is the
parity function of A. However, the logic necessary to com-
pute the parity function of the sum of two numbers requires
the duplication of the carry logic. In addition only half
of the possible single component failures are detected.
The main point in this discussion is that any coding method
used for error detection within an AU is quite complex in
terms of the number of logic gates.
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3. Encoding and Decoding
Within the logical structure of P are areas in which bit
patterns must be decoded or encoded into different formats.
The decoding may or may not produce mutually exclusive
outputs. These processes may, in many instances, allow a
single component failure at the input to the combinational
structure to produce multiple errors on the output of the
combinational circuit.
Address decoding is an example in which parity can help in
detecting errors. Associated with each decoded state is an
input parity state. A single error on the input of an
address decoder will change the parity bit state. This fact
can be exploited in error detection. However, the failure of
the address decoder in such a manner as to select two addresses
simultaneously is very difficult to detect.
4. Control Unit
The utilization of a microprogrammed control memory greatly
reduces the problem of error detection. Parity associated
with each control word is very effective. However, access-
ing the wrong control word because of a failure in the
addressing logic can cause catastrophic results.
Incorrect addressing can be caused by incorrect address
decoding, which could result in the selection of the incor-
rect control word or the logical OR of two control words.
5. Packaging and New Technology
Before presenting possible solutions to the problem of error
detection a few points will be made considering the tech-
nology with which the next generation system will be built.
a. The cost of a system will be a function of the
number of different types of circuit packages,
and the external connection complexity (pin count)
of each package, and more or less independent of
the complexity within a given package.
b. The number of kinds of functions must be minimized.
This will lead to greater use of programmable func-
tions utilizing read only memories.
c. The interconnections between LSI circuits must be
minimized to achieve a high level of reliability.
d. Functions such as arithmetic units will be integrated
on one LSI chip.
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As an example of the cost of an error detecting code, consider the case
of a register-to-register transfer. Information transfer from one register
to another can be protected by the attachment of a parity bit. Considering
present day MSI technology an 8 bit register is packaged on one chip. Simi-
larly, an 8 bit parity generator or checker is also packaged on the chip.
Therefore, the parity logic constitutes just as many circuits as the register
itself. This seems to require twice the logic.
To obtain independent failures the error detection logic and the process-
ing logic must be packaged separately. This implies that they cannot be
manufactured on the same LSI chip. If error detection is accomplished at the
level of the register, or arithmetic unit, then the error detection logic
will consist of at least the same number of LSI packages as the functional
logic.
One may consider the use of redundant registers with a comparator. This
would require three times the logic.
7.1.2.4.2 Recommendations and Conclusions
1. It will require at least twice the logic, and subsequently
at least twice the cost to detect all possible single com-
ponent failures in P.
2. Redundancy at the processor level seems the most practical
because:
a. The redundant processors can be packaged separately
with independent power distribution logic. This
will more closely approach the failure independence
assumption.
b. Redundancy with a comparator at only one interface
will reduce the number of interconnections between
the redundant processors.
c. Redundancy at the module level can yield a degree of
reconfigurability. If the failed half of the duplex
processor is switched out, the reliable half can
still be used by itself or in conjunction with
another processor.
d. Error detecting codes won't detect all possible errors.
e. Periodic software self-test won't catch all failures
before they propagate to multiple errors.
3. To reduce the problem of fault isolation and to implement
rapid or instantaneous recovery a triple processor with
majority voter is recommended.
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4. Since it is assumed some functions may require error detection
and switchover within tens of microseconds, a triple processor
with voter is almost mandatory.
5. The voting element must be redundant to prevent the nonreport-
ing of failures.
6. The internal structure of each P element can be simplified
since no error detecting hardware need be incorporated.
The entire error reporting mechanism is contained within
the voter element.
7.1.2.5 Failure Tolerant Operating Memory, M2
The criticality requirements indicate that redundancy of M2 for recovery
need only require at most 12.5-percent more memory. This assumes that all
single component failures can be detected.
The error detection could possible be accomplished with a completely
redundant M2 with a comparator. However, this is very costly. A method will
be described in which complete error detection with M2 can be accomplished
without a doubling of memory.
It is assumed that the processor contains local storage, M1, and trans-
fers between Ml and M2 are multiword (block oriented).
7.1.2.5.1 Error Detection Criteria. The major problem in applying error
detecting codes to memory storage is that of assuring that a single component
failure does not cause undetectable multiple errors. To meet the Fail Opera-
tional requirements all component failures must be detectable before the
failure propagates. For the purpose of this discussion, the following errors
must be detectable for a memory error detection proposal to be satisfactory.
1. All bit failures within a word must be detectable
2. Addressing an incorrect word must be detectable
3. Addressing an incorrect block must be detectable
4. The failure of a memory module to sequence must be
detectable
5. Errors yielding an all "0" or all "1" word must be
detectable
In conventional 2, 2-1/2 or 3-D core or plated wire memory systems all these
errors can result from single component failures.
7.1.2.5.2 Proposed M2 System Properties. To achieve the above five goals an
M2 configuration with particular properties is proposed. The interaction
between M2 and P plays a large role in the error detection process. The con-
figuration possesses the following aspects.
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1. The entire operational memory, M2, possesses a partial backup
M2', which is sufficient to aid in recovery of critical tasks.
If the allowable recovery times for time critical tasks are
sufficiently long for critical programs to be read from M3
into an alternate M2 module (i.e., greater than 10 milliseconds),
M2 need only serve as storage for the redundant write operation,
less than 12K words. If recovery times are more stringent than
this, invariant critical programs will need to reside in M2' in
addition to the variables. M2' may then exceed 30K words.
2. The block transfers between M1 and M2 allow the application of
a block code. This code (shown in Figure 7-2) utilizes one
parity bit per word and one parity word per block. If address-
ing to a level less than a block is desired the entire block
is still accessed to provide error detection.
If a block of information words contains B bits per word and
W words per block, then a total of W + B + 1 extra bits are
required per block of W x B bits.
For a 16-word block of 32 bit words, containing a total of
512 bits, an aggregate of 49 extra bits would be required.
3. The parity check bits, both vertical and horizontal, will be
stored in both M2 and M2'.
4. All check bits are verified after each read operation. The
P unit always reads M2 for information and M2 and M2' for
the check bits. The interface of the P unit performs the
parity verification automatically in the hardware as well as
compares the check bits.
5. The interface between P and M2 is physically separate from
the interface between P and M2'. That is, P has two buses
to memory, one for M2 and one for M2'.
6. The P element will contain a time-out mechanism to indicate
that the memory has not responded within a predetermined
time limit.
7. The first word in each block will contain the block address.
Let us now examine how well the above properties satisfy the five error
detection criteria presented in Section 7.1.2.5.1.
1. All single bit errors are detected by both horizontal parity
bits and veritical parity words. As a matter of fact, single
bit errors are correctable although this feature of the block
code is not exploited. Two dimensional odd parity will not
detect symmetrically clustered even numbers of errors in
different words as below.
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GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
HORIZONTAL PARITY BITS
ONE BIT PER WORD
(CHECK ON ROWS)
_..5._- CHECK ON CHECKS
VERTICAL PARITY BITS
ONE WORD PER BLOCK
(CHECK ON COLUMNS)
EXAMPLE - ODD PARITY, 5
1 0001 1
0 1 1 10 0
1 01 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
BIT WORD, 6 WORD BLOCK
Figure 7-2. Block Code for M2
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ERROR HORIZONTAL
BITS 7 PARITY
WORD 1 X X
WORD 2 X 
PARITY
_'_V_ ERTICAL
PARITY
The probability of this occurring in practice can be mini-
mized by careful memory design. Logically adjacent bits
can be assigned physically nonadjacent memory arrays by
bit-plane organization, interleaving, etc.
2. If M2 accesses an incorrect word, the failure can be
detected by two mechanisms. The horizontal parity will
detect the error in one-half the time. The main mechan-
ism, however, is the vertical parity word, which will
indicate a multiple error. If the vertical parity word
does not detect the failure, then the accessed word must
have had the same data content as the desired word. This
is, of course, perfectly satisfactory.
3. If an addressing failure causes the access of an incorrect
block in M2, then the vertical parity word comparison will
indicate the failure. Similarly, the horizontal parity
bits will also make the indication positive.
4. The improper sequencing of a memory module can manifest
itself as an incorrect word. This is detectable by parity
checks. The nonsequencing of M2 or M2' results in a mem-
ory hang-up situation. This must be detected by the time-
out mechanism in the requesting P or I/O element.
5. Burst errors which cause all the bits in a memory word to
become all "0" are detected by the horizontal odd parity
bits and vertical parity word. An all "1" burst error in
a word is detected by the vertical parity word.
It seems from these considerations that all failures in M2 modules can be
detected by the above scheme. Failure in the parity generation and error
detection logic is a failure in the P or I/O interface. A failure in the
P or I/O interface is discussed later. A precise determination as to
whether the block oriented M2 with check bits in M2' will satisfy the 100-
percent error detection criteria must depend upon a careful analysis of a
specific M2 design and technology. This detailed analysis is beyond the
scope of this present effort.
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7.1.2.5.3 Memory Failure Recovery. For time critical (TC) functions which
contain program and data in redundant storage, M2', recovery from a memory
failure is a simple matter. Since the P unit detects the failure during a
read block operation, the P unit need only initiate a command to read the
redundant copy from M2'.
In those cases where an addressing failure during the addressing of TC
information causes a different block to be read from M2 and M2', a procedure
must be initiated to isolate the bad block. This can be accomplished by
comparing the address contained within the first word of the block with the
desired address. Depending upon recovery time requirements for TC functions
this procedure may be accomplished in software, firmware, or hardware.
In case of a transient which destroys the contents, but not the mechanism
of M2, backup programs from M3 must be read in and allocated memory space.
This can proceed while critical tasks are still being executed out of M2'.
Complete restoration of M2 including critical and noncritical tasks might
take hundreds of milliseconds. However, as long as M2' can execute the TC
functions the situation is satisfactory.
7.1.2.6 Fault Tolerant Input/Output
It is not specified at this time the maximum recovery time from failure
in the I/O unit. The resolution of this question is the same as for P. It
is a matter of time criticality. As with P, two I/O units are required for
failure detection. It is assumed that software fault isolation will require
too much time. Therefore, a triple redundant I/O unit is proposed.
7.1.3 Summary of Central Multiprocessor Design Factors
The major controlling factor in the configuration is the failure toler-
ance requirements. This is closely followed in importance by those factors
which tend to reduce the software cost by making the system easier to program
and test. It is probable that the software cost for the space station will
ultimately overshadow the cost for the computer hardware. Therefore, the
judicious incorporation of hardware which relieves the programmer of implement-
ation details related to machine functions can create a more cost effective
system.
7.1.3.1 Failure Tolerance Features
1. Each processor element will be triply redundant with adaptive
voting elements.
2. Each I/O unit will be triply redundant with adaptive voting
element.
3. Memory error detection will be provided through exploitation of
a block code with check bits and information bits being stored
in independent memory modules
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4. M2 memory will have an area in which critical functions operate
so that fail operational performance can be attained for critical
tasks.
5. The internal bus must contain dual redundancy so that a failure in
a bus interconnection does not cause overall system failure.
7.1.3.2 Memory Hierarchy
A number of different levels of memory must be considered. Numbers pre-
sented below are only tentative.
1. MO. This is the microprogrammed control memory. The speed of
MO will probably be in the 50 to 100 ns, access time range.
The number of bits is a function of the number of micro con-
trolled macros desired for a given performance level. Probably
a total of 25,000 bits would prove satisfactory. This could be
arranged in an appropriate combination of micro and nano memor-
ies, taking advantage of both horizontal and vertical micro-
programming features.
At least part of MO should be RAM memory. We suggest at least
10,000 bits.
2. Ml. This is the local storage dedicated to each P element.
Its speed is in the 100 to 500 ns access time range. If used
as a cache, 4K to 8K of 32 bit words would be very adequate.
Cache memory size used with the IBM 360/85 was determined
experimentally by executing various mixes of machine code.
It is not clear at this time what the size of or even the need
for M1 will be in the case where the P element executes instruc-
tions at a higher level than the base 360 set from which cur-
rently reported M1 performance specifications were derived.
This is a function of the locality of HOL instructure flow and
HOL data. This subject will be investigated later.
3. M2. This is the operational memory. The speed of this memory
is in the 1 to 2 microsecond range. Although it was indicated
in Section 2.0 that 90K of memory is required with an appropri-
ate memory management algorithm for communicating between M3
and M2, either via paging or segmentation, the requirements
imposed upon M2 can be reduced to the 23K to 64K range, with
32 bit words organized into blocks of 16 to 64 words each.
The size of the backup module M2' is determined by (a) the
recovery time constraints of critical tasks, and (b) storage
for the vertical parity bits associated with the blocks. The
bit total is directly proportional to the number of stored
blocks, which is inversely proportional to the number of words
in a block. For 16 words in a block the total number of parity
bits approaches 10 percent of M2 storage. For a 64-word block
the total number of parity bits is less than 5 percent of M2
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storage. The minimum size for M2' is approximately 4K, 32 bit
words. For this situation 64 word blocks are assumed. Time
criticality is such that all backup is contained in M3. On
the other extreme, M2' can be 32K, 32 bit words. This is
arrived at by assuming 16 word blocks and that all critical
programs and data are contained in M2'. For the purpose of
this discussion, M2' is considered to be the totality of all
backup operational memory.
4. M3. This is the mass memory. It has a latency time of the
order of 1 to 10 ms. All but the high iteration rate functions
reside in M3. Any expansion of DPA functional capability will
probably occur in terms of 600K, 32 bit words are required for
M3.
5. M4. The archival memory is large, consisting of many millions
of words. It has been defined not to impact design factors
within the central multiprocessor.
7.1.3.3 Processing Element
1. The P element will contain a local memory M1 to reduce bus
traffic and increase processing speed.
2. Microprogrammed control will be utilized.
3. Hardware will be incorporated to aid in implementing a higher
order language. This includes the hardware control of stack
mechanisms, the automatic setting and testing of descriptors,
and the direct execution of a reverse polish string or inter-
mediate level language.
These hardware elements tend to make performance criteria
such as MIPS or EAPS less meaningful than for machine lang-
uage execution. The decision to store instructions in terms
of the more semantically concise HOL notation will tend to
reduce the amount of M2 and M3 storage required.
7.1.3.4 Input/Output Unit
1. The I/O unit will be microprogrammed controlled. The memory
can be ROM except during the development stages of the system,
when a RAM will make for easier system integration.
2. A maskable interrupt between the I/O unit and the P elements
will be provided. Details concerning the interrupt will be
placed in dedicated M2 locations by the I/O processor. It
is better to provide the interrupt capability at this initial
stage of planning, and to disable it by means of a mask, than
to determine a later requirement for it and to have no way of
implementing it.
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3. The I/O unit should be allowed an independent asynchronous inter-
face with P, since it would lead to a less complex, and therefore,
reliable design.
7.1.3.5 Internal Bus
The choice of configuration and performance criteria for the internal
bus is a subject to be covered later. A decision is not given at this time.
However, a few observations can be made.
1. Enough capability should be provided so that the bus is not
the limiting factor in performance, especially in the maxi-
mally expanded configuration.
2. The number of interconnections between communicating elements
should be minimized consistent with performance factors.
7.1.3.6 Memory Protection
1. The M2 complex will be provided with logic to automatically
control the interlock mechanism as well as to prevent and
abort deadlocks.
2. The hardware testing of descriptors for memory protection
will be provided.
7.1.3.7 Some Operational Considerations
1. The transfer mechanism between M1 and M2 will probably consist
of a hardware controlled algorithm with a limited associative
memory to aid the search procedure.
2. Transfer control between M2 and M3 will probably consist of a
combination of paging and segmentation. Again, some special
associative hardware, packaged within the M2 complex, will aid
in the dynamic allocation and deallocation of M2 physical space.
3. Transfer control between M3 and M4 is not a major time factor.
It can be controlled entirely by software. M4 can be program
controlled like any external I/O unit. It is not considered
to be part of the M1-M2-M3 virtual memory system.
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7.2 HOLD MEMORY ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL BUS DESIGN
The remainder of Section 7.0 develops the concept of a higher order
language machine (HOLM). In order to study the merits of a HOLM and its
possible application in the central multiprocessor, the memory hierarchy
and the internal bus design were studied. A functional division of the CP
memory into the M1, M2 and M3 levels (defined in Section 7.1) is made.
Recommendations of internal organization, performance, and technology for
each level are presented. An analysis of bus traffic in a HOLM environment
13 is given. Problems of conflict and implementation are discussed. A
recommended bus transfer concept is described.
7.2.1 Higher Order Languages and Higher Order Language Machines
This paragraph addresses the topic of employing a higher order language
for the central multiprocessor. Before proceeding with the detailed discus-
sion some clarifications must be made concerning the programming language and
the machine upon which the language is executed. To aid in the understanding
of the differences between a higher order language and a machine-oriented
language, the following definitions are presented.
1. Higher Order Language (HOL). An HOL is a notational system
which allows the programmer to define the problem to be
solved in a form which reflects the characteristics of the
problem, and which is related to the programmers natural mode
of expression.
2. Machine-Oriented Language (MOL). A MOL is a notational system
which enables the programmer to describe his problem in terms
of the instructions of the available computer. Since most
present day computers are based upon the Von Neumann type
architecture a MOL possesses executable statements such as
LOAD, STORE, ADD, SUB, CONDITIONAL BRANCH, etc.
3. Higher Order Language Machine (HOLM). A HOLM is a machine
which directly executes HOL statements. There is no need
to convert the HOL into some MOL by means of a preliminary
compilation in order to process the HOL statements. In other
words, a HOLM is a piece of hardware which was designed with
the characteristic structure of a particular HOL in mind and
which therefore executes the basic HOL operations efficiently.
4. Machine-Oriented Language Machine (MOLM). A MOLM is a con-
ventional machine whose basic instructions are biased toward
the control and manipulation of data by the basic elements
of its architecture.
The relationship between the language and machine is depicted in Fig-
ure 7-3. If a MDLM is used to execute a HOL, then a translation is required
to convert the HOL into the MOL. This process is usually referred to as
compilation. If the HOL and MOLM possess a large mismatch the inefficiencies
can occur in terms of speed of execution and utilization of memory.
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ALGORITHM
Figure 7-3. Language and Machine
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The assembly process takes the MOL or HOL, converts operations to binary
form and establishes the relationships between symbolic addresses and physi-
cal memory space. For the purpose of this discussion the assembler is an
intrinsic part of the machine.
7.2.1.1 Justification for Using a HOL
There are a number of standard arguments in favor of using a HOL over
a MOL as the basic language of a programming effort (3, 4, 5)*.
1. Ease of Communication within the Program
a. The program becomes self-documenting and therefore reduces
the cost and need for separate documentation for different
levels of management (e.g., mission definition, analysis,
program specification).
b. The ability to communicate allo;s the analysist who
develops the equations to program them. This avoids the
inherent difficulties of communication that occur between
differently oriented groups of people.
c. In any large project, the problems of maintainability are
aggravated by the inevitable turnover of personnel. Not
only must different people be able to maintain the program,
but they must also be able to easily modify, add, or redesign
sections of the software.
2. The HOL is chosen because it is oriented to the problem being
solved and uses language more natural to the programmer. The
concise formulation of the problem is therefore enabled. This
leads to:
a. Fewer errors due to conceptual difficulties and the
different ways of stating a problem.
b. Shortened program design and development time.
3. The programmers need be less concerned with the following
traditional machine features and problems:
a. Scaling and precision problems
b. Base register allocations
c. General register considerations
d. Initialization problems, particularly in loops
e. Data protection
4. The HOL allows program transferability from one machine to
another, eases debugging, reduces checkout problems due to
problem oriented modularity and separation from hardware.
* References are listed at the end of the section.
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5. Carey and Sturm (Reference 6) present some interesting facts
concerning the costs of existing space software and the projected
cost savings of a compiler for aerospace programming. In par-
ticular, they are concerned with the SPL compiler. The following
information is extracted from the above reference to indicate the
software cost for aerospace missions:
a. The cost of software for manned space missions is two to
four times the hardware cost.
b. The Apollo Saturn V's instrument unit software was produced
at a rate of 2.5 instructions per man-day.
c. As much as 1 to 2 months was needed to make a 500 to 1000
instruction change in the Titan III computer.
d. Software checkout is very expensive and not perfect. A
single error in a 2000 instruction space program might
require 50 to 100 validation runs on a simulated ground-
based machine. Extrapolation to a 25,000 instruction
program indicates 1000 to 1200 runs.
e. Typically, 100 instructions in new unvalidated machine
code written by a senior programmer may contain 3 to 8
errors. Carey and Sturm estimate 10 to 70 percent of
these errors can be avoided by the use of a compiler.
f. By hand, machine code typically is produced at a rate of
270 to 350 instructions per man-month. With a compiler,
500 to 540 instructions per man-month is possible.
g. Writing a JOVIAL compiler for an IBM 4 Pi computer would
cost between $300,000 and $500,000.
Software is indeed expensive. To quote Carey and Sturm,
"But software is soft more in name than in fact. The
dollars involved are hard, and so are delays in soft-
ware development."
6. Lest the cost of the compiler frighten anyone, consideration
must be given to the alternative; namely, the generation of
an assembler. IBM (7) states that two to five man-years were
required to produce assemblers for various space-qualified
computers. The assembler for the B-70 computer required three
to four man-years, the Gemini computers took two to three man-
years. The 4 Pi/CP required four to five man-years. A second
assembler for the CP required two additional man-years. If we
estimate 40 to 50 thousand dollars, loaded, per man-year, the
cost of an assembler is the $100,000 to $250,000 price range.
In the same reference, IBM states that it was cost-effective
to produce Algebraic Language Translator (ALT) compiler just
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for the purpose of reducing programming errors. This compiler
was developed for the TC-2 computer for the A-7D/E aircraft
even though it was not part of the contract.
7.2.1.2 Justification for Using a HOLM
Computational inefficiencies occur whenever a compiler is required to
translate the statements of the problem into machine instructions due to the
mismatch between the computer architecture and the HOL architecture. The
design of a machine which matches the language will not only eliminate the
processing inefficiencies and improve performance over a conventionally
structured MOLM, but it will also reduce memory requirements because a HOL
statement is more semantically concise and economic of space. A number of
designs have been proposed and implemented. The following estimates of per-
formance and cost reductions have been made.
1. Kerner and Gellman (Reference 2) have designed a machine which
directly executes Fortran statements. Programs written in this
language and executed on their machine occupied 75-percent less
memory. This conclusion was reached by comparing the machine
code generated by the Fortran compiler for the IBM 7094 with
the number of words required to represent the instructions for
the HOLM. The 4:1 compression of memory space for program stor-
age was the result.
Since a significant portion of the memraory in the space station
is required for storage of programs, a substantial cost savings
is possible. An estimate of the logic cost for the Fortran
language processor (FLP) was made. It was estimated to require
45,000 gates, which is equivalent to a medium- to large-scale
computer.
An interesting analysis was conducted considering a computer
aboard and earth-orbiting space station. The computer was
estimated to contain 260,000 32-bit words. Sixty-thousand
words were allocated to executive program data and work area,
leaving 200,000 words for instruction storage. The instruction
compression ratio of 4:1 was applied indicating a memory sav-
ings of 150,000 words or 5.7 million bits.
The analysis indicates, that considering the logic necessary to
implement the FLP, the memory and power supply, a savings of
315 pounds could be obtained. At a launch cost of $1000 per
pound, this amounted to $315,000 per vehicle.
2. Sugiomoto (Reference 1) has studied the direct execution of the
PL/1 language. He has actually implemented the PL/1 reducer,
and has some experimental results. For typical scientific pro-
grams, the length of the object code has been reduced by 25
percent compared to the object code generated by presently
available PL/1 compilers. He also found a speed gain of 28
percent for arithmetic string operations.
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It should be emphasized that Sugiomoto's data are experi-
mental, while Kerner and Gellman's work is analytical and
the result of simulation tests.
3. Rice and Smith (Reference 8) discuss the SYMBOL system which
includes the development of a language and hardware to execute
the language. They concluded that the direct hardware imple-
mentation of a general-purpose, high-level language and a good
conversation mode system can save up to 50 percent of the
overall facility cost of a good conventional system using a
general-purpose, high-level, batch-oriented system.
7.2.2 Memory Hierarchy
The different levels of memory hierarchy were defined in paragraph
7.1.3.2. Figure 7-4 illustrates four of these levels and the data paths
between them. Memories M1 and M2 will be discussed in the following para-
graphs; the mass memory and the archival memories are discussed in
Section 8.0.
7.2.2.1 Design of M1
Five categories of local functions can be identified:
1. High-speed buffer for interface to M2
2. HOL instruction buffer
3. Data buffer and search memory
a. Descriptor cache
b. Value cache
4. Control stack
5. Evaluation stack
7.2.2.1.1 Interface Buffer. This buffer accepts blocks of five words which
arrive from M2 at intervals of 200 microseconds per word. Transmissions are
checked for parity and content and are dispatched to the other M1 areas for
processing. The size of this buffer need not exceed a few words. Its speed
must be commensurate with the delivery rate of data (i.e., less than 200 ns
cycle time).
7.2.2.1.2 HOL Instruction Buffer. This buffer holds the stream of HOL
particles, probably one byte each, while they are decoded and executed. The
size of this buffer is determined by the degree of locality in the instruc-
tion stream, and the value of instruction hit ratio desired. A buffer size
sufficient to hold small routines would aid in keeping program references
local. A 64 or 128 word buffer is suggested. A buffer that is more than
one block large immediately incurs the problems of mapping from M2, determin-
ation of presence and location of desired information, and replacement
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policies. A size of 64 words implies a 16 lvel associative search for the
desired block (4 words per block); this is well within current state of the
art, even at 100 ns to 200 ns cycle times.
7.2.2.1.3 Data Buffer. The use of descriptors as a control and protection
mechanism is proposed. The execution of a HOL statement is expected to gen-
erate several times as many references to data elements for the purpose of
manipulation in control stacks, etc., as for actual numerical evaluation.
Hence, it is proposed to provide separate storage and control for descriptors
and operand values. Sumner (Reference 10), reporting on the design of the
MU5 computer of Manchester University, found in practice that most programs
contained less than 100 names; individual routines, less than 64. Accordingly,
a 64-level associative store for procedure and data descriptors is proposed.
Storage for operand values should be sufficient to contain the larger
data structures which the HOL will recognize. A degree of associative search
in the value buffer may assist the evaluation of repetitive operations involv-
ing large structures, although this may only be determined by closer analysis
of real situations. An operand value store of about 64 words is proposed
with, at this time, a random access organization.
7.2.2.1.4 Stack Mechanisms. It is proposed to assign a control and evalua-
tion stack mechanism to each individual AU. A stack will help to improve the
hit ratio by maximizing local operations. The exact implementation of the
stack is not important: most stack mechanizations involve a conventional
memory address and control organization with stacking being handled by pointers
or indirect addressing. Special purpose hardware using shift registers may
yield higher performance. Although control and evaluation stacks are concept-
ually separate, it is possible to combine them in a single mechanisms, as in
the SPL machine of Keeler, et al (Reference 9).
This study does not allow a detailed enough analysis to establish speci-
fic organization, size and speed requirements for the proposed stack memory.
However, for completeness, it is estimated that each stack (control and eval-
uation) should be about 64 words deep. Stack overflows must be provided for
by continuing each stack in appropriate regions of M2.
7.2.2.1.5 M. Summary. We have just outlined five major functional areas to
be considered as the sum total of the local buffer memory Ml. Each has been
very approximately sized at 64 words as illustrated in Figure 7-5. The total
M1 capacity does not exceed 350 words, or about 104 bits. Consequently, the
constraints on the technology to be used for M1 are considerably eased. It
is very likely, in fact, that the proposed M1 will prove smaller and consid-
erably less difficult to design than the micro and nano memories required in
each AU to implement the HOL execution capability.
The overall speed requirement in M1 is difficult to assess in view of
the uncertainty concerning HOL operation. It can certainly be stated that
it will not exceed that required to sustain the 106 equivalent add instruc-
tions per second of a conventional architecture (i.e., about 500 ns cycle
time), although certain portions, such as the M2 interface buffer, must
operate at less than 200 ns for reasons stated above. Current technologies
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Figure 7-5. M3 Functions
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Storage for operand values should be sufficient to contain the larger
data structures which the HOL will recognize. A degree of associative search
in the value buffer may assist the evaluation of repetitive operations
involving large structures, although this may only be determined by closer
analysis of real situations. An operand value store of about 64 words is
proposed, with, at this time, a random access organization.
7.2.2.1.4 Stack Mechanisms
It is proposed to assign a control and evaluation stack mechanism to
each individual AU. A stack will help to improve the hit ratio by maximizing
local operations. The exact implementation of the stack is not important:
most stack mechanizations involve a conventional memory address and control
organization with stacking being handled by pointers or indirect addressing.
Special purpose hardware using shift registers may yield higher performance.
Although control and evaluation stacks are conceptually separate, it is
possible to combine them in a single mechanism, as in the SPL machine of
Keeler, et al. (9).
This study does not allow a detailed enough analysis to establish specific
organization, size and speed requirements for the proposed stack memory. How-
ever, for completeness, it is estimated that each stack (control and evaluation)
should be about 64 words deep. Stack overflows must be provided for by
continuing each stack in appropriate regions of M2.
7.2.2.1.5 M1 Summary
We have just outlined five major functional areas to be considered as the
sum total of the local buffer memory Ml. Each has been very approximately sized
at 64 words, as illustrated in Figure 7-5. The total M1 capacity does not
exceed 350 words, or about 104 bits. Consequently the constraints on the
technology to be used for M1 are considerably eased. It is very likely, in
fact, that the proposed M1 will prove smaller and considerably less difficult
to design than the micro and nano memories required in each AU to implement
the HOL execution capability.
The overall speed requirement in Ml is difficult to assess, in view of the
uncertainity concerning HOL operation. It can certainly be stated that it will
not exceed that required to sustain the 106 equivalent add instructions per
second of a conventional architecture (i.e., about 500 ns cycle time), although
certain portions, such as the M2 interface buffer must operate at less than
200 ns for reasons stated above. Current technologies available to implement
a 104 bit memory in this speed range include plated wire and bipolar, MOS and
CNOS semiconductor LSI. A choice of specific technology must fall on the
secondary factors of cost, power dissipation, weight and volume. Another
factor to be considered is that a semiconductor approach allows logic and
memory functions to be combined which provides it a considerable advantage in
the design of associative and/or search memories. The complementary MOS
technology technology has extremely attractive properties: high speed (<50 ns),
low power (10-9 watts/bit), and noise immunity. It is apparently developing
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available to implement a 104 bit memory in this speed range include plated
wire and bipolar, MOS and CMOS semiconductor LSI. A choice of'specific tech-
nology must fall on the secondary factors of cost, power dissipation, weight
and volume. Another factor to be considered is that a semiconductor approach
allows logic and memory functions to be combined which provides it a consid-
erable advantage in the design of associative and/or'search memories. The
complementary MIS technology has extremely attractive properties: high speed
( 50 ns), low power (10-9 watts/bit), and noise immunity. It is apparently
developing strongly in the commercial field, which is always an auger that a
technique is about to become generally accepted, and by post-1975 CMOS may be
the overwhelming candidate for space station use. If an M1 technology must
be pin-pointed today, it would be CMOS.
In summary, the M1 functional and performance specification is as
follows:
1. Organization
a. Interface buffer. 5 to 10 32-bit words; 200 ns cycle time
word-by-word shift register at input, 4-word parallel
transfer at output
b. Instruction buffer. 64 words arranged in 16 four-word
blocks, with each block containing a search tage to
enable 16-level associative search for desired block
c. Data buffer. One 64-word content-addressable memory
(CAM), and one 64-word location-addressable (random
access) memory
d. Control stack. Two 64-word last-in, first-out lists;
probably arranged as location-addressab'le RAM with
address pointers
2. Performance
Apart from interface buffer section, which must cycle at 200 ns
interval, 200 ns to 500 ns cycle times for all-sections.
3. Technology
For post-1975: CMOS. Bipolar LSI and plated wire would be
strong back-up candidates.
7.2.2.2 M2 Design and Interface to M3
This paragraph will be mainly concerned with the capacity requirements
of the operating memory M2, the organization of the data, and the management
of the flow of program and data between M2 and Ml, and between M2 and M3.
The M2 access speed has already been largely determined by the discussion of
M1 in the previous paragraph. In order to make appropriate design decisions
we must preview some of the results of the paragraphs that follow. The dis-
cussion on failure tolerance concludes that:
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1. Two physically independent M2 complexes are required to provide
recovery for critical functions in the case of an M2 module
failure. Critical variables are stored redundantly in each
complex. Critical instructions and fixed data are permanently
resident in M2, but are not redundantly stored in M3.
2. Each M2 complex consists of five physically separate modules,
four for program and data and the fifth for storage of the
check word with which all information transfers are validated.
3. The mass memory M3 is used as the primary storage medium only
for noncritical programs and data. For this reason, no redund-
ancy of the M3 unit is proposed.
The total M2 storage requirement for the M2 design proposed in this
report can be summarized as follows. The estimated differences between a
conventional and a HOL machine are shown for comparison.
Total M2 Storage Requirement (32-bit words)
Function Conventional HOL
Critical instructions 24,254 8,040
Critical fixed data 5,523 5,523
Critical variables 6,523 6,523
Critical variable redundancy 6,523 6,523
Overlay area 32,768 16,384
Total information storage 75,591 42,993
Error checking (+25 percent) 18,898 10,749
Total storage 94,489 53,742
200% design/growth margin 188,978 107,484
Grand total with maximum
expansion 283,467 161,226
The following comments are made concerning the breakdown of M2:
1. A HOL approach is expected to require only 30 percent of the
storage for instruction of a conventional machine.
2. No storage reduction for data in a HOL machine is assumed.
3. These estimates reflect the functional breakdown of Section 2.0
which identified a total storage requirement amounting to 90K
words. The subsequent storage requirement of 67K words was not
functionally broken down, making it impossible to estimate the
individual functions. The figures are therefore very conserva-
tive.
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3. The overlay area is the region of M2 reserved for executions
of noncritical programs permanently resident in M3. It con-
tains both instruction and data area. The instruction stor-
age area is reduced for the HOL for reasons of semantic
conciseness. The data areas are not modified from original
estimates.
The above total M2 requirement is split between the two M2 complexes.
For each complex the sizing is as follows, assuming a HOL organization.
Required Storage for Each M2 Complex
Number of 32-Bit Words
Function
Critical instructions and fixed data 6,787
(half in each M2 complex)
Critical variables (redundant storage 6,523
in each M2 complex)
Overly area (half in each M2 complex) 8,192
Error checking (half in each M2 complex) 5,375
Total basis 26,877
Additional 200% (for design and growth margin) 53,746
Maximum capacity per M2 complex 80,623
Since each M2 complex consists of five separate modules, no module need
exceed 16,384 words, even in the maximum configuration.
Information is referenced and transferred from M2 to M1 in five-word
blocks. It is therefore natural to control its storage and management within
the M2 complex in a block-oriented fashion. The speed requirements indicate
that a new word from M2 is to be delivered to the bus every 200 ns. This can
be achieved without imposing a difficult constraint on the M2 technology by
interleaving a number of modules of more modest performance. For the five-
day interleaved M2 complex, the information is organized as follows:
Module 1 Module 2 Module 3 Module 4 Module 5
Block 1 Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5
Block 2 Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5
Block n Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 Word 5
The major properties of this arrangement are:
1. Addressing of each M2 complex need only be to the level of a
block. A reference to any word in the block by the ALU results
in the whole block being accessed.
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2. The words of which each block is composed are stored in
physically independent modules, which eliminates most
common mode sources of error against which the two-
dimensional parity error detecting scheme might be
ineffective.
3. Expansion within each M2 complex is achieved by adding
further blocks. This can be accomplished by substituting
larger modules rather than by adding modules. This is
deemed to be less difficult in terms of the bus interface
logic and the address sequence, and memory control logic
unique to each M2 complex. The individual modules of M2,
sized at a maximum of 16K words, can initially be imple-
mented at less than 8K, and expanded as additional memory
requirements develop during the MSS lifetime (Note, however,
that it is essential to size the block addressing scheme to
the maximum capabilities from the outset).
A block diagram of the elements of a five-way interleaved M2 complex is
shown in Figure 7-6. Each module is complete with its individual address and
control logic and memory buffer register. The master controller and sequen-
cer (MSC) manages the scheduling of the individual modules, and resolves the
conflict arising from simultaneous requests to one M2 complex from the three
processing elements; Aul, Au2, and the I/O.
The AU and I/O interface constitute the three ports into each M2 com-
plex. Each interface element performs the following functions:
1. Bus interface
2. Data verification
3. Command decoder
4. Block address buffer
5. Data buffer
Another outcome of resolving conflict on the block rather than the word
basis is a reduction in the average block transfer rates experienced by each
AU. This is because with block resolution the MSC is capable only of process-
ing one block at a time. If only one AU is accessing memory, then it will
receive or transmit words at the rate of five words per M2 block cycle. If
two AU's are accessing memory at the same time each receives or transmits
words at an average rate of five words per two M2 block cycles. That is, the
M2 complex handles the words at its maximum rate independent of the number of
requests.
The utilization of M2 is proposed as follows:
1. Those programs that have been identified as critical are to be
resident in M2. They are to be assigned fixed predetermined and
permanent areas in the M2 memory map. Specific locations can be
assigned (i.e., the mapping of name space into physical M2 space
will be done once, for critical routines, at compile time). No
overlapping of critical programs upon each other, or of folding
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upon themselves, will be allowed. The unique location of
critical software in M2 will enable the recovery of critical
functions to be more easily accomplished.
2. Programs corresponding to noncritical functions will be perm-
antently resident in M3. As they become active they will be
called by the executive into an area of M2, which has pre-
viously been referred to as the "overlay area".
The overlay area constitutes "multiplexing" of M2, because a
finite memory space is used to satisfy the storage demands of
programs whose sum total may exceed what is available by a
considerable amount.
Many of the noncritical functions are very mission-mode
dependent. That is, they are executed at their specified
iteration rate, only during specific mission times. For
example, all the shuttle alignment, terminal rendezvous
and docking function need only be read into the overlay area
when the shuttle is docking with the space station.. Func-
tions associated with crew medical functions, station
scheduling or solar array control are not required during
this mode.
None of the noncritical functions which are required at all
times have iteration rates higher than once per second. All
these functions can be segregated into overlay sections in
M3 and be prescheduled to be overlayed into M2 in a fixed
sequence. This allows a degree of look-ahead in accessing
M3 in anticipation of execution.
The degree of M2 time sharing which can be achieved can only be deter-
mined by a closer analysis of the individual timeline of the noncritical
functions. The impact of multiprogramming (processor time sharing) should
be considered in parallel with M2 overlaying to effect an optimum M2 utili-
zation. It has been assumed that an M2 region of 16K words will satisfy the
instantaneous requirement of any set of active noncritical functions.
Technology is not a constraining factor in the design of M2. The require-
ments for an internal M2 module are a maximum capacity of 16K words, random
accessible with one microsecond cycle time. 16K 32-bit words amount to a
half million bits. A module of this capacity with a one microsecond cycle
time presents no problem to the current technologies of ferrite core, plated
wire or MOS. The choice must, as in the case of Ml, rest on secondary fac-
tors. Plated wire is the strongest contender, being nonvolatile, non-
destructive readout, and capable of low power operations.
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7.2.3 Internal Bus
It has been determined that the internal bus is essentially a memory
switching and control mechanism as shown in Figure 7-7. It enables the AU's
and I/O units to communicate with the operating memory M2. Two signals are
postulated between an AU and I/O. The signal directed from I/O to AU is a
maskable interrupt and tells the AU to look into M2 to interrogate the nature
of the interrupt. The signal directed from AU to I/O causes the I/O to look
into M2 to obtain information concerning the nature of the I/O procedure to
be executed.
Figure 7-7 also shows that the mass memory M3 possesses a separate input
into the I/O element. The I/O unit not only controls information on the data
bus but also the flow of traffic between M2 and M3.
Several bus configurations were evaluated to arrive at a final configur-
ation. Detailed design factors were discussed and a tradeoff evaluation pre-
sented. In order to perform this evaluation a number of ground rules were
established to arrive at a consistent result.
First, it should be realized that any bus configuration can be designed
to meet any particular communication requirement. The variables such as
bus width, speed per wire, power dissipation can be varied and different
technologies applied to meet the requirements. If different implementation
technologies are employed for each configuration, the detailed designs must
be performed before a valid comparison of the total cost can be made. This
is clearly beyond the level of effort planned under the current contract.
The different configurations have been evaluated on the basis of the
following three ground rules.
1. All configurations were postulated to provide the same level
of performance. That is, each will allow enough traffic so
the AU's can achieve their specified instruction rate and the
I/O can achieve its through-put rate.
2. The same technology was applied to each configuration. This
indicates that for a given bus length the maximum bit rate
that an individual wire may sustain is the same for each con-
figuration.
3. For evaluation purposes, fault tolerance aspects were not
considered at this time. Redundancy was considered after a
basic architectural philosophy was established.
The bus configurations considered are depicted in Figure 7-8.
7.2.3.1 Internal Bus Traffic Requirements
Requirements imposed upon the internal bus possess two aspects. The
first is the derivation of the total number of bits per second the bus must
sustain to meet the instruction rate requirements. The second aspect deals
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with the physical packaging of the system and determines the bit rate limit
which may be expected from a given technology.
The total bit rate which the bus must carry may be calculated by consid-
ering the total number of instructions per second which the AU's must execute
and the traffic imposed by the I/O unit including data bus traffic and M3-M2
data transfer.
The following analysis will take the instruction rate requirement and
translate them into bus rate requirements for both a conventional 360 type
computer structure, and for an AU element which contains Ml and executes
higher order language statements directly from a reverse polish stack.
From Table 2-2, the maximum requirements imposed upon processing speed
is 1.893 MIPS. These instructions relate to a 360 type computer organization.
Analysis of two different sets, each of approximately 200K instructions,
shows an average of 7.2 bytes fetched from memory per instruction executed.
Hence, the bit rate is close to 8 x 7.2 - 57.6 bits per instruction, exclus-
ive of parity, in these samples.
Using this number, we find that dynamic instruction execution with a
360 type architecture imposes a traffic rate of 1.893 x 57.6 Mbps = 110 Mbps.
In addition to the 110 Mbps, the bus must carry the addressing and con-
trol bits necessary to initiate a memory request. In a word organized M2
this would require one address word per fetched word (each fetched word being
32 bits). If 18 bits are assumed to be sufficient for addressing each 32 bit
word, then the bus must sustain an additional 18/32 - 56.4 percent of the
original 110 Mbps, for a total of 62 Mbps. This results in a total bit rate
of 110 + 62 = 172 Mbps for a conventional computer organization without a
local Ml memory and a word addressed M2.
If the HOLM organization proposed in Section 7.2.1 is incorporated, a
reduction in bus traffic can result. This organization assumes a specialized
M1, 4-way interleaved M2, with direct storage and execution of reverse polish
HOL instructions.
In a dynamic execution situation the above analysis of instructions indi-
cates that from 47 percent to 50 percent of the memory accesses are for
operands while the remainder are for instruction. Using the average 48.5
percent for operands, we conclude that out of a total 110 Mbps, 53.5 Mbps
are associated with operands and 56.5 Mbps are associated with instructions.
In processing a HOLM instruction set, the number of bits of instruction
information that need be processed will be substantially reduced. We shall
assume that 70 percent of the 56.5 Mps associated with instruction fetches
can be saved. This yields a reduction of 39.6 Mbps.
As in the previous discussion of the assumed 360 organization, address-
ing and control will add to the overall bus traffic requirements. Assume 16
bits are required to address and specify a 4-word (128 bit) transfer. Then,
16/128 = 12.5-percent more bits must be added.
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Table 7-2 summarizes these conclusions and indicates a total internal bus
traffic due to instruction of more than a factor of two, as compared to a con-
ventional structure. Assuming two AU's, then 40 Mbps will be considered to be
the bus traffic created by each AU. As a side issue parity bits and check
words should be considered.
Table 7-2. Internal Bus Traffic Due to Instruction Execution
(Maximum instruction rate)
Bit rate
Bit rate
Bit rate
due to instructions
associated with operands
due to addressing
Total conventional
Reduction due to HOL semantic
conciseness
Subtotal of instructions
and operands
Addressing (+12.5% of subtotal)
Total HOL machine bus
traffic
Conventional
Structure
(1.893 Mips)
56.5
53.5
62.0
Mbps
Mbps
b ps
172.0 Mbps
HOLM
Structure
-39.6 Mbps
110 - 39.6 = 70.4 Mbps
9.9 Mbps
79.3 Mbps
l al
The 40 Mbps rate imposed by each AU represents an average required to
meet the performance specification. The peak rate is limited by one of two
factors: the first is the speed at which the M2 complex can provide or
absorb information. The second is the speed at which M1 can provide or
absorb information. A 4-way interleaved M2 complex with a 1 microsecond
cycle time per intnernal module can supply a peak data rate of 128 Mbps. A
5-way, 1 microsecond, interleaved M2 complex corresponds to 160 Mbps. Sim-
ilarly, an M1 memory with a 250 ns cycle time and a 32 bit word corresponds
to 128 Mbps and a 200 ns M1 corresponds to the 160 Mbps peak rate.
Figure 7-7 indicates that the I/O unit contributes to the internal bus
traffic for three reasons: the external data bus, instruction execution, and
the M3-M2 transfer mechanism.
The maximum design limit imposed upon the external data bus is 10 Mbps.
In the worst-case situation all these bits will appear on the internal bus.
This factor can, however, be reduced by considering the impact of the data
bus control units (DBCU) and the I/O unit in compressing the internal bus
bit rate. The DBCU generates certain addressing and control information
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automatically upon a trigger command from the I/O unit. This type of traffic
does not originate from M2 and should be subracted from the 10 Mbps. An
analysis of the data bus for the shuttle indicates that for messages of length
10 bytes, 50 percent of the data bus traffic is associated with addressing and
control. This, therefore, reduces the impact on the internal bus to 5 Mbps.
If we assume that the I/O mnit is structured like a processor, then the
instruction execution will add additional bus traffic. The I/O processor
will require a smaller instruction set (compared to the AU) which will be
compatible with the more limited language used to program the I/O functions.
Because of the very specific tasks (data flow control) assigned to the I/O,
program locality should be very high. Much higher than for the AU SDC's
IMSIM simulation indicates that the I/O unit accounts for about 12.5 percent
of all instructions that are executed. This would create bus traffic of
10 Mbps for a HOLM and 25 Mbps for a conventional structure. This impact
can be further reduced by an estimated 50-percent due to the very high anti-
cipated temporal locality. In a HOLM, I/O traffic, therefore, only contributes
5 Mbps while in a conventional structure I/O contributes approximately 11 Mbps.
A mechanism for M2-M3 control will produce additional bus traffic. The
peak rate is determined by the access rate of M3. A drum will yield about
6 Mbps. A plated wire mass memory will produce approximately the same rate
if power dissipation is to be kept to a low level. Combining the data bus,
instruction execution and M3 transfer mechanisms a total of 16 Mbps is imposed
by the I/O unit for a HOLM, and 21 Mbps for the conventional structure.
Table 7-3 shows the average bus traffic requirements for the three major
internal bus configurations. Comparisons between a conventional AU structure
and a HOLM is also made.
7.2.3.2 Internal Bus Design Factors
The following paragraphs present a discussion of the various factors
which must be considered in specifying the internal bus.
7.2.3.2.1 Synchronization. One of the first factors is the synchronization
of the interfaces to the bus. If complete phase synchronization can be
accomplished then the logic required to control and interface to the internal
bus can be minimized. A completely phase-locked system does not impose an
insuperable technological problem. The computer display channel (Reference
11) synchronizes the system at 7.5 MHz with equipment separated by more than
thirty feet. No major technical problems were encountered during the design
or during operation. Phase synchronized internal bus interfaces are, there-
fore, proposed.
7.2.3.2.2 Speed Per Wire. The following analysis will indicate the maximum
bit rate that can be sustained per wire. The following assumptions are made
concerning the analysis.
1. The bus drivers and receivers should use the same integrated
technology utilized in the design of the other logical elements
of the system.
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Table 7-3. Bus Traffic Summary for Configurations
Configuration 1--Single Time Multiplexed Bus
Configuration 2--Double Time Multiplexed Bus
Configuration 3--Dedicated bus
_I Configuration
Conventional Structure
Traffic on each time multiplexed
bus 193 Mbps 96.5 Mbps (3)
Traffic on bus dedicated to AU -- -- 86 Mbps
Traffic on bus dedicated to I/O -- -- 21 Mbps
HOLM Structure
(5 )
Traffic on each time multiplexed
bus 96 Mbps 48 Mbps --
Traffic on bus dedicated to AU -- -- 40 Mbps
Traffic on bus dedicated to I/O -- -- 16 Mbps
NOTES:
(1) The total traffic load of 172 Mbps (Table 7-2) for instructions
plus 21 Mbps for I/O is carried on the time multiplexed bus.
(2) The double time multiplexed bus carried one-half of the 193 Mbps
on each leg of the bus (on the average).
(3) Each AU sustains one-half of the 172 Mbps required for instructions.
(4) See paragraph 7.2.3.1 for rationale
(5) Estimates for HOLM follow the same philosophy as for a conventional
structure
2. Very conservative design ratings in terms of delay and speed
will be used to maximize component reliability.
3. The internal bus structure should be as simple as possible.
This implies no pipelining in the bus. That is, the bus is
allowed to settle to its quiescent voltage level before a
new transfer is initiated.
Figure 7-9 indicates the basic elements of the internal bus interface.
This figure indicates the total delay accumulated in transmitting one bit
over a bus wire. The numbers were obtained by the following reasoning:
1. The flip-flop delay is obtained by considering a J-K flip
flop such as an SN 54105.
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2. The delay of the line driver was estimated by considering an
AN55110 line driver. Assuming 10 pf per foot of cable, a
total of 150 pf capacitive load was postulated.
3. The delay of the bus wire was estimated by postulating 1.5
ns/foot propagation velocity.
4. The line receiver delay is typical of an SN55108 line
receiver.
5. Clock skew is an estimate of aging of components once the
system has been initially adjusted.
If the communications elements utilize a clock width of 20 ns, then for
T2L flip flops signals cannot change at their inputs within this 20 ns.
Therefore, total time between bits on a wire is the 150 ns delay plus 20 ns
dead time which equals 170 ns. This yields a maximum bit rate on a wire of
5.85 Mbps. A more conservative figure, which will be used, is 5 Mbps per
wire.
7.2.3.2.3 Number of Bus Wire. Unfortunately, the internal bus must be
designed to handle the peak traffic load. For a 32 bit wide data path and
5 Mbps, a total maximum transfer rate of 160 Mbps can be achieved. This is
exactly compatible with the 5-way interleaved M2 memory complex. Since the
bus can handle 5.85 Mbps, the utilization of 5 Mbps on each wire is clearly
conservative.
7.2.3.2.4 Bus and Memory Conflict. For a time multiplexed bus, one must
consider conflict over the use of both the internal bus and the memory. For
a dedicated bus system only memory conflict need be considered.
For the purpose of the following discussion the parity bits and check
word transmitted with each block will be ignored. These bits are required
for error detection and will create the same overhead (in terms of bits per
second) independent of the configuration. The numbers to be presented assume
a 4-way interleaved M2 corresponding to a peak rate of 128 Mbps.
Consider first the conventionally structured AU and I/O without an M1.
From Table 7-3, we notice that a 32 bit wide bus will not satisfy a single
time multiplex configuration for the average rate. Also, the dual time
multiplex bus will just about carry the average required load. However, it
will be busy most of the time. As a matter of fact, both parts of the time
multiplexed bus will be busy 57 percent of the time. This will tend to
reduce overall performance.
With the dedicated bus structure, the bus contention is not a factor.
However, heavy bus traffic will cause M2 to be busy for a significant per-
centage of time. If M2 can deliver information at a 128 Mbps rate, each AU
will require M2 (86/128) = 67 percent of the time. Memory conflict is now
significant.
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Figure 7-9. Internal Bus Delay Factors
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It is clear that a HOLM structure minimizes bus and memory conflicts
compared to conventional structure.
Consider a single time multiplexed bus with HOLM structured AU's. If
one AU desires bus access, what is the probability that the bus is busy?
The other AU and the I/O unit impose an average traffic of 56 Mbps. The
probability that the bus is busy, given an AU is making a request, is
56/128 = 44.6 percent. To compensate for the bus being busy and the processor
having to wait, the desired system peak performance must be increased by 44.6
percent to maintain the same overall throughput. The probability that the
dual time-multiplexed bus is busy is 4.1 percent.
The dedicated bus only faces the problem of memory contention. Assuming
two M2 complexes, with each module possessing a 4-way interleaved structure
so as to achieve 128 Mbps, and assuming that information is randomly stored
in both M2 complexes, what is the probability of a memory module being busy
given a request by an AU?
The bit rate imposed by one AU and the I/O is 56 Mbps. On the average,
half or about 28 Mbps, comes out of each M2 at a peak rate of 128 Mbps.
Therefore, an M2 complex is busy 28/128 = 22 percent of the time. The
memory conflict problems are the same for either bus structure.
By more intelligently storing information in M2, the busy probability
can be reduced. The 22-percent represents a worst-case figure. With a 4-
way interleaved memory, four simultaneous communications can ensue. This
means that even with a 3-port memory system the worst delay encountered is
two memory cycles.
On the basis of the above discussion, the dedicated bus with HOLM AU's
and I/O structures is the most desirable.
7.2.3.2.5 Hardware Considerations. Table 7-4 indicates the number of drivers
and receivers needed for each configuration. The three configurations must
be structured so as to yield the same performance. If the dual time-multiplexed
bus is W bits wide, then an equivalent single time-multiplexed bus must be 2W
bits wide to achieve the same data rate with the same technology (bits per sec-
ond per wire). For a 2-AU, 1-I/O, 2-M2 configuration the dedicated bus width
can be less than the dual time-multiplexed bus. However, for the purpose of
discussion, we will assume they are equal and still show that the dedicated
bus structure requires less drivers and receivers.
We notice that for two AU's, one I/O and two M2's that the dedicated bus
requires 10-percent less drivers. For two AU's, one I/O and three M2's all
the configurations use the same number of drivers and receivers. For four or
more M2 complexes the dedicated bus loses out.
7.2.3.3 Internal Bus Recommendations
As a result of the preceding analyses, including an examination of the
operational multiprocessor requirements, a recommendation for the dedicated
bus with multiport memories is made. Table 7-5 presents an evaluation of the
various tradeoff factors.
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Table 7-4. Comparison of Number of Drivers and Receivers
I
Bus width
Number of
Number of
Number of
Number of
Number
each
each
each
AU's = A
I/O units = I
M2 modules = M
ports per AU
per I/O
per M2
driver/receiverpairs for
AU
I/O
M2
1
2W
1
1
1
2W
2W
2W
Configuration
21
W
2
2
2
2W
2W
2W
3
W
1
1
A+I
W
W
W(A+I)
Total number of driver/receiver
pairs 2W(A+I+M) 2W(A+I+M) AW+IW+NW (A+I)
A = 2, I/O = 1, M = 2 lOW lOW 9W
A = 2, I/O = 1, M = 3 12W 12W 12W
A = 3, I/O = 1, M = 2 12W 12W 12W
A = 2, I/O = 1, M = 2 12W 12W 12W
A = 2, I/O = 1, M = 4 14W 14W 15W
Table 7-5. Internal Bus Evaluation Summary
1 - first choice
2 - second choice
3 - third choice
Factors Note * Configuration **
1 2 3
Performance 1 1 1 1
Expandability 2 1 1 1
Timing problems 3 3 2 1
Bus contention 4 3 2 1
Bus control 5 3 2 1
Bus-M2 interface control 6 1 2 3
Bus-P interface control 7 1 2 1
Development risk 8 2 3 1
Bus hardware 9 2 2 1
* Note explanation on following page
**Configuration 1 - Single time-multiplexed bus
Configuration 2 - Double time-multiplexed bus
Configuration 3 - Dedicated buses with multiport M2
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Notes of Explanation for Table 7-5
1. All the configurations were normalized to achieve equivalent
performance.
2. Expandability is not a major consideration since it is provided
for in the initial sizing of the central processor.
3. The dedicated bus (Configuration 3) possesses the least timing
problems, since the bit rate on each leg of the bus is less
than for Configurations 1 or 2 (See Table 7-3).
4. There is no bus contention in Configuration 3. Configuration 1
has the most (paragraph 7.2.3.2.4).
5. Control of the time-shared bus requires logic to poll the commun-
icating elements and resolve bus conflict. A separate bus control
element must be designed. The dual time-multiplexed bus must also
control which bus is used by which communicating pair. The dedi-
cated bus control is distributed within the M12 complex. Bus
conflict is not a problem.
6. The 3-port M2 interface used in Configuration 3 is the most
complex. It must provide buffer storage for three M2 requests
and a scanner multiplexer element. It must also resolve memory
conflict. The single time-shared bus has only one port. Con-
flict does not exist at the M2 interface since it is resolved
by the bus control logic. Configuration 2 must provide logic
to resolve simultaneous access by two buses into a single M2.
7. The bus AU interface, as well as the bus I/O interface, is the
same for Configurations 1 and 3. Both have single ports.
Configuration 2 may communicate on one of two buses and pro-
vides a slightly more difficult situation. Most of this prob-
lem is resolved by the bus control logic.
8. The dedicated bus has been used in existing aerospace multi-
processors; for example, the CDC Alpha. Single time multiplexed
buses have been used mostly for I/O channels. Dual time multi-
plexed buses have not, to the author's knowledge, been applied
in computer systems, although they are commonplace in telephone
switching networks.
9. For the two AU, one I/O, two M2 configuration, Configuration 3
needs 10-percent less interface circuits (see Figure 7-9). For
larger configurations, the balance favors the time-multiplexed
bus. However, we are considering the configuration implied by
the performance and capacity requirements.
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1. The bus structures were normalized to provide the same
performance.
2. Section 2.0 indicates that the difference between the initial
design requirements and the maximum design requirements is
only 50 percent. This limited expansion capability can be
achieved internal to each of the communicating elements.
Therefore, expandability is not a factor in evaluating the
various internal bus structures.
3. The switching hardware for the internal bus is assumed to be
packaged within the M2 complexes.
4. In evaluating the internal bus structure, a limited multi-
processor consisting of two AU's, one I/O, and two M2 complexes
was used as a basis.
7.2.4 Fault-Tolerant Central Processor
The basic fault tolerance requirements were discussed in Section 6.0 of
this report. Subsequent to the study reported in that section, the criteria
were reviewed at a DPA design review meeting. Table 7-6 presents the modi-
fications and clarifications of the DPA failure and error tolerance criteria.
The most significant change in requirements is that after failure detection,
computational processing may be suspended for up to one minute so that fail-
ures may be isolated, the system reconfigured and the restart procedure
initiated.
It is assumed, in the configuration to be described, that this suspension
of computation and control for one minute is satisfactory. However, we have
tried not to lean too heavily upon this requirement. All the functions per-
formed during reconfiguration should not require more than 100 ms and at most
one second of computation to commence a retry operation.
The one-minute interruption is still considered to be within specifica-
tion as far as the definition of "Fail Operational" is concerned.
7.2.4.1 Philosophy
The following points of view have been formulated after a reevaluation
of the requirements.
1. All critical programs and variable data should be permanently
resident in M2.
2. Backup for critical programs will reside in M3. The details of
this mechanization will be discussed shortly.
3. All noncritical programs and variable data will reside permanently
in M3 and be brought into M2 using the preplanned overlay tech-
niques discussed in Section 7.2.2.2.
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4. Application programs will be structured so that they are
restartable with a minimum of initialization. Only critical
tasks need be restartable. Each task must be analyzed in
detail so it can be segmented into restartable jobs. Although
this software effort can be considerable, it can only be cir-
cumvented by designing a completely triple or quadruply
redundant system with triple voting elements. This includes
AU, I/O and M2 as well as the internal bus and data bus.
5. The responsibility for enabling a function to fail safe shall
not be placed upon the software within the central multi-
processor. The responsibility shall reside with the particular
subsystems external to the data bus. The only imposition upon
the central multiprocessor is to communicate to the outside
world that a fail safe condition exists (i.e., following the
second failure within the central multiprocessor). The
external subsystems must be designed to terminate operations
smoothly, or to take other appropriate action to prevent the
propagation of the error conditions. Control units must be
designed to prevent lockups, and to not accept erroneous
sensor on command data.
6. Should a failure occur within the central processor, it will
be reconfigured to handle only critical functions. This may
include deactivating operational hardware. Full operational
status is not reestablished until detailed fault isolation
routines are executed and the faulty IFRU is replaced.
7. The one-minute reconfiguration time implies that traffic on
the data bus may be suspended for up to one minute during the
reconfiguration cycle.
8. Finally, a second failure is assumed to not occur during the
reconfiguration cycle.
7.2.4.2 Fault-Tolerant System
Figure 7-10 depicts the block diagram of the fault tolerant multi-
processor. Each element will be discussed! separately, and then the inter-
action of the elements to provide fault tolerance will be described.
7.2.4.2.1 Internal Redundancy. The fault-tolerant multiprocessor consists
of two dual redundant AU complexes. Two complexes are required to meet the
performance required. Internal to each complex are two AU's operating in a
completely phase-synchronized manner. The outputs of the two AU's are com-
pared in a comparator C. Only with two AU's and a comparator can the goal
of 100-percent failure detection be achieved. This failure detection require-
ment is necessary for both critical and noncritical tasks. When the C element
detects an error within the AU complex the following actions ensure:
1. All four AU's will be notified.
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2. The AU complex without the error will notify the executive
(resident in M2) so the failed AU complex will be made a non-
available resource.
3. The system will revert to the fail operational mode, with
only the good AU complex executing critical tasks.
4. The good AU complex will issue a signal to reset all registers
and flip flops in the other AU complex and initiate its hard-
wired start-up sequence.
5. After the failed AU complex is restarted it will be made an
available resource again and assigned scheduled tasks.
6. If no more error indications occur, then it is assumed that the
error was a transient and the noncritical tasks are resumed.
If another error indication is obtained a hardware failure is
suspected. Steps 1 through 5 should be repeated at least twice
before the firm determination of a hardware failure is made.
7.2.4.2.2 M2 Fault Tolerance. The central multiprocessor will consist of
two M2' complexes, each with half of the required capacity. The concept of
an M2 presented earlier has been modified by absorbing the functions of M2'
into the memory complex itself. The storage of the error checking bits is
still contained in a physically independent memory module. Both M2 complexes
along with the AU's and I/O's are used to meet the fault tolerant require-
ments.
The major functions of the M2 complexes are as follows:
1. Each M2 complex consists of a four-way interleaved memory.
2. The fault-tolerant structure possesses a fifth internal
module which is used for storage of error checking inform-
ation.
3. Each internal memory module can be expanded up to 16K words.
4. The AU or I/O interfaces provide an error detection function
for both memory and internal bus. They also serve as a com-
mand and address decoder as well as a data buffer for the
five memory modules.
The error detection features incorporated into the M2 complex consist
of:
1. Every word written into a memory module will contain a parity
bit generated by the AU or I/O. This makes every memory word
33 bits long.
2. Every access to the M2 complex will consist of a 4-word block,
with each word stored in a separate memory module.
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3. Program instructions and data are contained in memory modules
one through four. The fifth module contains a special vertical
check word. This word corresponds to the "exclusive OR" of the
vertical parity word, described earlier, and the physical block
address.
4. The memory interfaces will be capable of responding to a number
of different commands.
a. Read and check. This causes the five memory modules to
be read and sent to the requesting unit: data parity
bits, check words and all. The R element of the AU or
I/O will verify the parity bits and check word. This
also checks the internal bus transmission. Although the
transmission of the fifth check word increases the bus
traffic by 20 percent, the ratio of average to peak
transfer rate will be able to absorb this increase.
b. Write and verify. This command transmits information
from the AU or I/O with parity bits and check word gen-
erated by the AU's already attached. Upon receiving
the five-word block the interface logic at M2 will check
the word parity bits. The vertical parity check word
will be calculated and the block address extracted. This
will be compared with the storage address sent in the
initial address and command word.
After the block is stored in the M2 modules it will be
read out again and the read process verification sequence
described in the read and check function executed.
The write and verify command increases the bus traffic by
240-percent for write operations. However, most of the M2
accesses are not expected to be write operations. The
write and verify command is only required for the final
results of computations. Temporary variables are contained
in the evaluation stack resident in Ml. If every instruc-
tion were a store operation, only 50 percent of the memory
accesses would be write operations. If every instruction
pair were a load followed by a store, then only 25 percent
of the operations would be writes. Considering a more
realistic dynamic instruction stream and realizing that
temporary variables need not be written into M2, it is esti-
mated that no more than 15 percent of the memory accesses
are write operations. Therefore, the bus traffic would only
be increased by 36-percent on the average.
Table 7-3 indicated a 40 Mbps requirement for the average
bit rate on the internal bus. However, the design goal
was chosen to be 128 Mbps to handle peak requirements. Both
read and write verify commands do not make the average bus
rate exceed the peak bus rate. The average is increased by
21.2 Mbps for a total of 61.2 Mbps.
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These two commands will satisfy failure detection criteria within M2.
Both of the M2 complexes must work together to meet the overall fault
tolerant requirements. Each M2 is divided into a number of distinct areas.
One area contains variable information associated with critical tasks. Cer-
tain tables associated with the executive function fall into this area. This
area is denoted by CD. The second area is associated with resident critical
instructions. This is denoted by CI. The final area contains images of non-
critical instructions and data, a copy of which is permanently in M3. This
area is denoted by NC. For details see Figure 7-11.
The CD area in both M2 complexes is always written into redundantly. The
information contained in CD is necessary to restart critical functions in the
"fail operation" mode. The two CI areas contain different instructions in
each M2. If this area of memory fails, the one-minute reconfiguration inter-
val is more than sufficient to read copies of the programs from M3. If the
NC area of memory fails recovery is not necessary. Only the detection of the
failure and the appropriate fail safe sequencing is required.
7.2.4.2.3 Internal Bus. With redundant dedicated bus structures, a bus
segment could fail and still the AU or I/O would keep working. Further
reflection upon this problem leads to the conclusions that if one dedicated
bus segment failed the AU that drives that bus could be reconfigured out of
the system until the bus was repaired. The other AU complex with its bus
could handle the critical functions until the system was repaired.
For the I/O functions, two buses are shown originating from the I/O
complex. Each bus intersects a different M2 complex. The failure of one
I/O bus forces one M2 complex to be reconfigured out of the system; however,
the other M2 complex has enough capacity to execute all critical I/O tasks.
7.2.4.2.4 Input/Output Complex. It has been determined that one I/O unit
is capable of handling all data bus traffic, M3 traffic and the necessary
limited instruction execution.
Figure 7-10 shows a triple redundant complex with voters.
The data bus control unit (DBCU) is shown as a single interface between
the triple redundant I/O and the quad redundant data bus. To meet the fault
tolerant criteria it would probably have to be triple or quad redundant. The
design of the DBCU is considered to be external to the central multiprocessor.
The mass memory is shown interfacing to the I/O complex.
7.2.4.2.5 M3, Considerations. M3 need not possess any reconfiguration capa-
bility since no critical information is resident in M3. A 100-percent error
detection capability must still exist.,within M3 to provide a fail safe capa-
bility for the overlayed noncritical functions. When M3 fails it is configured
to be off-line. Critical functions can still be executed since they are
resident in M2.
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The error detection logic for the pages stored in M3 can be similar to
that proposed for M2. It should contain both horizontal and vertical parity
as well as physical address information within each stored block. Echo check-
ing for write operations is suggested.
7.2.4.2.6 Restart Software. The ability to restart a process after it has
been abruptly stopped due to failure detection has been assumed in the previous
sections. This is well known to be a difficult and fallible task. A number of
suggestions are made to make it easier.
1. All restartable program elements must be constructed from
reentrant code. That is, code that does not modify the
instruction stream by execution of the program.
2. All the results from the execution of a routine should be
accumulated and written into the CD area of memory at the
end of the routine.
3. The redundant CD areas in the two M2 complexes should be
written sequentially in time so as to prevent the failure
in an AU complex from causing both copies to be written
incorrectly.
4. All restartable programs should be structured to operate
upon one set of input parameters presented in one time.
These input parameters are stored redundantly in CD. They
are not destroyed until after the final results have been
redundantly written into CD and verified.
5. Only tasks scheduled by the executive are restartable
entities.
6. Tasks which are at lower levels of priority or are called by
restartable tasks, will be completely reexecuted by execution
of the main task. All parameters generated by these lower
level utility tasks are temproary and will be reevaluated.
7. The interaction between reexecutable tasks should be minimized
and only handled at the highest executive level.
8. Critical program instructions and variables may be conveniently
identified when the HOL program is written. The critical vari-
ables may be identified in the initial declare statement.
Variables not declared are considered temporary. They can be
recalculated and are not critical. The program name may contain
information as to its criticality. The compiler or link loader
can utilize this information when M2 space is allocated.
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7.2.5 Summary and Recommendations
The final conclusions and recommendations concerning the elements
internal to the operational multiprocessor are presented in this section.
7.2.5.1 Architectural Considerations
The internal structure of the multiprocessor will consist of:
1. Two independent AU complexes
2. Two independent 3 -port M2 complexes
3. One I/O complex
4. Internal buses dedicated to the two AU's and I/O unit
5. An M3 storage device interfaced to the I/O complex
6. Expansion will be internal to each communicating element
7.2.5.2 M1 and AU Considerations
The local storage, M1, and the AU form an integral structure and must be
discussed as one unit. The following recommendations are made.
1. The internal structure of the AU and the utilization of Ml
shall be such as to cause an efficient execution of higher
order language statements stored in M2.
2. The functions incorporated into M1 include:
a. Evaluation stack
b. Descriptor stack
c. Temporary storage of variables
d. Buffer for the polish string
3. Associated with the descriptor stack will be a small associ-
ative memory of about 64 words.
4. The total size of M1 should be less than 400 - 32 bit wide
words.
5. The addressing of M1 shall be down to the byte (8 bit) level.
6. Speed requirements shall be between 200 ns and 500 ns cycle
times.
7. Error detection is accomplished by utilizing two AU's and a
comparator in each AU complex.
8. The recommended Ml technology is CMOS, with bipolar and plated
wire as alternative.
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7.2.5.3 Input/Output Considerations
The following recommendations are made concerning the I/O complex.
1. The I/O processor is a simpler structure than the AU.
2. It possesses local storage sufficient for buffering data
transfers.
3. M3 is controlled through an independent I/O port.
4. The I/O unit performs the following functions:
a. Instruction execution for data bus control
b. Instruction execution for M3 control
c. Buffering of data bus commands and data
d. Partial buffering of M3 data transfers
e. AU interrupt control and priority
5. Fault tolerance will be achieved through triple redundancy
with voters.
6. The DBCU will contain a hardwired fail safe sequence for the
second failure.
7.2.5.4 M2 Considerations
The following conclusions have been reached concerning M2.
1. M2 performs the following functions:
a. Stores all critical functions
b. Redundantly stores critical variables
c. Provides an overlay area for M3 storage of noncritical
functions
2. The M2 memory complex possesses the following features:
a. Five-way interleaved memory modules
b. Independent AU and I/O interfaces through 3 ports
c. Block-oriented organization with 4 words plus one
check word per block
d. Each word is 32 bits plus one parity bit
e. Each M2 memory module is expandable from an initial
8K words
f. Upward expansion to 16K for each memory module is
sufficient
3. M2 cycle time is approximately 1 microsecond for a memory
module. Overall throughput to the internal bus is 160 Mbps
with five-way interleaved memory.
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4. There is a 1 microsecond latency for each read operation.
5. The maximum delay due to memory conflict between the two
AU's and the I/0 is 2 microseconds.
6. The technology suggested is plated wire.
7. The maximum capacity of each M2 complex is less than 80K
words including parity words.
8. Error detection is accomplished by:
a. Word parity bits
b. Vertical parity words exclusive ORed with the physical
block address
c. Echo checks of all write operations
7.2.5.5 M2-M3 Transfer Control
The following decisions have been reached concerning the relationship
between M2 and M3.
1. There will not be a virtual memory system.
2. Preplanned overlays will be used to map M3 into the 16K
overlay area in M2.
3. The overlays will be determined within each mission phase
by time-lining non-overlapping functions.
7.2.5.6 M3 Considerations
1. The functions of M3 are
a. To store all noncritical instructions and data
b. To store redundant copies of critical programs which
are resident in M2
2. Nothing stored in M3 is critical and therefore M3 recovery
after failure detection is not required.
3. One-hundred-percent failure detection is required. This
is accomplished by:
a. Word parity bits
b. Vertical parity
c. Imbedding physical address information in each block
4. Two technologies can be anticipated. A drum will provide a
low-risk option and implies a 5 millesecond latency time.
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A large plated wire memory is a higher risk option. No
mass plated wire memories have been built. Although the
latency time for plated wire is less than for a drum, it
is not a critical factor in the CP configuration proposed.
Either technology will suffice as far as requirements are
concerned.
7.2.5.7 Internal Bus Considerations
The following conclusions have been reached concerning the nature of the
internal bus.
1. The bus structure consists of a dedicated bus link for each
AU and I/O complex, requiring each M2 complex to possess
three ports.
2. The bus is 32 data bits wide plus one parity bit, with an
unspecified number of control lines.
3. The maximum bit rate on each wire shall be 5 Mbps.
4. The peak transfer rate on any bus link shall be 160 Mbps.
5. There is no bus contention with the dedicated bus.
6. Error detection in the internal bus shall be by means of word
parity bits.
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8.0 MEMORY STUDIES
8.1 MASS MEMORY TECHNOLOGY
8.1.1 Introduction
The object of this particular task was the development of quantitative
data on memory techniques that are capable of being developed into a manufac-
turable process for the 1975 time period. The emphasis of the study was a
review of candidate memory technologies now in existence or in development.
Extrapolation of the current state of those technologies is made to estimate
their expected status in 1975. Where possible, estimates of physical charac-
teristics, cost parameters and performance characteristics of each technology
are indicated.
8.1.2 Selection of Applicable Technologies
In this section, we have chosen two ranges of memory capacity, 104 through
106 bits ADT effort. These two ranges have been chosen since they encompass
the range of memory capacities for operating and bulk storage that are being
considered as part of the task to establish the baseline memory hierarchy. The
M3-1 category is generally categorized as random access, with access and/or
cycle times between 0.1 and 1.0 second. M3-2 may be block oriented, with
access/latency times up to several milliseconds, but with high read rates of up
to several million bits per second. For each of these ranges, we have selected
candidate technologies which are expected to be available in 1975, and then
discuss and compare them in terms of their applicability to memories of the
specified size. A firm recommendation for a particular memory type is not
made, however.
8.1.2.1 M3-1 Memory, 104 through 106 Bits
The list of technologies to be considered for this category is as follows:
Ferrite core, 2-D, 2-1/2-D, or 3-D
Plated wire
Post and film
Coupled film
Semiconductor
Bipolar
Static MOS
Dynamic MOS
CMOS
MNOOS
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For the core memory systems, any of the three organizations listed could
be used for capacities up to 105 bits, but above this, the 2-D core arrange-
ment becomes very expensive relative to the other organizations, and its
estimated failure rate also rises rapidly. At 106 bits, the estimated cost of
a 2-D memory would exceed $400K, and the MTEF of the memory would be less than
1000 hours. While it is true that 2-D core can provide a faster access and
cycle time than the other organizations, it is not likely that such fast cycle
times will be required for this memory. And if they are, another technology,
plated wire, can supply fast cycle times at a lower cost than 2-D organization.
All three of the core memory technologies have destructive readout operation,
which may prove to be a disadvantage in this application.
Plated wire memory overcomes the destructive readout disadvantage of
ferrite cores, but is more expensive and heavier than 2-1/2-D or 3-D core. Of
the existing technologies, if either NDRO operation or fast memory access and
cycle times are of overriding importance, plated wire is the obvious choice.
Of the planar film memories, both post and film and coupled film appear
attractive for certain characteristics. The post and film memory promises an
NDRO memory of reasonable size at a cost considerably less than that of plated
wire. This technology is almost ready for use. Prototype memories have been
fabricated on an operating pilot production line. The coupled film memory is
farther from realization.. The promise here is the very high density that
should be possible using this technique. The prospect of fitting a 106 bit
RAM memory into less than a tenth of a cubic foot is too attractive to dismiss
this technique at this time. The technology is not far enough advanced,
however, to allow price estimates to be made. The major hurdle for either of
of these technologies will be their reliability. Neither of them have been in
use for long enough to allow any evaluation to be made. Until both acquire
considerable mileage, they cannot definitely be considered for the space
station design.
All of the semiconductor techniques discussed appear to have some applic-
ability to this memory size except the charge coupled devices. These are
omitted primarily because the minimum practical block size of 103 to 106 bits
is larger than would be required at this memory level. With the exception of
the MNOS device, each of the semiconductor technologies discussed here can be
fabricated into either RAM or shift register memories. The comments which
follow apply equally to both.
Bipolar semiconductors can achieve a fast memory, but the cost and power
dissipation will be excessive for memories of over about 105 bits. At 106 bits,
the power consumption would be more than one kw and the cost would approach
$200,000. The static MOS memory will be somewhat lower in power and cost, but
the speed will also be less. The dynamic MOS memory has some interesting
possibilities in terms of speed and density, but its dependence on the clock
controlling the refresh circuitry is a disadvantage.
CMOS may turn out to be a best choice for this memory in terms of low
power and high speed if the technology develops as expected in the next few
years, and if the problems of radiation sensitivity and volatility can be
resolved.
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The MNOS memory is a non-volatile semiconductor memory which also offers
a potential for high density. Again, if the questions of radiation sensitivity
can be resolved, and the technology develops at a reasonable rate, this memory
could be quite attractive.
8.1.2.2 M3-2 Memory, 106 to 108 Bits
For memories in this capacity range, the problem of volatility becomes
more important, since the consequence of losing 107 or 108 bits due to a power
transient can be severe. While recovery by reloading from an archival store
can sometimes be mechanized, the time required to transfer this number of bits
can be several seconds or tens of seconds, which could be unacceptable. We
are, therefore, adding a non-volatility requirement to the specifications for
this memory. This rules out the semiconductor memories except for MNOS. Most
of them would be ruled out on power consumption or volume considerations any-
way.
The candidates for this memory are as follows:
Core, 2-1/2-D and 3-D
Plated wire
Magnetic "bubble"
MNOS
Soniscan
Wire ferro-acoustic
Beam memory
Drum
Disk
Tape
The MNOS memory is a semiconductor RAM memory which combines a high density
potential with non-volatility. The same reservations apply to M3-2 as M3-1
with regard to the use of MNOS in M3-2. If the problems of radiation sensitiv-
ity and the state of development of the technology can be overcome, the use of
MNOS would probably still be limited to the lower end of the M3-2 capacity
range due to the penalties of cost, volume, and power consumption.
The 2-1/2-D and 3-D core memories are basically RAM memories, but they
could be applied to storage systems having the capacity of an M3-2. The physical
limitations of the core stack constrains these technologies to the lower end
of the specified range. At some point between 4 x 106 and 3 x 107 bits, the
size of the core stack becomes unwieldy, and it will be desirable to break the
memory up into several smaller memories. The cost is also rather high, since
a 3 x 107 bit core memory is estimated to cost in the rage of $106 using either
organization. A memory of this same size for 32 bit words requires a core stack
that is about 1000 bits square, which is as large as can comfortably be estimated
for aerospace use at this time.
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Plated wire runs into the same problems as the core systems discussed in
the previous paragraph, and the cost of the memory is even higher. A 106 bit
memory might be practical but much over 107 will be too expensive and large.
A 107 bit memory will cost about $106 and occupy at best approximately three
cubic feet. The advantage of plated wire over core is again the NDRO readout,
the faster operating cycles and reduced power consumption. For over about 107
bits, neither plated wire nor core is practical for a single memory module.
The magnetic bubble memory is a new device currently in development. It
has a number of characteristics that makes it attractive for this application.
In volume it is projected to be much less than either core or plated wire, and
through the use of a moderate number of parallel loops its total data rate can
be made to match that of large core memories. The bubble memory is essentially
a serial device, and the length of the data blocks in the memory significantly
affect cost. There are indications that this type of memory may be economical
only when the serial length of the data blocks is quite large, such as 104 or
105 bits. Since at the present time, the projected shifting rate for the memory
is of the order of a megacycle, this implies a block time of 10 to 100 milli-
seconds to read a block, if the memory is to be economical. There is currently
considerable commercial interest in this technology, with the Bell Telephone
Laboratories actively developing it for use in electronic telephone switching
systems. This is a definite advantage, since much of the advanced research
expense will be commercially underwrittne. The use of the magnetic bubble
technology appears to be uneconomical for memories of the order of 106 bits
because of the overhead expense associated with the magnet structure, etc.
The range of applicability of this memory appears to start at about 107 bits,
and continue upward from there to at least 109 bits.
The two BORAMs (Block Oriented Random Access Memories), the ferro-acoustic
wire memory and the Soniscan memory, are complements of the bubble memory in
that they are particularly adapted to block sizes of 104 bits and less. In
addition, the serial data rates of these two memories are about an order of
magnitude higher than the magnetic bubble. The volume of the Soniscan memory
is an order of magnitude greater than the volume of a similar bubble memory.
This consideration may limit the use of Soniscan memories to capacities of 108
bits or less. At 108 bits, the memory would have a volume of nearly 10 cubic
feet. The ferro-acoustic wire technology is not well enough developed to give
a good estimate of volume, but it appears to be more dense than the Soniscan
and may be similar to the density of the bybble memory, or perhaps even smaller.
These two memory technologies do not appear to be restricted to the very long
serial lengths of the bubble memory, and therefore, the choice between these
technologies may turn on the block size requirement and serial readout rate.
The beam memory technology has not proceeded far enough yet to allow a
really accurate estimate of its adaptability to the aerospace environment.
Particular problems lies in the effects of the environment, such as shock and
vibration, on the alignment accuracies required within the memory. If they
are adaptable, current indications are that this type of memory will be useable
for block sizes of the order of 4 x 104 bits and less, so that it will be
competitive with the Soniscan and ferro-acoustic wire rather than the bubble
memory in this respect. For total capacity this type of memory does not appear
to become efficient until the capacity of the memory exceed 5 x 107 bits. The
useable range of this technology is up to at least 1010 bits.
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A major consideration with this technology is the current state of
development. It appears that the only type of beam memory with much chance of
being ready for use by 1975 is the mechanically deflected type. A mechanically
deflected memory would suffer from the same problems that drums, disks, and
tape recorders, in that it is subject to the wearout problem and will require
periodic servicing. This consideration alone might dictate against the use of
a beam memory in the space station. For space station applications beyond 1980,
however, it will become more and more likely that the electrically deflected
beam memories will be available. Thus, if the time period for this study were
extended to 1977 or 1978, there could be some justification in recommending an
electronically deflected beam memory.
The drum memory does not really appear to have a place in the space station
computing system. In the early days of computers, the slow operating speeds of
the computer meant that the few milliseconds latency time of the drum memory
was not of particular consequence. With present day processors, however, these
few milliseconds represent 103 or 104 instructions and this kind of a delay
cannot be tolerated in operating memories.
The disk memory has a slightly longer latency time than a drum memory
but has a major advantage over it. This is that higher capacities than 10° or
107 bits are easily obtained. At least one ruggedized disk of capacity 7 x 106
bits already exists, and there appears to be no reason why memories of at least
a factor of 4 or 5 larger capacity could not be built by stacking disks. The
cost of such a memory, at 15 cents per bit would be one and a half orders of
magnitude less than for the other already existing technologies and the weight
and volume would be correspondingly less.
Although the disk is a much slower technology than the bubble and BORAM
memories, it has the great advantage that is is a well-understood and proven
technology today. Therefore, the disk may be attractive as a backup specifica-
tion for use in case the bubble or Soniscan memories do not develop as
expected.
The tape recorder has the advantage of large capacity for its cost and
size, and virtually unlimited capacity if the ability to change tapes is pro-
vided. This is counterbalanced by the extremely long latency time of many
seconds, even when the tape is already in place. The tape recorder's place
on the space station appears to be in the archival storage of experiment data,
transport of data from the space station to the ground, and transport of new
programs, etc., up from the ground.
8.2 ARCHIVAL MEMORY
8.2.1 Introduction and Summary
This section presents the results of a study performed to define an archival
storage system for a Modular Space Station for the time period of the late 70's
and early 80's. The concept presented herein reflects the procurement of an
evaluation unit during the 1975-1978 time period and followed by the procure-
ment of the flight units.
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The Precision Instrument Unicon Data System was selected as the Archival
Storage System to satisfy the requirements of the Space Station Program. This
unit has the added flexibility that it can provide both digital data recording
of the acquired data quantity and bit rates as well as tore data in the
analog form.
The study consisted of a review of the various documentation prepared for
the archival storage system to establish an overall set of requirements. Based
on this review a set of requirements were developed. A review was made of the
various memory technologies to obtain potential candidate memory systems for
this application.
Based on this survey many candidate memory technologies were eliminated.
The most promising candidate technologies appear to be the optical devices.
This selection was based on the work statement which defines an archival
storage system for the defined magnetic tape equipment.
Trade offs were performed based on data supplied by vendors and discussed
in the literature which resulted in the selection of the final concept.
8.2.2 Tradeoff Selection
This paragraph defines those parameters which were used as a basis for
the selection of the archival storage equipment for the space station program.
When considering the factors to be used in the selection of archival
storage equipment for space application, the summary considerations would in-
clude compatibility with other equipments in the system, crew interactions,
interfacing repair and maintenance activity, and logistics for transportation
of information and equipments between the space station and ground. Detailed
factors used in the selection of the archival storage equipment are presented
below though not necessarily in the order presented:
1. Data quantity 5. Physical characteristics
2. Data rate 6. Data density
3. Volatility 7. Reliability
4. Development costs and status 8. Crew interface
Data Quantity. This factor was selected since it determines the maximum
size and cost for the development of the equipment.
Data Rate. This determines the speed that the storage device must operate
to handle the required data.
Volatility. Since data may be stored for a significant length time and
transported between space and ground volatility must be considered to preclude
loss of data.
Physical Characteristics. These are primarily size, weight, and power
requirements of the unit. Their importance is obvious when considering launch
vehicle weight costs and in-orbit power penalties to sustain its operation.
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Data Density. Data Density was selected as a selection factor since it
contributes directly to physical characteristics of the equipment and also
defines the primary growth area for all devices.
Reliability. Reliability was selected to assure acquiring data as the
opportunities are presented minimizing crew activity, and simplifying on-board
scheduling routines.
Development Costs and Risks. Since these parameters are directly related,
they are considered together.
Crew Interface. This factor is significant since it reflects into manning
and operational concepts of the modular space station.
The candidates that have been selected for further study for
storage system are the laser beam, electron beam and holography.
offs performed which led to the selection of the proposed concept
in Table 8-1.
the archival
The trade-
are presented
Table 8-1. Archival Storage Tradeoff Table
Criteria | Laser Electron Beam Holographic
Data quantity
Data rate
Data display
Volatibility
Reliability
Development
costs
and risks
Size
Weight
Power
2 x 1012
15 x 106 bps
2 x 107 b/sq
non-volatile
not known
3 meg.
medium
7 cu ft
235 pounds
10K w (pk)
in.
2 x 1012
15 x 106 bps
107 bits/sq in.
non-volatile
not known
not available
higher
I
2 x 1012
15 x 106 bps
108 bits/sq in.
non-volatile
not known
not available
higher
In early development
stages. Information
not available.
8-7
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division9ft North American Rockwell
As previously indicated, many technologies have been eliminated. Listed
below are the various candidates and rationale for their elimination in summary
form:
Technology Core Rationale for Elimination
Core Size and weight
Thin film Size, weight and cost
Plated wire
Thin film
Semiconductor Size, weight and cost
MOS, CMOS, etc.
Magnetic storage Size and weight
Reliability and quantity of tape
Disks and drums with its associated weight and
volume penalty
Bubbles Feasibility established. No operating
memories available in early develop-
ment to be able to effectively evaluate.
Based on results of the study and available information on the various
memory technologies, the concept proposed for the space station archival
memory is an optical device utilizing the laser beam. A candidate system
being proposed is the Unicom Space Data System of the Precision Instrument
Company. This concept was selected since it satisfies all requirements of
the archival storage system.
Since ground-based systems have been delivered and are in operation,
projections for the time period of interest indicate that such a system can
be developed for space use.
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9. DPA CONFIGURATION SELECTION
9.1 REVISIONS TO BASELINE DPA CONFIGURATION
Subsequent to the selection of a baseline DPA configuration (see Section
3) several of the influencing factors were changed as a result of the con-
current MSS Phase B definition studies. The buildup sequence shown on Figure
9-1 was selected in favor of the previously chosen sequence (power, core, etc.).
The DPA failure and error tolerance criteria were redefined, see Table 7-6.
The computational requirements were also redefined, see paragraph 2.2.1.
Figure 9-2 presents the configuration selected for the Data Processing
Assembly. Two identical central processors are utilized - one for station
operations and the other experiments and backup for station operations. The
station operations Central Processor (CP) is located in the primary control
module (SM-1). Supervisory control of the equipment in the Power and Core
Modules is provided via a radio link during station buildup prior to SM-1
arrival. A special component (Buildup Data Processor) is located in the Core
Module for interfacing with the radio link and the MSS subsystems. This com-
ponent will be removed or disengaged when SM-1 arrives and supervisory control
exercised by the station operations Central Processor.
The baseline configuration is further shown to consist of Remote Processing
Units (RPU) performing G&C subsystem functions and failure detection. A redun-
dant bus network connects these RPUs and Remote Acquisition and Control Units
(RACUs) to the central processor. A multiprocessor organization has been
selected as the most suitable for the central processor. Redundancy at the
central control level is further supplied by the other central computer con-
taining the critical operations function and experiment support software.
This second Central Processor is located in another pressure volume (SM-4)
and is identical:to the primary computer. The RPUs consist of uniprocessors
with special-input/output processing or signal processing as required to accom-
modate the subsystem functional requirements.
Figure 9-3 gives a block diagram of the new baseline DPA showing the
number and distribution of processors and RACUs.
Safety of operation is provided through use of redundancy of equipment
and location. The two control centers are located in two separate pressure
volumes. Interconnection is provided with a multiple bus network. Maintenance
is facilitated with an OBCO system which includes the monitoring of signals
and the ability -to fault isolate with either automatic or man-generated check-
out programs. Other features of this DPA are commonality arising from similar
components and few types; flexibility due to the bus structure, incremental
buildup capability and interchangeability of components; and operational avail-
ability due to several levels of redundancy and degraded modes of operations.
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Components of the DPA are realizable with the present aerospace state-of-
the-art. Future improvements in physical characteristics and cost are possible
with the expected technology changes in memories (solid state and plated wire)
and logical devices.
The baseline configuration also offers the system advantage of permitting
subassemblies and subsystems to be operated and checked out prior to total
system integration.
The central computing complex supervises the preprocessors and controls
the communication with the space station and ground subsystems. It supplies
the spacecraft and mission management operation and overall fault isolation
plus crew interface. The central processor has access to the measurements and
control points within the affected subsystems through the RACUs.
The configuration presented here is for a 6-man level. The growth to the
12-man station is accommodated by increasing the memory sizing and adding RACUs
to accommodate the increased power load.
The experiment or backup central processor is made identical to the
operational or primary central processor. Its normal operation would be to
hold critical programs in its operating memory. Periodically data would be
supplied to these programs to provide a reference point in the event of re-
configuration for a primary processor failure. The remainder of the computer
is devoted to servicing the experiments. Upon reconfiguration, i.e., after two
failures to the primary CP, the required operational programs (loaded from mass
memory) are performed and the experiment support permitted to degrade.
Table 9-1 presents the resultant computational requirements for the Central
Processors. As-can be noted, a-breakdown for critical and non-critical sizing
is provided. Further, the sizing estimates were doubled to arrive at the
estimate for the initial station. This allowance is for the uncertainties in
the estimation. An allowance for growth to a final capability is shown. The
initial DPA equipment would be designed for these final values. It is to be
noted that, at this stage, no allowance has been included for the additional
speed and memory required for error detection internally in the central pro-
cessor. Further, the allocation of non-critical information to the operating or
mass memory was made on the basis of iteration rate. If the iteration rate of
a function was greater than 1/second, the corresponding information was assumed
to be in mass memory, otherwise in the operating memories. The archival
memory contains the data base and programs.
The requirements for the preprocessors which are used in the Remote Pro-
cessing Units (RPU) and in the Guidance and Control Subsystem is shown in
Table 9-2. Since the computational loads are well defined by previously
sponsored NASA studies, since the central processor can accommodate any in-
creased computational loads, and since spare capability is provided in order to
make all preprocessors alike, the initial and final values for the memory and
speed we-re made equal and twice the sizing estimation.
The RACU quantity and subsystem interface information is presented in
Table 9-3.
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Table 9-1. Central Processor Computational Requirements
(MEMORY - 32 BIT WORDS/SPEED - EAPS)
SIZING EST. (X) INITIAL (2X) FINAL (3X)
CP - CRITICAL 36.3K/217K 72.6K/434K 108.9K/.65M
CP - NON-CRITICAL 30.7K/414K 61.4K/828K 92.lK/1.24M
CP - TOTAL 67K/631K 134.OK/1.26M 201K/1.89M
MASS MEMORY 341K 682K 1024K
ARCHIVE MEMORY-WDS 4.2M 8.4M 12.6M
Table 9-2. RPU Sizing
MEMORY/SPEED (X) 2X(INITIAL)(FINAL)
RPU (1) (2)
1 (RCS) 4700/55600 9300/111,200
2 (CMG) 2600/39800 5100/79,700
3 (ORA) 2500/800 5100/1600
4 (RCS) 4700/55600 9300/111,200
5 (IRA) 4400/69,600 8800/139,300
(1) Includes 5% for Executive
(2) A single RPU Design of 10,240 words (32 Bits) and 150 KEAPS is
recommended.
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Table 9-3. RACU Utilization
RACU
NO
1
m 2
3
4
5
.- 6
P4 7
8
9
10
11
12
> 13
m 14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
X 23
24
25
26
27
28
A
84
97
34
128
128
128
128
103
82
128
128
128
128
115
102
111
111
128
128
85
40
105
35
66
(NO:
IN
E
42
45
16
29
29
29
19
67
86
19
19
19
19
62
106
54
80
128
128
49
4
72
63
35
SIZED)
(NS)
(NS)
(NS)
D
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
OUT
_ E
13
34
30
128
83
128
83
54
47
128
83
128
83
52
51
65
86
128
128
47
19
55
36
44
D
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
29 107 75 78 1
30 107 75 78 1
31 44 48 1 26 1
32 128 63 23
x 33 128 16 39
t 34 99 54 44
35 86 54 43
36 115 22
37
38
39
c 40
X 41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
3 52
53
54
55
56
57
58
A
107
107
21
113
128
128
99
86
115
1ll
111
128
128
85
40
105
35
66
75
75
48
102
63
16
54
54
1
1
1
1
1
E D E 
78
78
26
10
23
39
44
43
22
65
86
128
128
47
19
55
36
44
0 59 30 44 11 1
o 60 47 16 11
RPU 1 24 24
2 52 16 24 1
3 18 33 1 21 1
4 24 24
5 27 81 1 61 1
54
80
128
128
49
4
72
63
35
(NS)
(NS)
(NS)
(NS 
1
1
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The dual redundant bus permits the intercommunication of either of the
central processors (CP) with any subsystem or element of the DPA. There are
a number of ways, as will be illustrated, by which the DPA may operate. The
selection of the most suitable requires further studies including those re-
garding detailed definition of the experiments and subsystems.
One concept of normal operation is to assign one CP to perform the
station operations and use one bus in each pressure volume while the other CP
does the experiments and uses the other buses. The RACUs are assumed to be
capable of only communicating with one bus at a time. If a conflict occurs,
the CP requesting access to a particular RACU can note whether transmission
is being conducted with the other and idle until servicing can be accomplished.
Alternately, the operational CP could have priority over the experiment CP
and be serviced immediately.
Another concept of normal operation is to allocate time slots for particular
RACUs and communicate accordingly. Since the bus rate has been chosen to meet
the requirements for both experiments and operational data flow, sufficient time
slots are provided.
Still other methods of operating are possible. For instance, identical
data can be transmitted on two or more buses. Such bus usage permits data com-
parison at the receiving end. More than two may also be utilized to send identi-
cal data to all RACUs and be useful for rapid reconfiguration or as an aid to
identify a fault DPA component.
Error detection and fault isolation of the DACS is performed in the central
processor using software to process data derived from echo checking, command
verification and validity tests. Further error detection of the DACS is obtained
by use of coding on the data, format and transmission procedures and built-in
self test into the DACS elements.
The central processors also use a combination of hardware and software to
detect failures and to isolate faulty units. The recommended central processor
concept, described in the next section, uses comparators to check all memory
command, address and data. Coding of data and address verification is also used.
ThLe G&C RrUs perform periodic self and subsystem tests. Upon error detection,
the RPU can be provided programs over the data bus from archive memory for further
isolation. Relocating of operational programs can also be accomplished over the
bus.
9.2 CENTRAL PROCESSOR TASK ALLOCATIONS
In paragraph 5.5 where processor utilization was discussed with respect to
the simulation results, the low utilization of the I/O processor was noted. It
was suggested that either a lower speed be used in the I/O processor or that a
reallocation of tasks between the I/O processors and the AU sets of a central
processor be investigated. SDC.undertook this investigation to assist in the
final selection of central processor parameters by effectively allocating the
estimated software workload among the central processor computing elements.
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The major criteria and guidelines employed in this effort were as follows:
a. All critical functions for the station operations CP are to be
duplicated and executed in parallel in separate processing elements.
b. Non-critical functions are to be allocated in an attempt to
balance the load imposed on each "half" of the CP; that is,
distributions are to be made to allocate approximately the same
processing load to each of two AU-I/O combinations.l
c. Within each AU-I/O combination, a further distribution is to be
made to evenly allocate the software load between the AU and
the I/O. The ultimate goal is to attempt to use identical
processor types for AU and I/O operations, thereby standardizing
the types of the many processing elements used throughout the
station.
Detailed breakdowns of the subsystem software loads were then made to
further identify discrete portions of these loads and their expected operating
times. For all subsystems the workload portions were designated as to their
applicability for AU processing (i.e., relatively long-running computer-
bound operations), I/O processing (i.e., loads which are comparatively short
and interface frequently with subsystems through the external data bus), and
processing which could be performed equally well either on AU or I/O.
Processing segments were then allocated to the AUs and I/Os to meet
established criteria.
The final step consisted of the resultant estimation of AU and I/O speed
requirements to accommodate these loads, allowing for the operations necessary
to transfer data on the TLM and Digital Data buses.
9.2.1 Computational Requirements
MSS functional data processing requirements for the command and control
central processor have been specified and identified in respect to the com-
putational support requirements for iSS subsystems. An overall summary of
the computational load required to meet total subsystem computational needs,
with load figures for critical and non-critical subsystem functions is as
follows:
1 In the final configuration, each "AU" or "I/O" may actually be a set of
similar elements for further redundancy and reliability. For convenience
in this report each potential AU set or I/O set will be referred to as an
"AU" or "I/O" respectively.
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CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL TOTAL REQUIRED
S B SYSTEM KEAPS KEAPS KEAPS
G&C - 3_.0 38.0
ECLSS 2.3 26.2 28.5
EPS 22.6 135.8 158.4
RCS 8.1 2.8 10.9
STRUCTURES - 0.8 0.8
CREW - 1.1 1.1
ISS 177.8 225.5 403.3
TOTALS 210.8 430.2 641.0
9.2.2 AU-I/O Pair Loading
Based on this tabulation, and employing the guideline that all critical
functions would be duplicated on each side of the CP, an initial allocation
can be made of subsystem functions to each "half" of the CP (i.e., each of
the two AU-I/O set combinations). Since the remaining OBCO executive and FI
routines encompass about one-half of the non-critical total, a decision was
made to allocate all non-critical OBCO functions to one AU-I/O pair, with all
other non-critical subsystem functions allocated to the other AU-I/O pair.
Critical functions would be performed by both pairs simultaneously. The
resultant distribution to each AU-I/O combination would then be as follows:
AU-I/O1
CP EXECUTIVE - 84.OK
OBCO M&A EXEC - 17.6
OTHER CRIT. FUNCS. - 109.2
OBCO - 212.4
(remaining exec.
plus FI)
CRITICAL
FUNC-
TIONS
NON-
CRITICAL
FUNC-
TIONS
AU-I/O2
CP EXECUTIVE - 84.0K
OBCO M&A EXEC. - 17.6
OTHER CRIT.FUNCS. - 109.2
G&C - 38.0
ECLSS - 26.2
EPS -- 135,8
RCS - 2.8
STRUCTURES - 0.8
CREW - 1.1
OTHER ISS - 13.1
BG & ON-DEMAND - negligible
423.2 KEAPS 428.6 KEAPS
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Note that no attempt has been made to allocate segments of the estimated 84K
multiporcessor executive amongst components of the CP. Several approaches to
a supervisor rationale are possible (master/slave, distributed fixed modules,
"floating" modules, etc.), each of which could impact on the final distri-
bution of all critical and non-critical functions. However, multiprocessor
supervisor designs are generlly chosen to support a given distribution of
applications programs; that is, a segmentation of applications software into
AU and I/O processors should be performed first, irrespective of executive
considerations. Thus, since executive considerations are still under study,
initial consideration has been given to the distribution of applications
programs.
The AU-I/O pair loading illustrated can be summarized as follows:
. Approximately equal loads
· All critical functions in both pairs
· Non-critical OBCO operations assigned to one pair with all other
non-critical operations assigned to the other AU-I/O pair.
9.2.3 AU-I/O Element Loading
Based upon the previous AU-I/O pair loading, the allocation of functions
between the AU and I/O elements which constitute an AU-I/O pair is required.
Element allocation began with a detailed investigation of the subsystem
functional requirements. Employing the previously established criterion that
relatively short programs should be handled by the I/O, initial allocations
of each of these functional tasks were made to the AU or I/O. This criterion
was augmented by additional criteria, as follows:
a. In general, most critical functions should be performed in the I/O
processor to minimize transfer delays and to minimize possible
transmission errors on the internal data bus.
b. Wherever practical, closely related functional tasks and routines
should be performed on the same processor to minimize possible
searches and transmissions for common subroutines.
The results of this initial allocation of functional segments appears
in Table 9-4.
The next step involved the equitable distribution of these functions
between the AU and I/O of each AU-I/O pair. As stated previously, attempts
were made to achieve a balance between both of these processor "types", so as
to employ a single kind of processing element throughout the MSS. The results
of this distribution analysis appear in Tables 9-5 and 9-6.
In addition to the AU totals shown in Tables 9-5 and 9-6, it has been assumed
that the I/O processor must perform some processing and control for all
routines executed by the AU. This overhead (which is separate from that
employed by the CP executive) has nominally been taken to be 10% of the AU load.
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Table 9-4. Processor Allocations
ECLSS Pumpdown & Repressurization*
CO2 Managementf
Electrolysis Control*
02 Partial Pressure Control*
Humidity & Contamination Control
Circulation & Temperature Control
02/N2 Control
Active Thermal Control
Humidity & Urine Recovery Control
Wash Water Recovery
Food Management
Special Life Support
BG
1.7
0.1
0.5
BG
BG
2.4
0.1
4.7
0.4
OD
18.6
X
X
OPERATIONS
FUNCTION (KEAPS) AU I/O
Experiment Module Update BG X
Shuttle Alignment X
Terminal Rendezvous 38.0 X
Berthing X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
EPS Solar Array Control 0.8 X
EPS Operations* 150.0** X X
Fuel Cell Control* 7.6 X
Lighting Control BG X
RCS Nitrogen Quantity Balance 0.5 X
Hydrogen Gas Control 1.9 X
Thrust Value Control* 8.1 X
Oxygen Gas Control 0.4 X
Structures Berthing 0.8 X
Crew Medical Data Acquisition & Analysis 1.1 X
BG = background (insignificant)
OD = on demand
*critical functions
**critical portion (15K) will be performed on AU, remainder will be
performed on both AU and I/O: 100K on AU and 35K on I/O
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Table 9-4. (Cont.)
SUBSYSTEM
ISS
FUNCTION
Internal Communications Control
External Communications Control*
Tracking Control
CMD & Message Generation*
Displays & Controls*
Subsystems Operations*
Planning & Scheduling
Logistics Inventory Control
Information Storage & Retrieval
Mission Analysis & Assessment
Record Management
3 Remote Terminals
Printer
OBCO(M&A) - G&C*
RCS *
EPS*
ECLSS*
EXT COMM*
OBCO-M&A Exec*
OBCO (FI, etc.) - EPS
ECLSS
all other
OBCO-FI, etc. Exec.
subsystems
*Critical functions
**1OK will be resident in AU, 10K in I/O
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1.0
29.0
3.5
20.3
5.2
2.5
BG
2.3
0.2
4.8
BG
BG
1.3
0.9
3.5
0.7
13.6
0.5
17.6
145.0
15.0
32.4
20.0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Space Division9ft North American Rockwell
Table 9-5. AU-I/O1 SUBSYSTEM DISTRIBUTION
AU I/O
SUBSYSTEM
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL
G&C 
ECLSS 1.7 0.6
EPS - 22.6
RCS 8.1 -
STRUCTURES .
CREW .
ISS - 170.0 93.8 42.4
TOTALS 9.8 170.0 117.0 42.4
179.8 159 4
Table 9-6. AU-I/O2 SUBSYSTEM DISTRIBUTION
AU I/O
SUBSYSTEM
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL CRITICAL INON-CRITICAL
G&C - 38.0 - -
ECLSS 1.7 18.6 0.6 7.6
EPS - 100.0 22.6 35.8
RCS 8.1 - - 2.8
STRUCTURES - 0.8 
-
CREW 1.1 - -
ISS - 7.1 93.8 6.0
TOTALS 9.8 165.6 117.0 52.2
175.4 169.2
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Thus, the total expected AU and I/O utilizations are as follows:
AU-I/O1: Total AU1 load
I/O1 applications load
179.8 KEAPS
- 159.4
I/O1 overhead (0.10 x 179.8) - 18.0
Total I/O1 load
Total AU2 load
AU-I/02: Total AU2 load
I/02 applications load
I/O2 overhead (0.10 x 175.4)
Total I/O2 load
Total AU2-I/02 load
177.4 KEAPS
357.2 KEAPS
175.4 KEAPS
- 169.2
- 17.5
186.7 KEAPS
362.1 KEAPS
Thus, with the functional allocation so indicated, a reasonable balance
of the processing loads may be expected. A graphical summary of this resultant
allocation is shown in Figure 9-4.
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10. PROCESSORS PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
The objective of this study was to define the central processor and the
preprocessor in terms of their internal organization and required functional
and performance characteristics. The preceding sections of this report have
presented a number of concepts. This section examines these and presents
tradeoff considerations and conclusions regarding their use.
10.1 CENTRAL PROCESSOR TYPE
Two major approaches to the organization of the central processor are as
follows: (1) the approach recommended in paragraph 7.1.3 utilized internal
logic to detect failures; (2) the approach recommended in paragraph 6.2 places
more emphasis on software for detection. The development risks and costs of
the two types are felt to be nearly equal. In the one case, the hardware com-
plexity creates the risk and increases the cost. In the other, it is the soft-
ware complexity.
With regard to the reliability performance, each of the factors of fail-
ure coverage, fault isolation and reconfigurability need to be considered.
The hardware approach offers greater potential in the ability to detect fail-
ures rapidly and prevent error propagation. The fault isolation ability is
felt to be equal for the two types since both rely on software and each con-
figuration would have about an equal number of in-flight replaceable units
(IFRU's). The one-minute allowance for reconfiguration time (see Table 7-6)
means that either approach would probably be acceptable. However, the diffi-
culty in recovering from a propagated error and the necessity to utilize the
second computer after the first failure (since cross comparison within and
between computers is used for error detection) makes the software approach
less attractive.
The physical factors (size, weight, power) are related to the number of
hardware components involved. It appears that exclusive of memory and power
supply (which should be equivalent for either approach) that the hardware
approach involves about 20 percent more for the logic. On the assumption that
this is 20 percent of the computer hardware, the net difference betTween the two
is about 4 percent for power, weight and volume.
In view of the low percentage of difference in the physical factors, the
equality of development cost and risk, and the greater error detectability, the
use of internal logic is preferred.
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10.2 CP INTERNAL STRUCTURE
The candidates for the internal structure of the central processor are shown
in Figure 10-1 and briefly discussed as follows. The memories, power supplies
and internal busing are not shown since these items would be approximately equal
for any approach and not major contributors to the selected configuration.
a. Voters are used upon the address, control and data out of the AUs
and IOs. The memory data are encoded for error detection.
b. The voter of the AUs of the previous type are replaced by compara-
tors. The number of AUs are thus reduced. Both AU sets can perform
critical computations and provide continuation of operation upon a
first failure.
c. In this candidate, the comparators are used for both AUs and IOs.
d. The AUs of this candidate are designed such that an AU set can perform
the I0 operation. This eliminates the need for voter and I0 processor
development.
Types a, b, and c are about equal when considering development risk.
Type d.,has an advantage over these since it has less types of IFRUs to be
developed. The software development cost of the types b, c, and d is slightly
greater than type a since some rollback or reconfiguring software must be pro-
vided. However, types a and d represent more hardware development cost (see
Table 10-1).
Except for fault isolation, all versions have equal reliability performance.
Type a has an advantage with regard to isolation of a faulty element since the
voter elements can be used.
As previously noted, the logical portion of the central processor represents
about 20 percent of the hardware. Table 10-1 presents the estimation of amount
of this logic for each of the candidates.
Table 10-1. CP Hardware Comparison
Selected
Type a Type b Type c Type d
No. Equiv. AU * No. Equiv. AU * No. Equiv. AU * No. Equiv. Al
AU 6 6 4 4 4 4 6 6.6 to 7
IO 3 1 1/2 3 1 1/2 4 2
V 4 1 2 1/2
C 2 l/6 4 1/3 3 .25
Total 8 1/2 6 1/6 6 1/3 6.85 to
Element
Type 3 4 ,3 2
*10 = 1/2 AU, V = 1/4 AU, C = 1/2 AU
SD 72-SA-0114-410-2
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Figure 10-1. CP Internal Structures
LEGEND:
AU = Arithmetic Unit
IO Input Output Unit
C s Comparator
V n Voter
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This table indicates that types a and d represent more logic than types
b or c. As such, the power, weight, and volume requirements will directly
reflect this. The types of elements relate to the IFRU types and indicate
favoring type c.
10.3 HOLM VERSUS CONVENTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
10.3.1 Requirements
Section 7.2 presents the features of higher order language machines (HOLM)
This section examines the memory savings and cost effectiveness of the HOLM
approach. Speed is not considered a key factor since the central processor
requirements can be met with equal numbers of AUs and the same type of logic
for either conventional or HOLM computers.
Table 10-2 presents a summary of the memory requirements for (a) a
conventional architecture, (b) a HOLM where 50-percent memory savings is
achieved, and (c) a HOLM similar to that described earlier.
10.3.2 HOLM Implementation Costs
The only quantitative data published at this time relating to the design of
a HOLM are presented in the series of articles on the SYMBOL computer. Table
10-3 presents information extracted from these articles and gives an estimate
for the HOLM logic.
The arithmetic unit logic attributable to the HOLM features can be deter-
mined by considering those features of the SYMBOL machine thus involved. Table
10-3 gives these and shows that an estimated 6850 integrated circuits (IC's)
are required in addition to a conventional design of 2500 IC's for implementation
of an arithmetic unit and a translator. (For a conventional machine the trans-
lation would be done by software - a compiler.)
An evaluation method to determine the cost differential between a HOLM and
a conventional design is presented by Kerner and Gillman (see Reference 2 at
the end of Section 7.0). Table 10-4 presents this method with numeric values
and changes felt to be applicable to the MSS.
The cost differences between the conventional design and HOLM are shown in
Table 10-5 for both a 50-percent and a 7 0-percent memory reduction. These
results show that difference can be appreciably greater or less dependent upon
which factor of memory reduction is used (50 or 70 percent).
10.3.3 Conclusions of HOLM-Conventional Organization Analysis
The preceding analyses, summarized in Table 10-6, indicate that the total
cost can be nearly equal to or several million dollars more expensive when a
HOLM is developed rather than a conventional machine for the MSS. The actual
value is dependent upon what memory reduction is achievable.
The HOLM has greater risk and credibility due to (1) the uncertainty of its
memory improvement, (2) the newness of the concept which affects systems and logic
design experience and flexibility.
The result of this analysis is that a conventional organization is preferred
for the DPA central processors.
SD 72-SA-0114-410-4
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Table 10-4 Cost Evaluation of HOLM and Conventional
Design Applied to MSS
Equations:
Cost differential between two machines, C = nM + 2P + 2L
Manufacturing and development cost,
M=(s.b.r)-(g.cg.r)-(g.d.cc.co)
m
Power consumption cost savings per computer, P = (pm-pl)cw
Launch weight cost savings per computer,
L=[(wm-wl)l+(pm-pl)wwl] where n = number of computers
For MSS = 2 for vehicle
2 for backup
2 for program development
2 for qualification testing
or n = 8
Value
S Memory saved, bits
b Bit cost, $
r High reliability cost factor
g Number of gates added
cg Cost per gate, $
d Chips per gate
cc Development cost per chip, $
co Fraction of new chips
wm Weight of saved memory, lb.
wl Weight of additional logic, lb.
pm Power saved due to memory
reduction, w
pl Power penalty for added logic, w
cw Cost per watt, $/w
ww Weight per watt, LB/w
1 Cost to launch one pound, $/LB
SOM=operating; SMM=mass
Operating=.08, Mass=.004
3
IC's X gates/IC X 4AU=109,600
.1
.003
30K
.3 6X--63.6X105 SSi or 4Xlo SMM
2.5 X 10- g
10-4SOM or 10-6SMM
.9g
200
.16
1000
SD 72-SA-0114-4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
where
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Table 10-5. Cost Savings Between HOLM and Conventional Organizations 
-
Exclusive of Development - In Dollars
50%
M2 M3
Memory Saved Bits
P
L
M
40K X 33
-170,800
-223,500
-104,000
C
243K X 33
1,6oo
40,000
96,300
M2
70K X 33
-151,000
-174,800
134,000
-800K'
70%
M3
447K X 33
2,900
73,800
177,000
+1,9OOK
Table 10-6. Summary of HOLM
- Conventional Organization Evaluation
Item
Manufacture,
power, weight
Hardware
development
Compiler
development
and use
Max Total
Selected
Jonventional
x
.5 M
x+y+.5M
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Factor
Cost, $
HOLM 50%
x+.8M
y+1.8M
x+y+2.6M
HOLM 70%
x-1.9M
y+1.8M
x+y-. 1M
10-8
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10.4 SUMMARY OF PROCESSORS CHARACTER.ISTICS
The central processor is a multiprocessor which possesses the features
shown in Table 10-7. As noted, a conventional organization is preferred.
A memory hierarchy consisting of buffer memories in the processing elements,
modular operating and mass memories is provided. The requirements can be met
with two arithmetic and input/output processing sets. Each set contains dual
units with capability of comparing memory addressing, controls, and processed
results.
The central processor utilizes two operating memories for the main storage
functions. These memories are supplied by paging techniques with information
from a mass memory. Additional off-line storage is provided by an archive
memory. The key features of these are tabulated in Table 10-7.
An arithmetic unit provides one million equivalent adds per second capability.
An extensive repertoire, including floating point, is incorporated into the
design. Modes of operation include the normal computational and the executive.
Privileged instructions only executable in the latter are used. Linkage to the
executive mode is by interrupts and special instructions.
All input output functions are controlled by the AU's by means of IO
control words and commands from the AU's. Once initiated, IO actions proceed
independently of the AU's until completed.
Two transformer rectifier sets are used to convert the primary ac voltages
to secondary dc voltages. A redundant power distribution capability is provided
internal to the CP. Each set contains power circuitry in active redundancy
to be able to use either of the secondary sources.
It was noted earlier that the state of art in smaller aerospace computers
is well advanced for the type needed for the preprocessors. The typical charac-
teristics achievable from these are shown in Table 10-8.
The physical values shown in Tables 10-7 and 10-8 are achievable with
today's packaging capability. The processors are based upon the use of cased
devices on multilayer boards. The mass memory utilizes 2 mil plated wire and
power strobing and high-density devices with beam leads, hybrid thin-film, and
ceramic substrates.
SD 72-SA-0114-410-9
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Table 10-7. Technical Characteristics of the Central Processor
Tpe:
Multiprocessor, conventional organization, parallel, binary, 16/32
bit data and instruction words.
Operating Memory, M2:
Two required, plated wire, NDRO, each consists of five memory modules
of 13K x 33 bits maximum, one parity bit per memory word, one parity
word exclusive ORed with block anddress for every five memory words,
echo checking of write operations, one microsecond cycle time with
interleaving of the five memory modules, maximum capacity of 18K x
33 bits per each module.
Auxiliary Memories:
Mass Memory - M3, Virtual memory using paging methods, error detection
using one parity bit per word and one parity word with address exclusive
ORed per every four data words; echo checking of write operations,
2 mil plated wire, NDRO, maximum capability of 1280K x 33 bits, modular
design based upon 64K modules.
Archive Memory - Magnetic tape storage with >5x10 6 bits per cartridge.
Input-Output:
Two required, each contains dual IO units with comparator AU initiated
with self-contained control, solid state buffer memory of nominal 2K x
33 words and 200 nanosecond cycle time, interface with Data Bus Control
Unit, Telemetry Bus, and Mass Memory.
Arithmetic Set:
Two required, each contains dual arithmetic units with comparator,
solid state buffer memory of nominal 2K x 33 words and 200 nanosecond
cycle time 1 million equivalent adds per second per set, fixed and
floating point with 100-200 instructions.
Physical Estimates:
Mass Memory Archive Memory Multiprocessor Set
Size, cubic inches 3900 1200 1000
Weight, pounds 180 40 290
Power, watts 15 45 400
SD 72-SA-0114-410-10
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Table 10-8. Technical Characteristics of the Preprocessor
Uniprocessor, parallel-binary, 16 bits data, 16/32 bit instruction words.
Memory:
Capacity - 20K word, 17 bit Plated Wire Storage.
One bit of parity per 16 bits.
Cycle time - 1 microsecond
Input/Output:
One buffered 16 bit parallel input and output channel.
Eight external interrupts.
Instruction Repertoire:
Single and double word addressing.
Single word non-addressing.
Indexing
Indirect addressing.
Add Times (Fixed Point):
Add - 4 microseconds
Multiply - 20 microseconds
Divide - 40 microseconds
Special Features:
Internal and external interrupts
General register file usable as index, base or data register
Physical (20K x 17 Bits):
Size - 400 cubic inches
Weight - 15 pounds
Power - 50 watts
SD 72-SA-0114-410-11
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11. DPA DESIGN REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
11.1 DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY GENERAL SPECIFICATION
11.1.1 SCOPE
This document establishes the requirements for the Data Processing
Assembly (DPA) of the Modular Space Station (MSS):
11.1.2 REQUIREMENTS
This section establishes the performance and design requirements for the
Data Processing Assembly. This section also defines and specifies design
constraints and standards necessary to assure compatibility of the DPA with
other spacecraft subsystems.
11.1.2.1 ITEM DEFINITION
The Data Processing Assembly consists of the following:
Item Number
Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly (DACS) 1
Central Timing Unit (CTU) 2
Central Processor (CP) 2
Build Up Data Processor (BUDP) 2
The DACS consists of:
Initial Final
No. No.
Data Bus Control Unit (DBCU) 4 4
Remote Acquisition and Control Unit (RACU) 60 (TBD)
Digital Data Bus (DDB) 1 1
Remote Processing Unit (RPU) 5 (TBD)
11.1.2.1.1 Functional Description
The DPA performs as the computational and management center of the Modular
Space Station. The DPA shall perform the functions of data acquisition and
control, computation, data processing, display processing, multiplex system
control, data transfer, subsystem monitoring and control.
11.1.2.1.2 Data Processing Assembly
The DPA is a digital data acquisition and processing system whose elements
shall consist of a Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly, Central Timing
Units, Central Processors, and Buildup Data Processors. The elements shall
11-1
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be configured such that the loss of a single element shall not cause the loss
of any other element of the DPA. The block diagram of the DPA is shown in
Figure 11-1.
11.1.2,1.2.1 DPA Configuration
11.1.2.1.2.1.1 Initial Configuration. The initial DPA configuration shall consist
of those DPA elements required to meet or exceed the initial spacecraft require-
ments. The initial DPA configuration shall be obtained by using those
elements from the standard (44iraI) configuration required to meet the
initial requirements. Table 11-1 presents the quantity and location of the DPA
elements for the initial orbit configuration.
11.1.2.1.2.1.2 Growth to the Standard (Final) Configuration. The standard DPA
configuration shall meet the final requirements by inserting modules without
any modification to the initial configuration.
11.1.2.1.2.1.3 Identical Elements. Each element shall be identical with all
elements within the same classification.
11.1.2.1.2.2 Modularity
The DPA shall be designed such that the addition and deletion of its
elements can be made with ease.
11.1.2.1.2.3 Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly
The DACS shall be the subassembly which provides the communication between
a number of physically separate locations and equipments. The DACS shall con-
sist of the following elements.
11.1.2.1.2.3.1 Data Bus Control Unit. The DBCU performs as an input/output device
for the central processor, controls the information on the data bus, and
provides the buffering, formatting, protective coding and checking of the
digital data bus data.
11.1.2.1.2.3.2 Digital Data Bus. The DDB provides a redundant communications
path between the central processors, remote processing units, and remote acquisi-
tion and control units located throughout the modular space station.
11.1.2.1.2.3.3 Remote Acquisition and Control Unit. The RACU is the DACS hardware
element that provides the standard interface between the data bus and subsystem
functional loops.
11.1.2.1.2.3.4 Remote Processing Unit. The RPUs provide the interface between the
data bus and subsystem functional loops together with processing capability.
11-2
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division
North American Rockwellcoco ibDC4-3
3 
r.n
 
v)
11-3
SD 
72-SA
-0114-4
P-f
Space Division
North Am
erican Rockwell
t· 
o
s 
o
C
Y
C
\i
LPC.,
OLnLU, 
-
0 
Lr 
-
C
M
LU 
-
J
/o
~
u
 
) 
0 
Z 
*
 
/ 
X
 
D
 
<
 
O
 
O
 
<
 
C_ U
n
 
y 
y 
O
-
QV::) 
<
7
 
L
U
- 
L
U
-z
L
U
0
LU 
W
D
(A
w
 0a
 
0 
0
o
T
SD 
72-SA
-0114-4
OI-OO-jLUa:()'-4IQ~
1
1
-4
004 Ad North American Rockwell
11.1.2.1.2.4 Central Timing Unit
The central timing subassembly consists of redundant timing oscillators
which provide such functions as vehicle time, timing signals and synchroniza-
tion pulses.
11.1.2.1.2.5 Central Processor
The Central Processor performs as the computational and management center
for the DPA system.
11.1.2.1.2.6 Build Up Data Processor
The BUDP provides the interface between the subsystems in the core and
power modules and the radio link to provide command and monitoring capability
during station buildup.
11.1.2.2 INTERFACE DEFINITION
11.1,2.2.1 Tolerances
Tolerances shall be as specified herein.
11.1.2.2.2 Electrical Interface
The following requirements for signals, sequences, timing and connections
shall apply.
11.1-2.2.2.1 Interfacing Equipment Requirements
Equipment interface shall be as specified in Table 11-2.
11.1.2.2.2.2 Interface with Test Equipment
In-Flight Replacement Units (IFRUs) shall be so designed that when removed
from the DPA system and tested at the bench, the total functional test require-
ment shall be satisfied with GSE and authorized adapters.
11.1.2.2.2.3 Power Supply Interface
Except as modified herein, the equipment shall be designed to comply with
requirements in the utilization of electric power and shall provide specified
performance when supplied with electric power of three-phase, four-wire "Y,
system, having a nominal voltage of 120/208 and a nominal frequency of 400
cycles per second (Hz). Power consumption shall be less than TBD watts.
11-5 SD 72-SA-0114-4
-D
 _ 
_
 
w
S
N
orth American Rockwell
tu
ed
I
E-4
H
 
_
.
SD 72-SA
-0114-4
11-6
Space Division
0•% North American Rockwell
11.1.2.2.2.4 Control Panel Interface
The DPA shall be capable of connection to a control
a minimum the CP control capabilities specified herein.
ities shall include the following:
panel to provide as
These control capabil-
Mode control
Register access and load
Memory access and load
Monitor while running
11.1.2.3 SPECIAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
11.1.2.3.1 Data Acquisition and Control Subassembly
The DACS shall provide the capability specified in the following sub-
paragraphs.
11.1.2.3.1.1 Digital Data Bus
11.1.2.3.1.1.1 Data Transmission. Data shall be transmitted over hardwire with a
word serial, bit serial time division multiplexed format.
11.1.2.3.1.1.2 Bus Geometry.
the equipment interfaces.
bidirectional central bus.
11.1.2.3.1.1.3
provided.
The bus geometry shall be unidirectional buses for
These equipment buses shall be interconnected by a
Bus Coupling. Transformer (ac) coupling to the buses shall be
The data bus shall use modems to interface with other DACS elements.
11.1.2.3.1.1.4 Bus Configuration. Two dual redundant bus sets with one set in
each pressure volume shall be provided. Both sets shall be provided in each
of the two spacecraft central control modules.
11.1.2.3.1.1.5 Bus Interface. All four buses shall be connected to each DBCU and
provide each CP with redundant paths to all DACS elements.
11.1.2.3.1.1.6 Bus Rate. The bus shall have a data transfer rate of 10 megabits/sec.
11.1.2.3.1.1.7 Bus Data Coding. Error detecting codes shall be used. Manchester
coding shall be used to transfer clocking signals.
11.1.2.3.1.2 Remote Acquisition and Control Unit
11.1.2.3.1.2.1 Bus Interface. The RACUs shall accept serial digital data in a
standard format from two data bus modems.
11.1.2.3.1.2.2 Error Coding. Error detecting codes shall be generated and checked
for transmitted and received bus data.
SD 72-SA-0114-411-7
Space Division@D North American Rockwell
11.1.2.3.1.2.3 Subsystem Interface. A single subsystem interface with capability
of
a. Input - 128 analog
- 128 discrete or 96 discrete and 1 digital 32 bit word
b. Output - 128 discrete or 96 discrete and 1 digital 32 bit word
shall be provided. When inputting or outputting digital words, discretes can
be used for word identification.
11.1. 2.3.1.2.4 Critical Subsystem Connection. The RACUs shall be connected to a
critical subsystem to provide dual independent measurements and commands.
11.1. 2.3.1.2.5 Non-critical Subsystem Connection. The RACU(s) shall be connected
to non-critical subsystems to provide non-redundant measurements and commands.
11.1.2.3.1.2.6 Data Conversion. Acquired bus or subsystem data shall be converted
to generate compatible signals and controls. Data buffering and data transfer
control shall be provided.
11.1.2.3.1.2.7 Control. Operation of a RACU shall be under control of information
from the CP over the digital bus.
1.1.1. 2.3.1.2.8 Power Connection. The RACU shall be designed to permit power connec-
tions to be one of the two following ways:
a. Single Source - For this connection, the RACUs for critical subsystems
shall be connected to opposite secondary sources in a module. Fault
isolation may require more manual participation.
b. Dual Source - For this capability, the RACUs shall be capable of
being supplied from either of two sources.
11.1.2.3.1.3 Data Bus Control Unit
11.1.2.3.1.3.1 Interface. The DBCU shall provide a single parallel digital inter-
face with the central processor and a quadruple serial digital interface with
the digital bus.
11.1.2.3.1.3.2 Bus Control. The DBCU shall control all messages for the DACS and
the communication with the RACUs and RPUs via the data bus.
11.1.2.3.1.3.3 Data Buffer. Data storage for message data sequences shall be
provided.
11.1.2o3.1.3o4 Message Generation. Message generation zhall ce uneer i*er. --' ;
control using information from the central processor.
11.1.2.3.1.3.5 Error Coding. The DBCU shall perform error encoding and detecting
on a word or message basis.
SD 72-SA-0114-411-8
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11-1.2.3.1.4 Remote Processing Unit
11.1.2.3.1.4.1 Item Definition. The RPU shall consist of a preprocessor and input/
output conversion and interface section of an RACU.
11-1-2.3.1.4.2 Performance. The subsystem and digital bus interfaces shall be equiva-
lent to that of an RACU. The RPU shall perform as an RACU when viewed from
these interfaces.
11.1.2.3.2 Central Processor
11.1.2.3.2.1 Item Definition
The central processor consists of the MultiprocessorSet, the Mass Memory
and the Archive Memory. Figure 11-2 presents a block diagram.
11.1.2.3.2.2 Interconnection
The CP shall communicate with the other elements of the DPA through the
DACS. A parallel bus shall be provided to the mass memory. A redundant serial
bus for telemetry and command data shall be provided to the radio link equip-
ment. Discretes shall be provided for communication with the other central
processor and control console.
11.1.2.3.2.3 Multiprocessor Mechanization
The multiprocessor shall be configured to use hardware comparators and
information coding to achieve the reliability performance required.
11.1.2.3.3 Central Timing Unit
11.12.3.2.1 Internal Clock
The CTU shall provide timing and synchronization signals from an internal
source. This source shall have TBD characteristics and TBD long term frequency
stability.
11.12.3.4 Buildup Data Processor
11.1.2.3.4.1 Usage
The BUDP shall provide monitor and control capability during early stages
of buildup.
11o12.3.4.2 Interfaces
The BUDP shall interface with the radio link and key subsystems with hard-
wiring.
SD 72-SA-0114-411-9
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11.1.2.4 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
11.1.2.4.1 Weight
The equipment weight and in-flight replacement units are specified below.
The initial DPA equipment weight shall not exceed the total value specified.
Data Processing Assembly IFRU Weight Total
Data Bus Control Unit (TBD) (TBD)
Digital Data Bus (TBD) (TBD)
Remote Acquisition and Control Unit (TBD) (TBD)
Central Timing Unit 18 72
Central Processor
Arithmetic Unit Set (TBD) (TBD)
Input/Output Set (TBD) (TBD)
Operating Memory (TBD) (TBD)
Power Supply (TBD) (TBD)
Mass Memory (TBD) (TBD)
Archive Memory (TBD) (TBD)
Buildup Data Processor 40 80
Total (TBD)
11.1.2.4.2 Size
The limiting boundaries of IFRUs shall be TBD. There shall be no protrusions
outside the specified boundaries. Maximum volume of the DPA shall be as speci-
fied below.
Maximum Size
Data Processing Assembly (cubic inches)
Data Bus Control Unit TBD
Digital Data Bus IFRU TBD
Remote Acquisition and Control Unit TBD
Central Timing Unit TBD
Central Processor TBD
Buildup Data Processor TBD
11-11
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division9D North American Rockwell
11.2 MULTIPROCESSOR SET SPECIFICATION
11.2.1 SCOPE
This document establishes the requirements for the multiprocessor set
(MPS) of the central processor for the Data Processing Assembly (DPA) of the
Modular Space Station.
11.2.2 REQUIREMENTS
This section establishes the performance and design requirements for
the multiprocessor set. This section also defines and specifies design
constraints and standards necessary to assure compatibility of the multi-
processor set with other subsystems.
11.2.2.1 Item Definition
The multiprocessor set consists of the following:
IFRU Number per Multiprocessor
Operating Memory Unit Set 2
Arithmetic Unit Set 2
Input/Output Unit Set 2
Power Supply Unit 2
11.2.2.1.1 Functional Description
The multiprocessor set performs as the computational and management
center for the DPA system. The Multiprocessor Set shall perform the functions
of computation, data processing, display processing, and multiplex system
control and data transfer.
11.2.2.1.2 Multiprocessor Set (MPS)
The Multiprocessor Set is a high-speed, general-purpose digital multi-
processor whose elements shall consist of Operating Memory Unit (M2) set,
Arithmetic Unit (AU) set, Input/Output Unit (IOU) set and Power Supply Unit
(PSU). The elements shall be configured such that the loss of a single
element shall not cause the loss of the entire MPS. The elements shall also
be configured such that the loss of a single element shall not cause the
loss of any other element of the MPS. The MPS shall be capable of operating
with degraded capability when only one M2, one AU set and one IOU set are
operative. The block diagram of the computer is shown in Figure 11-3.
11.2.2.1.2.1 Multiprocessor Set Configuration
11-12
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11.2.2.1.2.1.1 Initial Configuration. The initial multiprocessor configuration
shall consist of those multiprocessor units required to meet or exceed the
initial multiprocessor sizing requirements.
11.2.2.1.2.1.2 Growth to the Final Configuration. The Final multiprocessor
configuration shall consist of the initial AU and IO sets plus replacement
of larger sized memory units (M2) to meet or exceed the final multiprocessor
sizing requirements. Multiprocessor configuration updating to meet final
multiprocessor configuration shall be accomplished without any modification
to the initial AU and IO sets.
11.2.2.1.2.1.3 Identical Submodels. Each unit of each class shall be identical
with all units within the same classification type.
11.2.2.1.2.2 Modularity. The MPS shall be designed such that the addition and
deletion of M2, AU and IOU sets can be made with the insertion or removal of
the element, its cables, cooling connection, and its power supply.
11.2.2.1.2.3 Arithmetic Unit (AU) Set. The AU set shall contain two AU's and an
output comparator. Each AU shall be independent and contain the arithmetic
and control logic required to perform the computations and digital data
processing. Two dimensional parity checking of AU input data and generation
prior to comparison of AU output data shall be provided. Output comparison
on all address, control, and data lines between the two AU's in a set shall
be made. The AU set shall be capable of initiating and terminating the input-
output operation of any IOU set.
11.2.2.1.2.4 Input/Output Unit (IOU) Set - The IOU set shall contain two IOU's
and an output comparator. Each IOU shall be independent and contain the IO
logic to transfer data between the memory units and the peripheral devices.
Two dimensional parity checking of IOU input data and generation prior to
comparison of IO output data shall be provided. Output comparison on all
address, control and data lines between the two IOU's in a set shall be made.
The IOU set shall be capable, upon initiation command from an AU set, of con-
tinuous data transferral and buffering between the main memory and an input-
output channel. The TOU shall have the capability of controlling at least
four simultaneous IO channels. IO data flow between the IOU set and memory
during simultaneous IO channel operation shall be transferred in parallel words
in an interleaved fashion.
11.2.2.1.2.5 Operating Memory Unit (M2) Set - The M2 set shall contain five
independent plated wire memory modules. A five word data block shall be used
to communicate with the AU and IO sets. Four memory modules shall contain
program and data and the fifth a parity check word for each block. The M2
set shall contain the read-write circuitry, timing, and access control logic.
Error checking using two dimensional parity, address comparison, and write
echo checking shall be provided, Virtual memory capability with a mass memory
and using paging techniques shall be provided.
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11.2.2.1.2.6 Power Supply Unit (PSU) - The power supply unit shall convert the
spacecraft primary ac power to the required secondary ac power. The power
supply unit shall be capable of supplying full power to the MPS. Dual redun-
dant power distribution shall be provided.
11.2.2.2 Interface Definition
11.2.2.2.1 Tolerances
Tolerances shall be as specified herein.
11.2.2.2.2 Electrical Interface
The following requirements for signals, sequences, timing and connections
shall apply.
11.2.2.2.2.1 Interfacing Equipment Requirements. Equipment interface shall be as
specified in Table 11-3.
11.2.2.2.2.2 Interface with Test Equipment. In Flight Replacement Units (IFRU's)
shall be so designed that when removed from the DPA system and tested at the
bench, the total functional test requirement shall be satisfied with GSE and
authorized adapters.
1.2.2.2.2.3 Power Supply Interface. Except as modified herein, the equipment
shall be designed to comply with requirements in the utilization of electric
power and shall provide specified performance when supplied with electric
power of three-phase, four-wire "Y" system, having a nominal voltage of
120/208 and a nominal frequency of 400 cycles per second (Hz). Power con-
sumption shall be less than 400 watts.
11.2.2.2.2.4 Control Panel Interface. The computer shall be capable of connection
to a control panel via the GSE connector, to provide as a minimum the control
capabilities specified herein. These control capabilities shall include the
following:
Mode control
Register access and load
Memory access and load
Monitor while running
11.2,2.3 Special Performance Requirements
11.2.2.3.1 Arithmetic Unit
The Arithmetic Unit shall provide the capability specified in the
following subparagraph.
11.2. 2.3.1.1 Control Section
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11o2.2.3.1.1.1 Mode Selection. The control section shall provide for selection
of the processor state. Two modes shall be provided:
a. Executive mode. An interrupt or executive call shall cause the
I/ AU to enter the executive mode. In this mode the AU shall be
capable of executing privileged instructions which cannot be
/ executed in the normal mode.
/ b. Normal Mode. Programs operating in the normal mode shall be
j restricted to the execution of non-privileged instructions.
If privileged instructions are attempted to be executed in this
mode, an illegal instruction interrupt shall occur.
11.22.23.1.1.2 Microprogramming. AU control shall be provided by means of
microprogramming.
11o2.2.3.1.2 Time Idle Feature. Each AU shall be capable of performing a Time
Idle operation. The operation shall set a value in the timed idle counter.
The AU shall perform no more instructions until a timed idle fault or a time
idle release. The value shall be automatically decremented until it reaches
zero and a time idle fault will be issued. Each AU shall be capable of
issuing a timed idle release which shall release the time idle in all other
AU's. When a timed idle release is received by an AU with its timed idle
counter set, the AU shall proceed to the next instruction and resume normal
instruction sequencing.
11.2.2.3.1.3 AU Failure Notification. Each AU shall be capable of issuing an AU
failure interrupt to the other AU's if it detects an error in its operations.
Each AU shall also contain a fail safe timer which must be reset by the AU
at least once per second. If the timer is not reset in the prescribed time,
an AU failure interrupt shall be issued to all AU's including the AU whose
timer has expired.
11.2.2.3.1.4 Memory Lockout Provision. The MPS shall provide a memory lockout
capability instruction. This capability shall enable each AU Set to have
sole access to a block of data or instruction in memory, The lockout design
shall not depend upon the instruction execution timing of one AU in relation to
another AU. The lockout design shall not require more than one privileged
instruction execution in setting or releasing the lockout.
11.2.2.3.2 Power-Up Sequencing
When power is applied to the MPS:
a. All external signals (discrete and I/O commands) shall be in a
false state. The IOU's shall be in the idle state.
b. The AU's shall be activated via the power-on interrupt. Dupli-
cation of functions by the various AU's can be prevented by the
lockout feature.
11-17
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space Division094 North American Rockwell
The MPS shall be capable of receiving a "Load" signal. When the load signal
is received, the activated AU Set shall operate on a read-only program. The
read-only program shall have sufficient capability to allow the loading of a
program from an external device. Rules a and b above apply to the load pro-
cedure as well as power-on.
11.22.3.3 Operation Speeds
11.2.2.3.3.1 Arithmetic Unit. The MPS shall be configured in the initial systems
with sufficient AU's sych that the total throughput for the MPS shall be a
capability of 1.9 x 100 operations per second. The operations per second shall
be computed as follows:
op/sec = . t
where wi and ti are defined as follows:
ti is the effective
time required to perform wi is weighting factor
each operation below for each operation
1 load .291
2 store .254
3 add/subtract* .125
4 multiply* .083
5 divide* .006
6 AND/OR .032
7 shift (3 bits) .064
8 branch .145
*Floating point
Operation types 1 through 6 include an instruction fetch, a full word operand
fetch, and a full word operation.
11.2.2.3.4 Arithmetic Unit Features
11.2.2.3.4.1 Word Length.. The full word length for processing data shall be
32 bits including the sign bit in the most significant position.
11.2.2.3.4.2 Registers
11.2.2.3.4.2.1 Register File. The AU shall have registers capable of being used
as arithmetic registers (accumulators), temporary storage registers and
index registers. Each register shall be capable of holding a full computer
word.
11.2.2.3.4.2.2 Control Registers. Control registers shall be provided to perform
various control functions.
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11.2. 2.3.4.3 Buffer Memory. A buffer memory (M1) shall provide a fast local
storage for each AU. The buffer shall accept five word block data from the
operating memory and check for parity. The memory size shall be 2K x 32
words. Associative search control and replacement based upon activity shall
be provided.
11.2.2.3.4.4 Timing
11.2.2.3.4.4.1 Clock Accuracy. The accuracy of the computer clock frequency
shall be +200 parts per million total including calibration errors, drift
due to temperature, short term stability and long term (10 hours) stability.
11.2.2.3.4.4.2 Fail-Safe Timer. Each AU shall contain a fail-safe timer which
must be reset by the AU (under program control) at least once per second.
11.2. 2.3.4.4.3 Real-Time Counter. The equipment shall contain the hardware real-
time counter. The counter shall be capable of incrementing or decrementing
itself until it reaches a zero state. Upon reaching the zero state, it shall
be capable of issuing a system interrupt and automatically reinitializing.
The reinitialization value is supplied by the AU and remains constant until
a new value is supplied by the AU. The counter shall be capable of being
sampled by the AU in such a manner that will not interfere with the register
counting function. The resolution of the real-time control shall be equal to
or less than one microsecond. The real-time counter shall be incremented or
decremented by the computer clock with the accuracy stated in 11.2.2.3.4.4.1.
The real-time counter shall be capable of holding a value of one second.
11.2.2.3.4.5 Interrupts. A minimum of TBD program interrupts shall be provided.
Each interrupt causes the arithmetic unit to take its next instruction from
a dedicated memory location associated with the interrupts. Memory addresses
that specify the dedicated location shall be permanently assigned. The
interrupts if honored shall be taken upon completion of instructions.
a. Each of the interrupts is individually maskable unless required
not to be masked by this specification. Masked interrupts remain
pending until unmasked and taken. The unmasking operation shall
be structured such that the equipment is capable of handling
multiple interrupts without the loss of return address linkages;
i.e., an interrupt shall not be taken until the instruction
following the unmasking instruction is executed.
b. The interrupt commands shall be capable of being configured in a
priority structure. The power-on interrupt shall have the highest
priority. A higher priority interrupt shall not be inhibited
while a lower priority interrupt is being honored. When an inter-
rupt request is honored, it shall be automatically reset. The
honored interrupt and all lower or equal priority interrupts shall
be automatically masked. They will remain masked until they are
unmasked by an unmasking instruction and then a lower priority
unmasked pending interrupt shall be honored.
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11.2.2.3.4.6 Addressing. The memory accessing instructions shall be capable of
addressing all the memory. Capability to address a total of 32,768 full
words shall be provided by either direct addressing or base addressing.
Capability to address a total of 1,460K full words shall be provided by
indirect addressing, paging, or other means.
11.2.2.3.4.6.1 Indexing. The memory accessing instructions shall be indexable.
The use of indexing shall not increase the instruction execution time.
11.2. 2.3.4.6.2 Indirect Addressing. The memory accessing instructions shall be
capable of indirect addressing and/or indexing. The use of indirect address
may increase the instruction execution time by one memory cycle per level of
indirect addressing.
11.2. 2.3.4.7 Instruction Repertoire. The AU shall have a flexible repertoire
of instructions. The repertoire shall include the capability for half word,
full word floating point arithmetic and fast shift matrix instructions,
and a privileged instruction set.
11.2. 2.3.5 Operating Memory
11.2. 2.3.5.1 Memory Data Protection. The contents of memory shall not be altered
because of any conditions of abnormal electric system operation, or due to
power supply malfunction, or due to any nominal space station environmental
condition.
11.2. 2.3.5.2 Memory Word Size. The full word length in memory shall be a minimum
of 32 data bits and 1 parity bit.
11.2. 2.3.5.3 Memory Organization. The 3 port operating memory shall be organized
in 5 equal memory modules. The five word data block shall be placed into these
in an interleaved fashion.
11.2. 2.3.5.4 Memory Capacity. The MPS shall be initially configured utilizing two
operating memory sets so as to provide a total memory capacity of 128K-33 data
bit words. The MPS memory capacity shall also be capable of being expanded to
181K-33 data bit words through the replacement of memory modules.
11.2. 2.3.5.5 Memory Speed. The effective memory cycle time of each memory module
shall be equal to 1.0 microseconds. An operating memory set shall have an
effective cycle time of 200 nanoseconds.
11.2. 2.3.5.6 Error Detection. Error detection shall be accomplished by
1) One parity bit per word
2) One vertical parity word per block exclusive ORed with the physical
block address
3) Echo checks on all write operations
Upon occurrence of an error an interrupt shall be issued to the AU's.
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11.2.2.3.5.7 Memory Control
11.2.2.3.5.7.1 Memory Access Priority. The memory shall have the capability of
being accessed for read or write operations via individual and separate
access ports for each user unit in the MPS. Memory access requests from I/O
shall be honored first, but no one register shall be allowed to monopolize
the memory module.
11.2.2.3.5.7.2 Memory Loading and Readout. The memory module shall have the
capability to read out the memory and to fill the memory from an external
source via the GSE connector as defined below and in Section 11.2.2.2.2.4.
11.2,2.3.5.7.2.1 GSE Loading and Readout. The memory load and readout shall be
accomplished by means of a GSE connector and shall be independent of the
initial contents of memory. The data transfer to and from any memory location
shall be in word form.
11.2. 2.3.5.7.3 Mass Memory. The memory shall provide the control algorithms to
transfer data to and from the mass memory via the input out on a page basis.
11.2. 2.3.5.8 Memory Modularity. The memory shall be of modular design such that
all units can be accessed simultaneously. Each module shall contain address
and data registers. The minimum size shall be 13K full words, maximum 18K.
11.2. 2.3.6 Input/Output Unit Set
The Input/Output Unit Set shall provide the capability for communication
with external devices.
11.2. 2.3.6.1 Input/Output Processors. Each of the two IO processors in a set
shall be duplexed into a comparator to check the results of identical
processing. These IO processors shall behave similarly to the AU processors
with regards to error response and memory interfacing. Each IO processor
shall contain a local buffer and use microprogramming control.
11.2.2.o3.62 Data Acquisition System (DACS) Channel. An IOU set shall be capable
of communication with a Data Bus Control Unit (DBCU) on a full word parallel
channel. Transfer of data on this channel shall be under control of the IOU
using request/acknowledge control signals. This channel shall be capable of
transmitting a minimum of 10 x 106 bits per second. External subsystems and
assemblies including the computer support set of a mass memory, archive
memory, digital printer and control console shall be connected to this IO
channel via the remote access and control units, digital data bus, and DBCU.
11.2. 2.3.6.3 Telemetry/Command (TM/CMD) Channel. The IOU set shall be capable of
communication with the telemetry and command equipment on a bit serial channel
at a rate of a minimum of 2.0 x 106 bits per second.
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11.2.2.3.6.4 Mass Memory Channel. The IOU set shall be capable of communication
with the Mass Memory on a full word parallel channel. Transfer of data on
this channel shall be under control of the IOU using request/acknowledge
control signals.
11.2.2.3.6.5 Multiple Channel ODeration. The IOU shall be capable of transferring all buf-
fered data on the Data Acquisition System, TM/CMD, OM and MM channels concurrently.
11.2.2.3.6.6 Signal Interface Requirements. Cable lengths for IOU to external
assemblies shall be a maximum of 15 feet.
11.2.2.3.7 Internal Data Bus
11.2. 2.3.7.1 Structure. The internal data bus shall consist of dedicated 33 bits
plus tbd control lines for each AU set and IO set to interconnect to the
3 ports in each operating memory.
11.2. 2.3.7.2 Bit Rate. The maximum bit rate per wire shall be 5 mbps.
11.2. 2.4 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
11.2. 2.4.1 Weight
The equipment weight and the equipment IFRU are specified below. The
equipment weight shall not exceed the total value specified.
Weight (lbs)
MPS including:
2 AU's = 20.0
2 IOU's = 20.0
2 OMU's = 250.0
Including interunit
cabling & power supplies
TOTAL 290.0
11.2. 2.4.2 Size
The limiting boundaries of IFRU's shall be TBD. There shall be no
protrusions outside the specified boundaries. Maximum volume shall be
6 cubic feet.
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11.3 MASS MEMORY SPECIFICATION
11.3.1 SCOPE
This document establishes the requirements for the Mass Memory for the
Data Processing Assembly (DPA) of the modular space station.
11.3.2 REQUIREMENTS
This section establishes the performance and design requirements for
the Mass Memory.
11.3.2.1 Item Definition
The Mass Memory consists of plated wire memory modules. A memory
module is 64K 33-bit words. The initial Mass Memory shall consist of
14 memory modules. Growth to the final configuration of 20 memory modules
shall be by inserting modules without any modification to the initial
configuration.
11.3.2.1.1 Functional Description
The Mass Memory provides the data and program storage for the
multiprocessor set of the DPA.
11.3.2.1.2 Interface Definition
The signal interface between each of the computer's IOs and the Mass
Memory consists of a program controlled parallel data channel. In addition
to the data channel, automatic load control and error indicating signals are
required. The Mass Memory shall also interface with the Digital Data Bus
through a Remote Acquisition and Control Unit.
11.3.2.2 Performance Requirements
11.3.2.2.1 Memory Data Protection
The contents of memory shall not be altered because of any condition of
abnormal electric system operation or due to power supply malfunction or due
to any normal space station environmental condition.
11.3.2.2.2 Memory Word Size
The full word length shall be a minimum of 32 data bits and one parity
bit.
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11.3.2.2.3 Memory Capacity
The Mass Memory shall be configured using multiple memory units so as
to provide a final memory capacity of 1280 33-bit words. Memory units shall
be 64K x 33 bit sizes.
11.3.2.2.4 Memory Speed
The effective memory cycle time shall be less than or equal to 10 pseconds.
11.3.2.2.5 Error Detection
11.3.2.2.5.1 Parity and Address Check. Each data word into/out of the Mass Memory
shall be checked for/provided with its parity bit. Each block of four words
shall have a check word corresponding to the Exclusive OR of the vertical
parity derived from the data and the physical block address and be checked on
a data transfer.
11.3.2.2.5.2 Echo Checking for Write Operations. Upon storing a block of data,
the block shall be read and verified for correct parity.
11.3.2.2.6 Power Requirements
The Mass Memory shall perform as described herein when supplied 115v
400 cps and shall not consume more than tbd watts.
11.3.2.2.7 Physical Characteristics
11.3.2.2.7.1 Weight. The weight of the Mass Memory shall not exceed tbd pounds.
11.3.2.2.7.2 Size. The volume of the Mass Memory shall be less than tbd cubic feet.
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11.4 ARCHIVE MEMORY SPECIFICATION
11.4.1 SCOPE
This document establishes the requirements for the Archive Memory for
the Data Processing Assembly (DPA) of the modular space station.
11.4. 2 REQUIREMENTS
This section establishes the performance and design requirements
for the Archive Memory.
2.1 Item Definition
The equipment is a spaceborne, read and write remote control, cartridge-
canister loaded tape storage device.
11.4. 2.1.1 Functional Description
The digital tape storage device provides the storage for data and bulk
program storage.
11.4. 2.1.2 Interface Definition
The signal interface between the computer's IOs and the Archive Memory
is provided via the Digital Data Bus using a Remote Acquisition Unit.
In addition to the data automatic load control and error indicating signals
are interchanged.
11.4. 2.2 Performance Requirements
11.4. 2.2.1 Tape Buffer and Control Logic
The tape buffer and control logic shall provide the necessary data buffer-
ing, data transfer control and transport control. Functions and modes of
operation possible shall be
Read block of data
Write block of data
Skip a block forward
Skip a block backward
Rewind
Indicate start point
Indicate end point
11-25
SD 72-SA-0114-4
a| Space Division
North American Rockwell
11.4.2.2.2 Tape Transport
The Tape Transport shall have the following capability
Capacity: .5xlO bits/cartridge
Tape start: <25 msec
Tape stop: <50 msec
Inter record gap: <4 inches
Read speed: -120 inches/second
Bit density: >800 bits/track inch
Data rate: _40K bits/second
Read operations shall be nondestructive. Tape cartridges shall be
removed without use of special tools.
11.4.2.2.3 Power Requirements
The Archive Memory shall perform as described herein when supplied
115v 400 cps and consume not more than 45 watts.
11.4.2.2.4 Physical Characteristics
110 4.2.2.4 .1 Weight. The weight of the Archive Memory shall not exceed
40 pounds.
11.4.2.2.4.2 Size. The volume of the Archive Memory shall be less than
1200 cubic inches.
11-26
SD 72-SA-0114-4
Space DivisionVA% North American Rockwell
11.5 PREPROCESSOR SPECIFICATIONS
11.5.1 SCOPE
This document establishes the requirements for the Preprocessor for the
Data Processing Assembly (DPA) of the Modular Space Station (MSS).
11.5.2 REQUIREMENTS
11.5.2.1 Item Definition
The equipment is a general purpose, stored program, parallel, binary
computer.
11.5.2.1.1 Item Diagrams
The functional block diagram of the computer is shown in Figure 11-4.
11.5.2.1.1.1 Functional Description. The computer shall be capable of performing
the computational and data processing tasks required of the preprocessor for
the DPA application. It shall interface with all necessary equipment and
internal devices in order to provide the operational capability required.
11.5.2.1.1.2 Computer Organization. The computer is functionally organized into
the following major assemblies.
11.5.2.1.1.2.1 Arithmetic Unit. The Arithmetic Unit (AU) shall be capable of
performing logical and arithmetic operations with 16 or 32 bit instruction
words. The instruction set shall provide for single and double word
addressing, indexing and indirect addressing.
11.5.2.1.1.2.1.1 Data Format. Capability shall be provided for fixed point
operation with either data word lengths of 16 or 32 bits, including sign.
11.5.2.1.1.2.1.2 Registers. The AU shall contain sufficient registers to perform
the instruction and data fetching and processing operations.
11.5.2.1.1.2.2 Input/Output. The I/O section shall provide for the control of
communications between external, internal, or the multiplexing function and
the AU or memory section. The I/O shall provide capability to communicate
with external peripherals, over a fully buffered parallel I/O channel. (TBD)
program interrupts shall be provided.
11.5.2.1.1.2.2.1 Peripheral Channel.
11.5.2.1.1.2.2.1.1 Input Channel Characteristics. Sixteen data input lines shall
be provided for the peripheral channel input bus.
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11.5. 2.1.1.2.2.1.2 Output Channel Characteristics. Sixteen data output lines
shall be provided for the data output bus.
11.5. 2.1.1.2.2.1.3 Addressing and Control. Six address lines and an initiate
signal shall be provided for peripheral address and control.
11.5. 2.1.1.2.2.2 Program Interrupt Channels. (TBD) external program interrupts
shall be provided.
A hardware priority shall be provided to resolve simultaneous requests.
Each channel shall have a dedicated location in memory associated with it.
When a request is to be honored, service to the other channels shall be
automatically suspended. The suspension shall remain in effect until an
instruction is executed to resume normal operations.
The program interrupt interface shall be fully buffered and shall
include an execution acknowledge signal for each interrupt channel.
11.5. 2.1.1.2.3 Memory Section. The memory system shall be a 20,488 word,(minimum requirement)
17-bit plated wire NDRO memory. Capability shall be provided for coupling
to additional memory units for expansion to TBD words in 8K word increments.
One memory bit shall be provided for parity checking. An internal interrupt
shall be executed upon detection of a parity error.
11.5.2.1.2 Interface Definition
11.5.2.1.2.1 Electrical Interfaces. The computer will interface with other
equipments of the MSS equipment in accordance with TBD.
11.5.2.2 Characteristics
11.5.2.2.1 Performance
The equipment shall provide satisfactory performance of all the functions
specified herein when subjected to the environments or any combination thereof
of the Space Station. Satisfactory performance is the performance of a function
within its upper and lower limits as specified with the respective functional
parameters.
11.5.2.2.1.1 Arithmetic Unit. The Arithmetic Unit performance characteristics are
summarized in Table 11-4.
11.5.2.2.1.2 Memory Section. The Memory Section shall include the following
features.
8,192 words of 17 bits
650 nanosec access time
1 rsec cycle time
Random access
Nondestructive readout
Nonvolatile
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Table 11-4. Preprocessor Performance Characteristics
Stored program, parallel general purpose
digital computer
Number System
Organization
Data Word Length
Instruction Word Length
Memory Addressing
Memory Speed
Basic Clock Rate
Register Complement
Instruction Repertoire
Binary, fixed point, two's complement
Conventional
16 bits, including sign
16 bits or 32 bits
65,536 words directly addressable - displace-
ment addressing also provided
1 psec cycle time; 650 n sec access time
1 MHz
Accumulator - 16 bits
Lower accumulator - 16 bits
Program counter - 16 bits
General register file - 7 registers, each
16 bits in length
indexing
- displacement addressing
- temporary storage
- all are addressable
Arithmetic status register
Instructions of three types exclusive of
interrupt and I/O commands
1. Single word addressing
2. Double word addressing
3. Single word nonaddressing
- Indexing
- Indirect addressing
- Typical execution times
Add: 4.0 psec
Multiply: 20.0 Vpsec
Divide: 40.0 psec
SD 72-SA-0114-4
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11.5.2.2.1.3 Input-Output (I/O). The I/O section performance characteristics
are summarized in Table 11-5.
Table 11-5. Input-Output Performance Characteristics
-11.5.2.2.1.4 Power Requirements
11.5.2.2.1.4.1 Power Levels. The computer shall perform as described herein
when supplied with 115 volts 400 cps and consume not more than 50 watts.
11.5.2.2.2 Physical Characteristics
11.5.2.2.2.1 Weight. The weight of the computer shall not exceed 15 pounds.
11.5.2.2.2.2 Size. The size of the computer shall not
of TBD inches in length, TBD inches in height, and
Maximum volume shall be 400 cubic inches.
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TBD inches in depth.
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Interrupts
- (TBD) interrupts
- (TBD) priority levels, uniquely or collectively
maskable
- Interrupt suspension capability
Internal
- (TBD) interrupts
1 buffered 16-bit parallel input/output channel capable
of communication with peripheral devices
Word rate - 80,000 words/sec max.
External
I/O Channels
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12. DMS PROCESSOR EEM DEVELOPMENT PLAN
12.1 INTRODUCTION
This development and test plan for the DMS EEM processor presents the
schedule and identifies the major tasks. This plan is consistent with and
requires inputs and support from the space station information management
system (IMS) advanced development technology (ADT) program described in
SD 71-240, Information Management Advanced Development Technology Extension
Study Plan, North American Rockwell, Space Division, October 1, 1971, and
summaried in the next section.
The ADT program is structured to include hardware and software studies
leading to specifications and breadboard equipment for investigating key
aspects of a spacecraft data handling system. These studies are necessary
to support the procurement of the EEM processor. The breadboards and software
defined in the ADT are required to enable concept evaluation and IMS integration
testing.
12.2 ADT MASTER PROGRAM PLAN
The end objective of the IMS advanced development activities is to
establish an integrated data management system test bed, whereby the
functional and performance characteristics proposed for the MSS information
subsystem can be evaluated. The target date for the availability of the DMS
test bed IOC at MSC is 1974; with an anticipated MSS launch date of 1983,
several years of DMS operation is possible. In this way the evaluation of
the validity of design characteristics by means of a low-cost test bed can
reduce the total development cost considerably. Furthermore, the test bed,
by its use, requires software; software is the most expensive procurement of
this subsystem, outweighing all hardware procurement costs. By spreading
the software development over 10 years, not only will the spending rate be
less, but the total cost will be less. Software costs are high because
software must be completed in a short time and is constrained by hardware
limitations, and verification and maintenance documentation is necessary.
These factors which are present in such programs as Apollo and F-lll can be
reduced by an order of magnitude in rate by spreading the time, defining the
hardware as a result of software needs, and approaching software development
in a breadboard to the same level of documentation that hardware breadboards
utilize.
The IMS advanced development master plan is illustrated in Figure 12-1,
extracted from NASA planning data. The 1971 IMS advanced development task
provided the parts to the left of the boundary on the figure.
The near-goal (1974) objective would be to assemble a prototype data man-
agement systemi to be used to develop automated subsystem's operations, orbiter
payload interface requirements and payload data management operations. Figure
12-2 relates the present ADT BB equipments to this objective by a series of
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tasks. Figure 12-3 illustrates how these ADT extension (ADTX) tasks contribute
to the definition and procurement schedule of an engineering evaluation model
(EEM) of the DMS multiprocessor. The six ADTX study areas are:
TASK A - OPERATIONS CONSOLE BREADBOARD
The contractor shall develop a preliminary system specification for an
operations console representative of the concept defined for the space station,
develop and conduct evaluation tests, develop the software for display generation
and control activation, integrate the console with the DACS breadboard, and
develop processor software to control and checkout the console.
TASK B - DACS EXTENSION
The DACS extension tasks will take advantage of the DACS breadboards as
a development tool. A test and analysis program will be developed around
the DACS breadboard alone; also, the DACS breadboard will be used in combination
with other breadboards such as the operations console breadboard, the ECLSS
breadboard, along with the other breadboards, will be integrated into a
subsystem operations breadboard and used in on-board checkout and automatic
control evaluations.
TASK C - SOFTWARE EXTENSION
The software extension task has several purposes that include: define
a philosophy for control and OBCO for each subsystem, and develop algorithms
for each subsystem; develop and investigate the use of higher order languages
for real-time programming applications; and develop the actual software programs
to operate and evaluate several breadboard subsystems.
TASK D - DATA PROCESSING ASSEMBLY EXTENSION
The purpose of the data processing assembly (DPA) extension task is to
continue definition of the DPA with a primary emphasis on the central multi-
processor. This will be accomplished by both analytical studies to reach a
DPA mechanization and simulation/evaluation of those mechanizations using
IMSIM models. This task culminates in the specification of an engineering
evaluation model (EEM) processor that will be used in conjunction with other
breadboard subsystems to evaluate the DPA operational concepts.
TASK E-- COMMUNICATIONS TERMINAL BREADBOARD EXTENSION
The basic objectives of these tasks is to identify technical guidelines
for the MSS communications system development and the functional requirements
for this system. This will be provided by a series of integrated tasks that
analyze requirements and techniques, develop breadboard hardware, develop
evaluation and test plans, and test and evaluate specific portions of the
communication system. These tasks will be followed by the evaluation and
test plan and the test of an integrated overall MSS communications system.
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TASK F - MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE
The man-machine interface task is intended to accomplish four
objectives: (1) define an interactive query language (IOL), which will
allow a crew member of optimally communicate with the DPA and requires
minimum training or effort; (2) define the display formats that yields
optimum machine to man communications; (3) develop a general set of crew
procedures that will be used to accomplish various functions that require a
combined effort between the DPA and a crew member; and (4) define the DPA
software algorithms/logic required to implement the selected IOL and display
formats.
12.3 EEM PROCESSOR PLAN
A development program consisting of three phases will provide the EEM
processor. Further, dependent upon the level of available funding, various
types of processor/breadboards may be procured.
Three possible breadboard processors are:
a. Simplex Model - 1 AU set; 1 IO set; 1 OM set and usable with
the existing DACS breadboard
b. Multiprocessor Model - 2 AU sets; 2 10 sets; 2 OM sets and
usable with the expanded DACS breadboard
c. Dual MP Model - Duplicate processors each consisting of
2 AU sets; 2 IO sets; 2 OM sets
The three phases and estimated durations are as follows:
Phase I: Requirements Analysis - 10 months
Phase II: Procurement
Simplex Model - 12 months
Multiprocessor Model - 15 months
Dual MP Model - 18 months
Phase III: Testing
Simplex Model - 8 months (Acceptance)
Multiprocessor Model - 10 months
Dual MP Model - 12 months
Figure 12-3 shows the major milestones of the ADT extension study which
will provide detailed definition of the central processor requirements and
of the EEM processor requirements. This figure shows a requirement of 21
months to define the requirements and perform the EEM processor design analysis.
This period would be followed by procurement and testing of the EEM processor -
requiring between 20 and 30 months depending on the option chosen.
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Figure 12-4 and the following pages describe the major tasks involved
in development of the EEM processor.
TASK 1 - REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
The major tasks which can be defined directly relating to the definiton
of the specifications required for procuring the EEM processor are performed
during this task. The subtasks are:
ADTX-SUBTASK D1 - EEM MULTIPROCESSOR SUPERVISORY SPECIFICATION
Using the DPA Supervisory Specification previously developed (WBS 85710-2),
update and modify this specification to reflect the requirements based upon
further evaluation of the DPA configuration. Develop the specification in
more detail to cover the requirements unique to the DPA, such as fault detection
and reconfiguration. Identify supervisory requirements for the EEM, and prepare
a program specification for the EEM executive program.
ADTX-SUBTASK D9 - EEM MULTIPROCESSOR PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION
Prepare a procurement specification, statement of work, and request for
proposal for the EEM multiprocessor. This task is the logical extension
WBS 85710-4. It will consolidate the results and recommendations of other
tasks of the DPA extension phase into one final document. The performance
specifications of the EEM developed under WBS 85710-4 will be developed in
more detail to include the internal bus characteristics, functional operation
of the memories, control logic, and all system interfaces.
SUBTASK - TEST PLANS
Develop test plans and specifications which include methods of testing
and describes test equipment for the evaluation of elements of the processor,
the complete processor and the processor when integrated in the DMS.
TASK 2 - EEM PROCESSOR PROCUREMENT
The specification prepared shall be used to obtain a processor for use
in the DMS.
The contractor will perform the necessary logic design for the arithmetic,
operating memory, and input/output units. The suitable technology shall be
selected and the necessary subsystem electronics designed to ensure providing
the required performance. Power supplies shall be designed according to the
needs.
The necessary hardware fabrication and assembly shall be performed to
provide a breadboard system built to best commercial practices.
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TASK 3 - SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT
The contractor will develop the software programs required to operate and
self-test the processor. This shall include support software such as an
assembler and program loader in addition to the executive and selected bread-
board applications program according to specifications prepared by ADTX tasks.
TASK 4 - ACCEPTANCE TEST
The EEM processor's capability shall be demonstrated according to the
specification and acceptance test plan to the designated NASA representatives
at the contractor's facility prior to delivery.
The elements of the processor shall be tested individually and when
integrated as a computer. The test data shall be collected and analyzed with
respect to performance required by the specification. Tests shall be conducted
according to the test plans. Developed software shall be tested and validated.
The acceptance tests shall verify the processor performance, design
characteristics, construction, and operability. Methods of verification shall
include inspection of hardware, review and acceptance of analytical data,
demonstrations, tests, and review of test data.
The actions and tests to support the design and development shall be
accomplished through, but not limited to, the following:
1. Inspection
Workmanship
Documentation
2. Analyses
Electrical Interface
Personnel Safety
Maintainability
3. Demonstrations
Interface Compatability
Failure Detection
4. Tests
Power Interface and Interrupts
AU, IO, and Operating Memory characteristics as delineated
in the EEM Processor Specification
Control Panel
Support Software
Failure Response including Fail-Safe
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TASK 5 - CONCEPT EVALUATION TESTS
The concept evaluation tests shall permit the key features of the
EEM multiprocessor to be investigated. These shall include the following:
1. Error Detection
Comparator usage
Two dimensional parity
Write echo
Memory protect
M2 organization
2. Cache Memory
3. Memory Management with Use of Paging
4. Multiprocessing
5. Reconfigurability
In addition to checking these features shown, the breadboard processor
can provide control and testing of the DMS. The following items can be
investigated:
1. Performance
a. Operability with the DACS and other breadboards
b. Transient response in buildup, power up/down, and
reconfiguration
c. Throughput as to the affect of message structures,
processing overhead, delays, queuing, etc.
2. Failure Tolerance
a. Redundance with regard to effectiveness
b. Error detection and reconfiguration capabilities
3. Application
a. Expandability of concepts and flexibility to changes
b. Executive functions of scheduling, control and resource
allocation
c. Support and operational software requirements and
implementation
12-14
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TASK 6 - INTEGRATION TESTS
The processor shall be integrated in the DMS at NASA-Houston and a series
of integration tests utilizing the Integration Test Plan and Specification
and software developed during Phase I and ADTX, respectively.
The processor, in conjunction with the other DMS elements, is intended
to demonstrate the following technology goals:
Failure detection and isolation abilities and techniques
of a spacecraft data handling system
Traffic control methods
Aspects of various allocations of operational functions
Performance of elements of a data acquisition and
control system
The integration tests for the EEM processor can be classified as follows:
1. Hardware Interface Verification - these tests shall verify
the capability of the processor to be utilized with the
DMS hardware
2. Hardware - Software Compatibility - the ability of the EEM
processor to control and operate the DMS shall be thus
demonstrated
3. Functional Performance Verification - these tests shall
constitute the DMS integration tests and demonstrate the
ability of the processor to perform the above goals. Some
analysis of the data acquired may be necessary to support
the verification
12.4 SCHEDULING OPTIONS
Figure 12-3 showed the time requirements associated with procuring
and testing (1) a simplex model, (2) a multiprocessor model or (3) a dual
multiprocessor model. In any event, it will be necessary to procure and
evaluate a dual multiprocessor model prior to the procurement of the MSS
central processors. There are a number of ways to accomplish this goal
ranging all the way from sequential procurement of sufficiently many simplex
models to all-out procurement of a dual multiprocessor in one effort.
To illustrate some of the effects of these possible procurement plans,
we begin by assuming:
1. MSS IOC at the end of 1984
2. 18 months for MSS subsystems integration
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3. 6 months for flight article dual multiprocessor
acceptance and qualification testing
4. 18 months for procurement of the MSS flight article
dual multiprocessor
5. At least 12 months of evaluation testing with the EEM
dual multiprocessor prior to procurement of the flight
article dual multiprocessor
Based on these, we can schedule IOC of the EEM dual multiprocessor for
mid-1980. These assumptions and three procurement options are illustrated
in Figure 12-5.
The first option represents sequential procurement of two simplex models
(together forming a multiprocessor) followed by procurement of a second
multiprocessor. This option will require the initiation of the requirements
definition at the beginning of 1974. This option may also be characterized
as having the least risk and by having the lowest peak of funding spread
over 7.5 years.
The second option represents sequential procurement of two multiprocessors.
Initiation of requirements definition could be delayed a year to the beginning
of 1975, but this option would require higher funding peaks and higher risk.
The third option represents procurement of a dual multiprocessor saving
another 15 months but requiring the highest funding peak and the highest risk
of all the options.
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